CITATION: Stingelin v. Woods, 2025 ONSC 3882
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: NICOLAS ALEXANDER STINGELIN in his capacity as Estate Trustee of the ESTATE OF MONIKA ANDREA STINGELIN, DECEASED, Plaintiff
AND:
CYNTHIA WOODS, Defendant
BEFORE: Schabas J.
COUNSEL: Amani Rauff, for the Defendant
Nicolas Stingelin, self-represented
HEARD: June 6, 2025
reasons on summary judgment motion
Overview
1This is a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant, Cynthia Woods, a lawyer, who has been sued by the plaintiff, Nicolas Alexander Stingelin in his capacity as the trustee for the Estate of Monika Andrea Stingelin, for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of a duty of care, and negligence.
2The defendant’s position is that she was never the lawyer for the plaintiff and did not owe any duty of care to the plaintiff. Further, she submits that the plaintiff has suffered no damage from any action or inaction by her, and that the action is statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, sched B.
3For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted. The issues raised by the defendant are amenable to summary judgment, based on admissions and facts that are not in dispute, and do not require a trial.
4First, based on the undisputed evidence, the defendant was never the lawyer for the plaintiff and there is no other evidence that would support a finding of a duty of care.
5Second, the plaintiff has suffered no damage as a result of any actions by the defendant. Rather, as became clear in oral argument, the plaintiff’s real complaint is that property and assets that were placed in trust in 1992 by Monika Stingelin for the benefit of her sister, Sabina Erlich, became part of Ms. Erlich’s property following Monika’s death rather than being placed in a Henson trust for the ultimate benefit of Sabina’s disabled son, Tony. However, this was not caused by a court order. On April 30, 2019, Sloan J. found that a Henson Trust had not been created and ordered that the assets placed in trust for Sabina belonged to her estate.
6The defendant was not involved in the application before Sloan J. and, in any event, if any harm to the plaintiff flowed from the Order of Sloan J. it flowed form that Order, not from the actions of others. Even assuming the plaintiff could sue over a court order, aside from legal fees incurred in opposing that order, the plaintiff could point to no other losses or damage.
7Third, in my view the action is barred by the Limitations Act. Assuming there was any valid cause of action, the plaintiff ought reasonably to have been aware of it by March 24, 2017, when Sabina’s estate sought the return of the trust assets from Monika’s estate. The plaintiff’s position that the matter was not discoverable until Sloan J. made his order against the plaintiff would allow parties to sit on their rights while other litigation continues. The plaintiff’s argument simply confirms my finding on damages, that the action is more about seeking to avoid the consequences of Sloan J.’s Order than any asserted wrongdoing or harm caused by the defendant.
8The plaintiff’s admissions and the evidence which is not in dispute provides a strong basis to decide the case. Both parties have put their best foot forward – through affidavit evidence, production of documents and notes, and cross-examination. No findings of credibility are necessary. In short, there is a more than adequate evidentiary record on which to grant summary judgment for the defendant.
Background
9The background to this matter was summarized by McGraw A.J. in his endorsement on a motion in this proceeding (reported as Stingelin v. Woods, 2023 ONSC 7086 at paras. 2 – 7) as follows:
[2] The Plaintiff, Nicolas Stingelin, is the Estate Trustee of his late mother, Monika Stingelin ("Monika") who died on September 7, 2011. Pursuant to a trust declaration dated September 10, 1992 (the "Trust Declaration"), Monika held four properties located in Kitchener, Ontario (the "Properties") in trust for her sister Sabina Erlich ("Sabina"). In her will dated March 6, 2004, Monika attempted to place the Properties into a Henson Trust for the benefit of Sabina, and upon her death, for the benefit of Sabina's disabled son Joseph Anthony Erlich ("Tony"). The Plaintiff was appointed as one of the Trustees of the purported Henson Trust.
