Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Sonia Yvonne Dixon v. Daphne Ann Maynard
Before: Fowler Byrne J.
Counsel: ADETONJI, Bola, for the Moving Party, non-party OLADEJO, Jide URBACK, Matthew, Public Guardian and Trustee, for the Defendant MAYNARD, Daphne Ann
Heard: February 5, 2026
E N D O R S E M E N T
1This motion was brought by Jide Oladejo ("Oladejo"), the former solicitor for Daphne Ann Maynard ("Maynard"), for payment of his legal fees. He relies on a contingency fee agreement that Maynard signed on December 4, 2020 ("CFA"). In the alternative, he claims payment based on the dockets he has submitted.
I. Issues
2In this motion, I have been asked to decide the following issues:
a. Is the CFA signed by Maynard enforceable, in that,
i. It complies with the Solicitor's Act; and
ii. Maynard had the requisite capacity to sign it;
b. If not, is Oladejo otherwise entitled to any fees, based on his dockets submitted?
II. Background
3Maynard and her daughter Sonia Yvonne Dixon ("Dixon") jointly owned a property located at 236 Triton Avenue, Vaughan, Ontario ("the Property"). On November 12, 2018, Daphne granted a power of attorney to Sonia and her grandson Leo-Andrew White ("White").
4In or around the fall of 2020, Dixon sold the Property and used Maynard's power of attorney to do so. It was scheduled to close on November 19, 2020. It is alleged that Maynard was not aware of the sale until the last minute and did not want to move. Through another lawyer, Maynard registered a caution on title to the Property on November 18, 2020.
5On November 19, 2020, Maynard instructed her lawyer to withdraw the caution in return for an undertaking from the real estate lawyer acting for her daughter, Demar Kemar Hewitt ("Hewitt"), that he would pay to her, her share, plus an additional $50,000 within one day of the closing.
6The sale of the Property closed on November 19, 2020. On November 20, 2020, prior to Hewitt sending the money to Maynard's lawyer, Dixon commenced an action against her mother Maynard, seeking an unequal division of the proceeds of sale of the Property. At that time, she claimed she contributed more to the property and should receive an unequal distribution from the proceeds. She also sought an order that Hewitt not pay Maynard's proceeds to her until which time this issue was decided.
7Maynard then retained Oladejo to act as her lawyer with respect to the collection of her share of the proceeds of sale of the Property. Maynard signed a CFA on December 4, 2020, wherein she agreed to pay 20% of anything Oladejo was able to recover plus disbursements. Further details of the CFA will be set out below. Also, on December 2, 2020, Maynard signed a revocation of her power of attorney, previously granted to Dixon.
8Given these conflicting claims to the proceeds of sale, Hewitt consulted with the Law Society of Ontario. After this consultation, Hewitt determined that he would need directions from the court before releasing any monies.
9Oladejo served and filed a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim in January 2021 on behalf of Maynard, wherein he named White and Hewitt, as additional defendants to the counterclaim.
10Hewitt brought an interpleader motion, argued on March 30, 2021, wherein he sought that the monies he was holding, namely $494,340.57, (one-half of the proceeds of sale, plus $50,000) be paid into court. Maynard opposed this motion, saying the money should be paid to her pursuant to Hewitt's undertaking. On July 30, 2021, Hewitt was granted his motion and the monies were paid into court. Hewitt was also granted costs in the sum of $3,000 to be paid by the unsuccessful party in the litigation. Maynard sought leave to appeal this order, which was dismissed. Maynard was ordered to pay Hewitt $976.32 in costs and to pay Dixon $1,031.13 in costs.
11On July 10, 2024, the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) became Guardians of Property for Maynard. In January 2025, this action was settled, with the PGT representing Maynard's interest. In this settlement, the sum of $484,616.24 was to be paid to the PGT on behalf of Maynard, subject to court approval.
