Kathleen Anne Lefebvre

This is an appeal concerning the interpretation of a pollution exclusion clause in a commercial general liability insurance policy.

The appellant insurer argued that the clause applied to property damage caused by a liquid chlorine leak from the respondents' premises, asserting that the storage of chlorine constituted a known pollution risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the exclusion did not apply, agreeing that for the clause to be triggered, the irritant or contaminant must enter the natural environment and necessitate clean-up costs.

The court concluded that the claim was essentially for negligence in the course of regular business, not an inherent pollution risk, and therefore the insurer had a duty to defend.

The appellants, a landlord and its beneficial owner, appealed a motion judge's decision that a subrogated action by the landlord's insurer against the tenant for fire damage was barred by the commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the tenant's contribution to the landlord's fire insurance precluded such an action, despite an indemnity provision, as the lease did not explicitly state otherwise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's interpretation of the lease, his holistic reading of its terms, or his consideration of relevant case law.

This appeal concerned the limitation period for an underinsured motorist claim.

The appellant insurer sought summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred, asserting that a demand for indemnification was made in April 2016.

The motion judge, relying on *Schmitz v. Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada*, found that the first valid demand for compensatory damages was made in February 2019, thus the limitation period began running in February 2019, making the action timely.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the factual findings or the application of *Schmitz*.

The plaintiff, injured in an automobile accident, settled with the at-fault driver and then claimed the balance of her damages from her underinsured motorist protection insurer, Coseco Insurance Company.

Coseco moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed Coseco's motion, finding that earlier communications from the plaintiff's counsel were merely notice of an intended claim, not a "demand for indemnification" that would trigger the limitation period.

The limitation period was held to have commenced only after a formal request for indemnification with full particulars was submitted.