Martin Teplitsky

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.

Commercial appeal arising from a bribery scheme that diverted a longstanding supply contract from the plaintiff to the corporate respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the consultant and his company, although described by contract as independent contractors, functioned as integrated members of the corporate respondents' sales organization and therefore attracted vicarious liability under the organization test.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial after post-judgment affidavit evidence from the consultant implicated the principal officer in the bribery scheme, as the evidence was apparently credible and could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained earlier.

Judgment was granted against the corporate respondents for compensatory damages and prejudgment interest, punitive damages were not extended vicariously, and a new trial was ordered on the officer's personal liability.

The respondent dentists participated in an advertising campaign and were charged with professional misconduct under a regulation restricting dental advertising.

They challenged the constitutionality of the regulation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the regulation infringed the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it prohibited legitimate forms of commercial expression and purposefully limited content.

The Court further held that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter because the absolute prohibition on all advertising, subject only to narrow exceptions, was overly broad and disproportionate to the objective of maintaining professionalism and preventing misleading advertising.

The appeal was dismissed and the regulation was struck down.