III. Analysis
1. Does the CFA conform with the Solicitor's Act?
12In December 2020, CFAs were governed by an Ontario Regulation titled Contingency Fee Agreements, O Reg 195/04, under the Solicitor's Act ("the Regulation"). The Regulation set out a number of requirements for any contingency fee arrangement. It is not disputed that the CFA is missing many of these requirements, which include:
a. A statement that the client and solicitor discussed other options other than a contingency fee arrangement, as per s. 2(3)(i);
b. A statement that hourly rates vary, and she could speak to others to compare rates, as per s. 2(3)(ii);
c. A simple calculation of how a contingency fee was calculated, as per s. 2(6);
d. A statement advising the client that he or she can ask the Superior Court of Justice to review the solicitor's bill, as per s. 2(8);
e. A statement that the lawyer cannot recover more than a plaintiff receives in a settlement or award, as per s. 3(1);
f. A statement that the client must pay any costs or award if the client is liable to pay costs, as per s. 3(3)(ii); and
g. A statement that if the party is under disability, the contingency fee arrangement must be reviewed by a Judge before the agreement is finalized or must be finalized as party of an approval of any settlement or judgment, as per s. 3(5).
13The Regulation does not state that any such omissions render the CFA void. That being said, in Edwards v. Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) (1979) Inc., 2016 ONSC 2501, at paras. 29-30, Justice Faieta found that had the legislature intended the court to be able to set aside the requirements in the regulations, it would have specifically indicated so. In the absence of such a provision, the omission of any of the requirements of a contingency fee arrangement must result in the agreement being voided. This decision has been followed on numerous occasions, and I was not provided with any decision that took a different approach than Justice Faieta.
14Olajedo argues that sections 23 and 24 of the Solicitors Act does state that I may enforce a contingency fee arrangement if I find it fair and reasonable. If I do not find it fair and reasonable, I can declare it void and I can order that any costs, fees, charges or disbursements incurred be assessed in the ordinary manner. He argues his CFA is fair and reasonable.
15These sections of the Solicitors Act, I do not read as allowing me to otherwise validate a contingency fee agreement with regulatory omissions. These sections give me the authority to set aside a contingency fee agreement even if it is compliant with the regulations, if I find it unfair and unreasonable, nonetheless.
16Accordingly, the CFA is void as being deficient in a number of regulatory requirements under the Solicitor's Act.
2. Did Maynard Have Capacity to sign the CFA?
17Given that I have found the CFA to be void, I need not address this issue.
3. Is Olajedo Entitled to Payment? And if so, How Much?
18On this motion, there was much evidence presented that showed that Maynard's capacity was at issue well before she retained Olajedo. What is clear though, is that Olajedo, and the lawyer that referred the matter to him, were not aware of this, at the time the CFA was signed.
19The dockets presented by Olajedo though, show that he became concerned about the capacity of his client, or should have been concerned, shortly thereafter. The Statement of Claim that was served on Maynard in late November or early December alleged that Maynard suffered from delusions and suicidal ideation. It was alleged that she was erratic and violent and suffered from psychotic episodes and in 2019 she was involuntarily detained for assessment at a psychiatric facility. In Maynard's Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, she disputed that she suffered from mental health issues and that she was found to be of sound mind at her involuntary assessment. She counterclaimed for psychological and emotional abuse as against her daughter Dixon.
20As early as December 21, 2020, Olajedo obtained Maynard's authorization and wrote to the Canadian Mental Health Association seeking a copy of their records in relation to his client. In particular, there was an allegation of abuse on Maynard and he understood that they became involved.
21On January 25, 2021, his dockets indicate that he received a medical note from her doctor, although it was not clear what the medical note addressed.
22Twice in February 2021, Olajedo's dockets indicated "wrote a letter for medical to Chun-Hing Wong". It is not clear who this individual is. In or around March 21, 2021, he was copied on a letter to then Regional Senior Justice Ricchetti, about the need for Maynard to have a litigation guardian because of her past mental health history, her lack of understanding of her financial affairs and the risk of financial abuse by others.