[3] After Monika's death, the Plaintiff did not transfer the Properties to Sabina. In 2015, Sabina retained the Defendant as counsel to prepare her will. Sabina named her friend, Penelope Chapman ("Penny") as her power of attorney for property and personal care. At Penny's request, the Plaintiff met with Penny and the Defendant on December 7, 2015 and March 7, 2016 (the "Meetings"). The Plaintiff alleges that Penny represented that Sabina's then-will (drafted in 2010) was drafted incorrectly as it did not have a proper Henson Trust. The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant represented at the Meetings that, among other things, the Properties would remain in the Henson Trust, that it was too late for Sabina to challenge Monika's will or alter the Henson Trust and that Monika's ownership of the Properties could not be challenged. The Plaintiff claims that he relied on the Defendant's advice to his detriment.
[4] Sabina died on July 22, 2016. Her will provided equally for Tony and her other son, Andrew, and did not mention the Trust Declaration, the Henson Trust or the Properties. The Plaintiff alleges that Sabina's will was contrary to her intentions and her previous will which provided the majority of her assets to Tony and that the Henson Trust was the intended beneficiary.
[5] Penny was appointed Estate Trustee for Sabina's Estate. The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Objection which was struck by Order dated October 22, 2018 of Chiappetta J. (the "Chiappetta Order"). The Plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of $1,500. Counsel has confirmed that Chiappetta J. held that the Plaintiff did not have standing.
[6] On June 17, 2017, Penny brought an Application to rectify the parcel register to register the Properties in the name of Sonia's1 Estate. The Plaintiff opposed the Application. By Order and Endorsement dated April 30, 2019 (the "Sloan Order"), Sloan J. held that the Trust Declaration was valid and that Monika's Estate had no interest in the Properties and declared that the Plaintiff had committed breaches of trust and fiduciary duty. He also ordered a reference to determine the quantum of damages incurred by Sonia's estate due to the breaches and ordered the Plaintiff to pay $22,388.75 in costs.
[7] The Plaintiff commenced this action by Statement of Claim issued on August 2, 2019 seeking declarations that the Defendant owed him a fiduciary duty and duty of care and breached those duties. He claims damages for the financial and other costs arising from the Application brought by Sonia's estate, the potential loss of his status as a contingent beneficiary of Monika's estate and reputational harm and mental suffering arising from he and Monika's estate having been declared in breach of trust. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's dealings with him at the Meetings gave rise to a solicitor-client relationship and that the Defendant was negligent in advising him and breached her fiduciary duty and duty of care. In her Defence, the Defendant denies that she owed any duties to the Plaintiff, and claims that the action is an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the Sloan Order and was commenced after the passage of the applicable limitation period.
Use of the summary judgment procedure
10Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that “the court shall grant summary judgment if […] the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence.” The word “requiring” was added in 2010. At that time Rule 20 was also amended to provide judges with the discretion to use additional fact-finding powers designed to expand the scope and use of summary judgment.
11In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 (“Hryniak”), the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of summary judgment, including when it is appropriate and the test to be met. Karakatsanis J. summarized the Court’s position as follows, at para. 49:
There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.
12In Royal Bank of Canada v. 1643937 Ontario Inc., 2021 ONCA 98 (“Royal Bank”), the Court of Appeal noted, at para. 27, that “motion judges are required to engage with the Hryniak framework process… look at the evidentiary record, determine whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, and assess, in their discretion, whether resort should be taken to the enhanced powers under rr. 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
13The Hryniak framework is summarized by the Court of Appeal at para. 24 of Royal Bank as follows:
First, the motion judge should have determined if there was a genuine issue requiring a trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the enhanced fact-finding powers under r. 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
Second, if there appeared to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, the motion judge should have determined if the need for a trial could be avoided by using the enhanced powers under r. 20.04(2.1) – which allowed her to weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of a deponent, and draw any reasonable inference from the evidence – and under r. 20.04(2.2) to order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties.
