Martin Teplitsky

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their actions challenging the validity of their mother's wills and inter vivos transfers of land to the respondent.

The appellants alleged undue influence and fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly use the expanded fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge made conclusory determinations on highly contested facts without conducting a necessary credibility analysis, particularly regarding allegedly fraudulent invoices used to justify the property transfers.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter directed to trial.

In a business dispute arising from a hotel development venture, the appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing all personal claims against an individual corporate principal while related claims against the corporation continued.

The Court of Appeal held that, under the post-Hryniak summary judgment framework, it was in the interest of justice to finally determine the individual's personal liability and that appellate deference was owed absent material error.

The court found that any factual errors by the motion judge were immaterial, upheld the conclusion that there was no evidence of a personal fiduciary duty, and agreed that the letter of intent was not shown to be a trust asset.

On the findings, the individual acted in good faith and in the corporation's best interests, so the personal tort claims failed and the fresh evidence motion was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged an order arising from misleading comparative advertising directed at the respondent's water heater and rental services business.

The Court of Appeal upheld findings of liability under ss. 7(a) and 22(1) of the Trade-marks Act and rejected the argument that damages had not been proven, holding that unchallenged affidavit evidence and evidence of unusual contract cancellations supported a prima facie case.

The court also upheld liability under s. 52(1) of the Competition Act, finding that the motion judge's conclusion that the brochure was directed at misleading consumers implicitly established the required mental element of knowledge or recklessness.

A separate appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The defendant director brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims against him personally in a commercial dispute arising from a proposed hotel development joint venture.

The plaintiff alleged the director breached fiduciary duties and induced breach of contract and trust after removing the plaintiff from negotiations with a municipal authority.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding the director’s personal liability.

Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to third-party stakeholders, and the plaintiff failed to establish a fiduciary relationship or any trust asset arising from the letter of intent.

The court further held that the director’s actions were taken bona fide on behalf of the corporation and were protected by the Said v. Butt principle.

The appellant leased a water heater from the respondent.

The respondent proposed an amendment to the rental agreement requiring customers to deal directly with the respondent to terminate the agreement, rather than using an agent.

The appellant sought a declaration that the amendment was invalid under the Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendment did not comply with the Regulation because the right to terminate was not unconditional.

However, the Court upheld the application judge's decision to invoke s. 93(2) of the Act, binding the appellant to the amendment, as the application was brought for a collateral purpose to benefit a competitor and no consumer was prejudiced.

The mother, residing in Ontario, applied under the Family Law Act to vary a child support agreement made with the father, who resided in the United States.

The application judge varied the agreement, but the appeal judge set aside the order, finding the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act provided a complete code for such proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal, holding that the agreement was a domestic contract under the Family Law Act, the Ontario court had jurisdiction, and the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act provides an alternative process rather than displacing the Family Law Act.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breaching a commercial lease agreement.

The trial judge had concluded that the parties reached a binding agreement on a final form of lease that differed significantly from their initial Offer to Lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a palpable and overriding error because the documentary record showed ongoing disagreement over significant substantive terms.

Since the landlord insisted on a lease form containing terms the tenant had not agreed to, the tenant did not breach the agreement by refusing to sign it.

The appellant sought to examine a non-party expert witness residing in British Columbia prior to an application hearing, but the motion judge dismissed the request for an interprovincial summons.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order finally disposing of an issue between a party and a non-party is a final order.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the expert's evidence was not necessary for the due adjudication of the proceeding under the Interprovincial Summonses Act.

The appellant, an Ontario corporation, sought to enjoin an Israeli bank from drawing upon a letter of credit issued by a Canadian bank in Ontario.

The motion judge stayed the action, finding that Israel was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while Ontario had jurisdiction, the motion judge did not err in concluding that Israel was the more convenient forum given that the majority of witnesses and evidence were located there, and the factual matters in dispute arose in Israel.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their claim of economic duress and effectively dismissing their entire action against the respondent banks.

The motion judge had found that past dealings between the parties could not constitute economic duress to vitiate a restructuring agreement and release.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the 'plain and obvious' test for striking pleadings under Rule 21.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that a claim of economic duress based on past dealings would inevitably fail, and ordered the appellants to file a new, focused statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The court considered written submissions and ordered the appellant to pay costs to the respondent, Domtar Inc., fixed at $13,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements.

Orlando Corporation appealed the trial judge's disposition of costs following a construction negligence trial where damages were reduced by 90% due to contributory negligence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by combining two separate offers to settle under Rule 49.10 and by failing to reduce the respondent's costs despite its expert witness misleading the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to depart from the strict application of Rule 49.10 to avoid an unfair result, and appropriately balanced the witness's conduct against the appellant's minimal success at trial.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining the scope of a guarantee and resulting damages on an application under Rule 14.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a factual dispute regarding the guarantee's scope and an insufficient factual basis to determine damages.

The court set aside the judgment and directed the trial of an issue on the alleged breach of the guarantee and resulting damages.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $50,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The plaintiff appealed a trial judgment apportioning 90% of the fault to it for corrosion damage to the steel roofs of two of its warehouse buildings.

The trial judge found the plaintiff negligent for failing to install a vapour barrier, which allowed condensation to cause the corrosion, and the defendant 10% at fault for failing to warn that its phenolic foam insulation contained corrosive acids that could accelerate the damage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff's failure to consider the permeability of the insulation and foresee the risk of moisture damage constituted contributory negligence.

The defendant's cross-appeal regarding its duty to warn was also dismissed.

The appellant developer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase development lands for over $45 million.

The appellant argued that the respondents' negotiators had actual or ostensible authority to conclude the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of actual authority and no representations by the principals to support a finding of ostensible authority.

The respondent sought costs following an appeal.

The appellant argued that the time claimed by the respondent for preparation was excessive.

The Court of Appeal agreed in part with the appellant's submissions and fixed the costs payable to the respondent at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellants appealed the assessment of a court-appointed receiver's fees and disbursements, including those of its solicitors.

They argued the motion judge exhibited bias, erred in precluding cross-examination of the receiver, and erred in finding the fees fair and reasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

While the court noted that a receiver's accounts should ideally be verified by affidavit to allow for cross-examination, it held that the questioning permitted by the motion judge was an adequate substitute in this case.

The court upheld the receiver's fees but allowed the appeal in part, remitting the solicitors' accounts for reassessment because the motion judge failed to give them separate consideration.

The cross-appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of contract regarding the sale of a tavern.

The cross-appellant argued that the respondent acted as a self-appointed agent, breached a fiduciary duty, and that the contract was unenforceable due to the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that the respondent acted on his own behalf with authority, owed no fiduciary duty as there was no agreement to relinquish self-interest, and that the contract did not involve any illegal or immoral act defrauding a third party.

The respondent lost its major customer due to a bribery scheme orchestrated by a consultant hired by the appellant, a rival supplier.

The respondent sued the appellant, arguing it was vicariously liable for the consultant's tortious conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not vicariously liable because the consultant was an independent contractor, not an employee, based on a holistic assessment of the relationship.

The Court also held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to reopen the trial to admit fresh evidence from the consultant.