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Motion to strike generic drug manufacturer's claims for damages, unjust enrichment, and Trade-marks Act violations dismissed.
The defendants moved to strike parts of the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought damages for the delay in marketing its generic drug caused by the defendants' actions under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.
The plaintiff claimed damages under s. 8 of the Regulations, unjust enrichment, and the Trade-marks Act after the defendants' patent was declared invalid.
The court dismissed the motion to strike these claims, finding they had a reasonable prospect of success and raised unsettled legal questions, but struck a bald claim for remedies 'otherwise available at law'.
Allegations of systemic discrimination may be pleaded to support a claim for constructive dismissal.
The appellant, a woman of colour, sued her former employer for constructive dismissal, alleging racial discrimination.
The motions judge struck paragraphs of her statement of claim that alleged systemic discrimination against employees of colour, holding that only discriminatory acts directed specifically at the appellant could be pleaded.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no principled basis to distinguish between direct discrimination and systemic discrimination for the purpose of pleading discriminatory conduct to support a wrongful dismissal claim.
Pension plan surplus must be distributed to affected members upon partial wind up.
The appellant employer sought to partially wind up its defined benefit pension plan following a corporate reorganization and plant closure, without distributing the $3.1 million pro rata share of the actuarial surplus to the affected members.
The Superintendent of Financial Services refused to approve the report, but the Financial Services Tribunal ordered its approval, relying on the doctrine of legitimate expectations and its interpretation of the Pension Benefits Act.
The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court, holding that section 70(6) of the Pension Benefits Act requires the distribution of surplus on a partial wind up, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot be used to create substantive rights or override statutory obligations.
Motion for pre-hearing disclosure partially granted to require statistical but not member-specific information.
The Superintendent of Financial Services brought a motion for an order directing Imperial Oil Limited to answer interrogatories in a proceeding concerning the partial wind up of two pension plans.
The Tribunal applied the test for pre-hearing disclosure and found that while member-specific information was not relevant, general statistical information about the employment status of certain plan members was arguably relevant.
The Tribunal ordered the Applicant to provide answers to revised interrogatories seeking statistical information within six weeks.
Superintendent ordered to answer interrogatories on past pension wind up practices using a representative sample.
The applicant, Imperial Oil Limited, brought a motion for an order directing the Superintendent of Financial Services to provide further and better answers to interrogatories and to produce documents related to the partial wind up of two pension plans.
The applicant sought information regarding the Superintendent's past practices on partial wind ups, specifically concerning the inclusion of certain employee categories and the calculation of grow-in benefits.
The Tribunal granted the motion, ordering the Superintendent to respond to the interrogatories based on a representative sample of files processed between January 1993 and October 2000, balancing the relevance of the information against the hardship of reviewing all files.
Intended defendants in a derivative action are generally not entitled to intervene in the leave application.
The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.
The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.
The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.