14In this case I do not need to utilize the enhanced fact-finding powers contained in Rule 20. The issues raised involve facts which are largely admitted by the plaintiff or are not disputed. The issues are largely matters of law that are also readily amenable to the summary judgment process.
15In some cases discoverability is an issue that may need to be addressed at a trial; however, as noted by Myers J. in RNC Corp. v. Johnstone, 2020 ONSC 7751, at para. 3:
A limitation period can present a neat issue with its own set of facts. In many cases, a motion for summary judgment on a limitation period can require the court to review just a few facts that are discrete or separate from the facts that form the merits of the claim and require no findings on the credibility of any witness’s testimony. Resolving a case on that basis can be a very efficient, affordable process that avoids the need for lengthy, complex, expensive discovery and trial on the merits.
16In my view, this is such a case. The facts relating to discoverability are not in dispute,
17The issues raised by the defendant are discrete, straightforward and do not require a fuller appreciation of the facts that might occur at a trial.
Best foot forward and the adjournment request
18On a motion for summary judgment the parties are required to put their best foot forward on the issues. As the Court of Appeal stated in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hylton, 2012 ONCA 614, at para. 5:
A party moving for summary judgment has the evidentiary burden of showing there is no genuine issue for trial. Once this burden is discharged the responding party must prove that its defence has a real chance of success. Each party must put its best foot forward to establish whether or not there is an issue for trial. The court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence the parties would present at trial. [Emphasis added.]
19The best foot forward requirement also means the full foot forward. As Corbett J. stated in Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200, at para. 33: “The court will assume that the parties have placed before it, in some form, all of the evidence that will be available for trial.” Or, as Karakatsanis J. stated when she was a judge of this court: “The court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence which the parties will present if there is a trial”: New Solutions Extrusion Corporation v. Gauthier, 2010 ONSC 1037, at para. 12.
20The plaintiff complained at the outset of the hearing that he had not had an opportunity to present all of his evidence and therefore had not yet put his best foot forward. He sought an adjournment, which was refused.
21This motion has a long history. It was commenced in July 2021. At that time, the plaintiff was represented by counsel. Motion records were exchanged, and supplementary records were also filed, by both parties. Cross-examinations were conducted, undertakings and further production followed. The original date for the hearing of the matter, January 31, 2022, was set in September 2021. Factums were prepared by counsel and exchanged; however, the hearing was adjourned by Dow J. on January 31, 2022, at the request of the plaintiff in order for the plaintiff to pursue an order to compel answers to questions refused at the cross-examination of the defendant. That motion was dismissed by McGraw A.J. on December 15, 2023. I have referred to his decision earlier.
22This date for hearing was set by Koehnen J. in CPC Court on May 29, 2024. At that time, the plaintiff became self-represented. Koehnen J.’s endorsement stated:
Ms. Vranic will file a notice of intention to act in person on behalf of her client, Mr. Stigelin. Mr. Stigelin has agreed.
Although Mr. Stigelin appears in his capacity as an estate trustee, he is for all practical purposes the sole beneficiary.
Mr. Stigelin maybe alleging that there are other beneficiaries by virtue of a Henson trust, a court has already determined that no such trust exists.
I have advised Mr. Stigelin that he should retain new counsel immediately who can work with the timetable set out below. There will be no adjournments granted because new counsel cannot work to the timetable below.[emphasis added]
23Koehnen J. granted the parties the opportunity to file revised factums. The defendant did so as required on July 31, 2024. Although the plaintiff had until November 15, 2024, no revised factum was filed. The Motion Confirmation Form filed on May 28, 2025 stated that Mr. Stingelin was self-represented and that the motion was going to proceed as scheduled on June 6, 2025.
