Amani Rauff

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action for solicitor's negligence against her former counsel.

She moved to deem facts admitted and to strike the statement of defence.

The defendant cross-moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motions as an abuse of process, noting she was attempting to have the court usurp the trial judge's role.

The court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, finding the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period, disclosed no genuine issue for trial, and constituted a collateral attack on prior decisions assessing the defendant's accounts and representation.

The appellant appealed from summary judgment dismissing negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against a lawyer retained to draft a deceased relative’s will.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because, even accepting the appellant’s version of events, the claim failed on duty, causation, and limitation grounds.

It declined to recognize a novel duty of care to a non-client who was not an intended beneficiary under the will, and found no ad hoc fiduciary undertaking.

The court further held that the alleged losses flowed from prior judicial findings concerning beneficial ownership of trust property, not from the respondent’s conduct, and that the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant lawyer appealed the dismissal of his action arising from statements about his COVID-19 litigation, public fundraising, and a complaint made to the legal regulator.

The Court of Appeal held that the impugned expressions related to matters of public interest, including the conduct of publicly funded litigation challenging pandemic restrictions and the right of members of the public to complain to the regulator.

The court found no reversible error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to clear the merits hurdle because the respondents had valid defences, including absolute privilege, justification, and fair comment.

It also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to prove sufficiently serious harm caused by the expressions to outweigh the strong public interest in protecting them.

The appeal, including the costs appeal, was dismissed.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

The plaintiff, acting as estate trustee, alleged the defendant provided negligent advice during meetings regarding a trust.

The court granted the motion, finding no solicitor-client relationship or duty of care existed between the parties.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff suffered no damages caused by the defendant, as the alleged losses stemmed from a prior court order, and the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The applicant, the 85-year-old mother of the deceased filmmaker Charles Herbert Officer, sought extensive financial and corporate disclosure from various respondents to support her application for dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The respondents, including the estate trustee, the deceased's former partner, and business associates, had already provided significant financial disclosure, including tax returns, bank statements, and a business valuation.

Justice Faieta dismissed the applicant's motion for further disclosure, finding the requests overbroad, unnecessary, and lacking proportionality, with minor exceptions consented to by the Estate Trustee.

The application was also dismissed on consent against several professional respondents.

The plaintiff, a lawyer representing advocacy groups in COVID-19 related litigation, brought an action for defamation, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and harassment against the defendants.

The defendants moved under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a SLAPP.

The court found that the impugned expressions, which criticized the plaintiff's legal approach and fees, related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to show that his claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences such as justification, fair comment, and absolute/qualified privilege.

The court concluded that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed any unproven harm to the plaintiff and dismissed the action in its entirety.

The appellants, a newspaper publisher and his company, appealed the dismissal of their defamation and other tort claims against city councillors, school trustees, and media entities under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The appellants had published articles critical of the Toronto Catholic District School Board's LGBTQ2S+ policies, using derogatory language.

The respondents, in turn, took action to have the City of Toronto cease advertising in the appellants' newspaper, alleging the articles promoted homophobia and transphobia.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the respondents' expressions related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the respondents had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment).

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the fair comment defence was viable, and that the appellants' constitutional arguments regarding freedom of expression and religious protection were without merit.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The appellants, former truck drivers for the corporate respondent, initiated a public campaign alleging unpaid wages while their Canada Labour Code complaints were ongoing.

The respondents sued for defamation, trespass, and other torts.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in his s. 137.1(3) analysis by focusing on motive rather than the expression's subject matter, but ultimately upheld the dismissal under s. 137.1(4), finding the respondents' claims had substantial merit, the appellants had no valid defence, and the harm to the respondents outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The applicant school board applied for judicial review of a labour arbitration award that upheld two grievances filed by the union on behalf of an employee with mental health disabilities.

The arbitrator had found that the employee was entitled to a sick leave refresh and that his return to work plan should have been accommodated through remote work.

Applying the Vavilov reasonableness standard, the Divisional Court found that the arbitrator's interpretations of the collective agreement and conclusions regarding medical evidence were internally coherent, justified, and reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The defendant, Andre Bluteau, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff, Julie Caron's, action for negligent legal advice.

