Helder M. Travassos

The applicants obtained a default judgment against their former lawyer for missing limitation periods in their personal injury claims.

They sought to garnishee the lawyer's professional liability insurance policy with LawPro.

LawPro had denied coverage because the lawyer completely failed to report the claim or cooperate in its defence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that LawPro's denial of coverage was appropriate due to the lawyer's fundamental breach of the policy's cooperation condition.

Relief from forfeiture was unavailable, and public policy did not require LawPro to operate as a no-fault insurer.

The mortgagor obtained an ex parte Order for Assessment under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act to assess the legal accounts of the mortgagee's lawyers, Cassels Brock, following a power of sale.

Cassels Brock moved to set aside the order, arguing the mortgagor was not their client, while the mortgagor moved for contempt due to non-compliance.

The court set aside the Order for Assessment, finding the mortgagor was not a 'client' under s. 3 and thus the order was a nullity.

The contempt motion was dismissed as the non-compliance was not deliberate and wilful.

However, the court allowed the mortgagor's alternative motion for an assessment under s. 9 of the Solicitors Act to proceed with viva voce evidence.

The appellant appealed a Master's order refusing to set aside the administrative dismissal of her action for damages for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that because her claim involved sexual assault and was not subject to a limitation period, the Master erred by not applying a more lenient test for setting aside the dismissal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly considered the nature of the claim as a contextual factor but properly concluded that the appellant's failure to move the action forward was unrelated to the nature of the assault, and that the respondents were entitled to expect compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to permit the addition of lawyer defendants to a statement of claim.

The motion judge had determined the proposed claims were not tenable at law.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed fresh as amended statement of claim, which alleged the lawyers provided incorrect advice regarding a share repurchase and litigation exposure, disclosed a tenable cause of action.

The Court also noted the motion judge improperly engaged in an assessment of the merits rather than solely assessing whether the claims were tenable at law.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their claims for conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of trust, and refusing leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the pleadings lacked the required particularity and were deficient.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend, as the pleading did not contain a radical defect incapable of being cured.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to amend those specific claims, while a motion to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their solicitor's negligence claim and awarding substantial indemnity costs to the respondents.

They also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias and negligence grounds, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported by the evidence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award to $35,000, while maintaining the substantial indemnity scale due to the nature of the allegations made by the appellants.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with no costs of the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her negligence claim against a lawyer retained by the Public Trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the argument that the Public Trustee's alleged misconduct in obliging the appellant to retain her own counsel created an action in negligence against the Public Trustee's lawyer.

The respondent dentists participated in an advertising campaign and were charged with professional misconduct under a regulation restricting dental advertising.

They challenged the constitutionality of the regulation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the regulation infringed the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it prohibited legitimate forms of commercial expression and purposefully limited content.

The Court further held that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter because the absolute prohibition on all advertising, subject only to narrow exceptions, was overly broad and disproportionate to the objective of maintaining professionalism and preventing misleading advertising.

The appeal was dismissed and the regulation was struck down.