David Neil Bleiwas

This is an appeal concerning the interpretation of a pollution exclusion clause in a commercial general liability insurance policy.

The appellant insurer argued that the clause applied to property damage caused by a liquid chlorine leak from the respondents' premises, asserting that the storage of chlorine constituted a known pollution risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the exclusion did not apply, agreeing that for the clause to be triggered, the irritant or contaminant must enter the natural environment and necessitate clean-up costs.

The court concluded that the claim was essentially for negligence in the course of regular business, not an inherent pollution risk, and therefore the insurer had a duty to defend.

The plaintiff, Fei Wang, brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendant, Wei Wu, to freeze a CIBC revolving line of credit and for an order permitting the registration of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property.

The parties, cousins, jointly contributed to the purchase of the property, with the plaintiff contributing a significant majority of the funds, despite title being solely in the defendant's name.

The plaintiff alleged an express or resulting trust.

Following the termination of the defendant's employment with the plaintiff's company and the defendant listing the property for sale with an intent to return to China, the plaintiff sought to protect his beneficial interest.

The court granted a temporary Mareva injunction for 10 days and ordered the plaintiff to provide notice for the CPL motion, scheduling both for a hearing on May 6, 2024.

The plaintiff brought an action for oppression against the personal and corporate defendants, alleging unauthorized withdrawal of corporate funds.

The court found the personal defendant liable for oppression, determining that funds were improperly withdrawn and rejecting defences related to a lease and the limitations period.

Damages were awarded to the plaintiff and another shareholder to ensure proportionate return of capital, but punitive damages were denied.

The defendant, Dr. Philip Ricciardi, brought a motion to prohibit Brian Ludmer from acting as counsel for the plaintiffs, Jefferson Wiggins et al., in a professional negligence action.

The defendant argued that Mr. Ludmer, having extensively interacted with Dr. Ricciardi as the plaintiff's previous family law counsel, would inevitably be a witness or rely on personal knowledge, creating a conflict of interest under the witness-advocate rule.

The defendant also raised a potential conflict regarding the limitation period defence.

The court granted the motion to prohibit Mr. Ludmer from acting due to the witness-advocate conflict, finding that his questioning would imply an 'unsworn offer of the lawyer’s version of the facts.' However, the court dismissed the limitation period conflict argument, as the plaintiff waived any claim against Mr. Ludmer.

The Landlord sought a declaration that a lease agreement with the Tenant (Fido Solutions Inc. and Rogers Communications Inc.) for a cellular tower site was properly terminated due to a bona fide intention to develop the property, rendering the facility's operation no longer feasible.

The Tenant disputed the termination and sought relief from forfeiture.

The court interpreted "feasible" to imply reasonableness and practicability, not impossibility, and found the Landlord's development plans, coupled with the City's conditions for parkland dedication, made the facility's continued operation unfeasible.

The court also determined that while the Landlord's acceptance of rent created an annual overholding tenancy, it was properly terminated by a second notice.

Relief from forfeiture was denied as the termination was an exercise of a contractual right, not a breach.

The Landlord's application was granted, ordering termination of the lease, removal of the facility, payment of rent, and deletion of the notice of lease from title.

Following reasons granting an interlocutory injunction in a dispute involving alleged breach of fiduciary duties and misuse of confidential information, the court addressed disagreements over the form of the order and costs.

The plaintiff sought additional wording expanding the scope of entities and confidential technology referenced in the injunction, which the court refused because the relief had not been sought in the motion record or oral submissions.

The court required that the original wording of the injunction regarding preservation of confidential information be maintained.

A stay of the data‑imaging paragraph was granted for two defendants pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs of the interlocutory injunction motion were ordered to be in the cause.

A non-profit organization providing rehabilitation services and limited residential accommodation for individuals with brain injuries sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal taxation under the Assessment Act as a 'house of refuge'.

The applicant argued that the entire building qualified because it provided protection, support, and rehabilitation services to vulnerable individuals.

The court applied the primary purpose test and held that a 'house of refuge' within s. 3(1)11 of the Assessment Act refers to a residence where people live.

Because only one floor of the building provided residential accommodation while the majority of the premises was used for rehabilitation and administrative purposes, the property as a whole did not qualify for the exemption.

The application was dismissed, though the residential floor was recognized as exempt from taxation.