23Most telling is that around this time, Oladejo arranged for Maynard to undergo a capacity assessment for property. This assessment was completed on March 12, 2021. On March 16, 2021, Ms. Shah, a designated capacity assessor, produced her report. In that report, she notes that she was provided with Maynard's hospital charts from 2018 and 2019 that indicated early signs of dementia. After reviewing these documents and conducting her own assessment, she found that Maynard was not capable of managing her property. Maynard's diagnosis of early to moderate dementia was progressing, and it impacted her memory and added confusion. This assessment was not shared with anyone until May 2023.
24Despite this assessment, Olajedo continued to take instructions from Maynard. He opposed the interpleader motion. He took instructions on Dixon's motion to have a litigation guardian appointed for Maynard. Maynard swore affidavits in these matters. Eventually, on May 30, 2023, the motions judge referred the matter to the Public Guardian and Trustee. Shortly thereafter, the P.G.T. asked the court to be appointed as Maynard's litigation guardian. The P.G.T. was so appointed on July 10, 2024.
25I do concede that matters were moving quickly at the beginning of Olajedo's retainer. He had to get instructions quickly to deal with the sale of the Property. Maynard was sued almost immediately by her daughter, and a defence was required. He acted in a way as to protect Maynard's rights. I accept that in the moment, he believed Maynard understood everything that was happening and had the capacity to instruct him. He also took the necessary steps to determine Maynard's capacity. He should be paid his reasonable fees for that period. Up to March 16, 2021, he docketed 45 hours. At his hourly rate of $300 per hour, that would amount to $13,500 plus disbursements and taxes.
26The difficulty arises on March 16, 2021, when Olajedo learned that Maynard had no capacity to manage her own affairs. While the assessment did not address capacity to instruct counsel, it has been recognized that the capacity to instruct counsel involves a higher level of understanding than when deciding personal financial matters: Calvert (Litigation Guardian of) v. Calvert, (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.), at 294, affirmed (1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 221(C.A.); Carmichael v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., 2020 ONCA 447, at para. 87.
27Justice Daley's endorsement of May 30, 2023 summarized the situation well. Maynard was swearing affidavits related to issues in the litigation within the same month she was found to lack capacity. He had serious concerns about the litigation guardian proposed by Maynard and thus referred the matter to the PGT.
28Since March 16, 2021, despite this knowledge of Maynard's capacity issues, Olajedo docketed another 96 hours. I recognize that some of the time spent was disputing who should be a litigation guardian for Maynard, and there is some value in that, but it must be significantly discounted by the fact that the instructions he was receiving, and acting upon, may not have been in Maynard's best interests. There was no way of knowing whether Maynard understood the extent that her instructions were diminishing her most significant asset – the proceeds of the sale of her home. If Olajedo's CFA stood, and based on the settlement, he would have been entitled to charge 20% of $484,616.24, or $96,923 plus taxes and disbursements. That is a significant part of her personal net worth. Based on Olajedo's docketed hours only from March 16, 2021, he would be entitled to charge another $28,000 plus taxes and disbursements.
29Accordingly, based on the dockets submitted, and the supporting evidence of the steps taken by counsel, and any benefit they would have had for Maynard, I am only willing to allow Olejedo's fees for this time, at a severely discounted level. For the remaining $28,000 that was docketed after March 16, 2021, I will allow only 15%, or $4,200.
30Olajedo, in his factum, claimed disbursements of $4,128. Unfortunately, no evidence was provided in support of that amount.
IV. Conclusion
31Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, I make the following orders:
a. The CFA is void; and
b. Olajedo is entitled to be paid by Maynard, from the funds held for her benefit, fees in the sum of $17,700 plus H.S.T. of $2,301, for a total of $20,001;
c. The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs themselves; if they are not able, on or before February 27, 2026, the PGT is to serve and file its Costs Outline, and written costs submissions, limited to 2 pages, along with any offers to settle that were served; on or before March 13, 2026, Olajedo shall serve and file his Costs Outline, and his written costs submissions, limited to 2 pages, along with any offers to settle that were served; if the PGT wishes, on or before March 20, 2026 it may serve and file his reply written submissions, limited to 1 page; and
d. The remainder of the motion is dismissed.
Fowler Byrne J.
DATE: February 12, 2026