Bluteau argued that Caron had signed a Full and Final Release covering all claims, including the negligence claim.

Caron contended that she only intended to release claims for costs and relied on doctrines of non est factum and duress, alleging verbal assurances that the release would not preclude a future negligence action.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation to the Release, finding its terms clear and unequivocal.

The court dismissed Caron's hearsay evidence regarding verbal assurances and found no basis for non est factum or duress, as she had legal representation and ample time to consider the terms.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claim.

The moving party condominium corporation sought an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) regarding an accessible parking space dispute.

The corporation had initially brought an application for judicial review, which was dismissed for being the incorrect route, causing a delay in filing the appeal.

The Divisional Court applied the test for extending time to appeal, finding that the corporation had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay was reasonably explained by counsel's error in choosing the appeal route, there was no significant prejudice to the respondent, and the proposed appeal had sufficient merit.

The motion to extend time to appeal was granted.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving party defendants sought their costs.

The plaintiffs argued that the court should apply the appropriateness exception under s. 137.1(7) to award partial indemnity costs instead of the presumptive full indemnity costs.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding no basis to depart from the full indemnity presumption, and awarded the defendants their costs on a full indemnity basis (and substantial indemnity for one defendant on a pro bono retainer), totaling over $383,000.

The plaintiffs, a newspaper publisher and his company, brought an action for defamation, misfeasance in public office, inducing breach of contract, and wrongful interference with economic relations against several city councillors, school board trustees, and a media company.

The action arose from statements made by the defendants criticizing articles published by the plaintiffs as homophobic and transphobic, and advocating for the cessation of city advertising in the plaintiffs' newspaper.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The court granted the motions, finding that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the other claims had merit, and failed to show that the defendants had no valid defences, including fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication.

Furthermore, the court found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff successfully resisted the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant had sought to enforce an alleged pre-litigation settlement but failed to establish that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of the motion on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $17,000, noting the strategic risk and power imbalance inherent in motion practice in wrongful dismissal actions.

The Union brought a motion to have three grievances (Dismissal, Attendance Support and Management Program (ASMP), and Harassment and Discrimination) heard together.

The Employer opposed the motion and requested the Harassment and Discrimination grievance be deferred pending a College of Nurses disciplinary proceeding.

The Arbitrator ordered that the Dismissal and Harassment and Discrimination grievances be heard together, as they involved allegations of a pattern of disparate treatment.

The ASMP grievance was ordered to proceed as a stand-alone grievance because it involved a broader inquiry and different witnesses.

The Arbitrator declined to defer the Harassment and Discrimination grievance.

The Union filed grievances alleging the Employer failed to adequately address complaints about the conduct of a Provincial Bailiff, Mr. Pacheco, which allegedly contributed to a poisoned work environment.

Mr. Pacheco sought intervenor status as a third party to defend his reputation.

The Arbitrator denied the request, finding that the proceeding focused solely on the Employer's response to the complaints, not the validity of the allegations against Mr. Pacheco.

Therefore, Mr. Pacheco had no direct interest or important stake in the outcome that would justify third-party standing.

The Union sought an order for the production of documents relating to complaints, discipline, and investigations concerning a specific employee's conduct and an allegedly poisoned work environment.

The Arbitrator ordered the Employer to produce the requested documents, subject to privilege, and imposed conditions on the Union's counsel regarding the use and destruction of documents containing personal information.

The successful appellant, Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries, sought costs of the appeal and the underlying application from the respondents.

The respondents argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the respondents were public interest litigants but held this did not excuse them from all costs consequences.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the respondents' public interest status, the Court ordered the corporate respondent to pay $350,000 in total costs and the individual respondent to pay $10,000.

The union filed a grievance alleging the employer failed to inform a disabled employee of early retirement options that would have allowed her to receive full pension benefits at no extra cost.

The employer brought a motion arguing the grievance was inarbitrable because the pension plan was not part of the collective agreement.

The arbitrator upheld the employer's motion, finding that the collective agreement contained no reference to pensions and the employer had no duty to communicate regarding matters outside the agreement.

The grievance was dismissed.