24However, at the outset of the hearing on June 6, 2025, Mr. Stingelin sought an adjournment. He asserted that he had retained counsel in March but had been told two days ago that his lawyer could not attend. Mr. Stingelin’s main concern, as he put it, was that he needed an adjournment to file a new affidavit to address in more detail what had happened in his two interactions with the defendant in late 2015 and early 20016. He professed to be unaware that the time for filing additional evidence was closed, and asserted that he was not asked to address his meetings with the defendant by his previous lawyers.
25I rejected Mr. Stingelin’s submissions. He provided no evidence of any retainer with a lawyer, nor had counsel for the defendant been advised of the retention of a lawyer; only that she had been told recently by Mr. Stingelin that he was seeking to retain someone. However, that was not mentioned in the Motion Confirmation Form.
26I also rejected Mr. Stingelin’s position regarding the need for additional evidence. To the extent there might be a valid claim against the defendant, it largely arises from the interactions between the defendant and the plaintiff at the two meetings they had in 2015 and 2016. Accounts of these meetings were provided in the affidavits of both parties. Mr. Stingelin’s first affidavit, responding to the plaintiff’s evidence, has at least 25 paragraphs addressing these two interactions. His assertion that he was not asked to address them by his lawyers is clearly wrong.
27Furthermore, the two meetings were also addressed at length in the cross-examinations. Aside from the fact that the time for any additional evidence passed long ago and granting an adjournment would have been unfair to the defendant, given the extensive evidentiary record which was created when Mr Stingelin had counsel I was satisfied that the plaintiff had an opportunity to put his best foot forward, and has done so.
28Further, while Mr. Stingelin also expressed concern about his ability to make submissions without a lawyer, I noted that he had been clearly warned by Koehnen J. over a year ago that no adjournment would be granted because he was without counsel. I also noted that I had, in any event, the thorough factum prepared by his lawyers in 2022 which addressed the issues based on the record which has not changed since that time. Accordingly, there was limited prejudice to the plaintiff in being required to proceed without counsel.
No duty of care
29In my view, the evidence of the plaintiff does not support the conclusion that the defendant owed a duty of care or was in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff. To the contrary, the plaintiff’s evidence favours the opposite conclusion. It is admitted that there was no solicitor – client relationship, nor are any of the usual indicia of such a relationship present here. The evidence is also clear that no other form of relationship or dependency that might give rise to a duty of care or a fiduciary relationship existed between Mr. Stingelin and Ms. Woods: 2116656 Ontario Inc. v Grant and LLF Lawyers LLP, 2019 ONSC 114 at paras. 17-22, 30-36; Wu v Di Iorio, 2021 ONSC 2332 at paras. 20, 28-30; Trillium Motor World Ltd. v General Motors of Canada Limited, 2015 ONSC 3824 at para. 412, aff'd 2017 ONCA 544.
30The defendant was retained by Sabina in 2015 to prepare her Will. She subsequently provided advice to Sabina’s Power of Attorney for property and personal care, Penny Chapman, after Sabina became ill.
31The only interactions or communications between the plaintiff and the defendant were at the two meetings on December 17, 2015 and March 7, 2016. The defendant attended at the request of Penny Chapman, as Ms. Chapman did not wish to meet with the plaintiff alone. The defendant’s evidence, supported by her contemporaneous notes, was that she told the plaintiff that she was counsel for Sabina and could not provide the plaintiff with legal advice. The plaintiff has admitted that it was “obvious” and “known” to him that the defendant was representing Sabina. The plaintiff has also admitted that:
- he never retained the defendant;
- he and the defendant never entered into any sort of written agreement or retainer for legal services;
- the defendant never told the plaintiff that she was his lawyer;
- other than the two meetings, the plaintiff has never spoken to the defendant;
- the plaintiff has never instructed the defendant to do anything for him, nor has the defendant prepared any documents for the plaintiff;
- the defendant has never emailed the plaintiff, or even responded to emails from the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s lawyer; and
- the defendant never sent a bill or reporting letter to the plaintiff, nor did the plaintiff ever pay the defendant for anything.
32The plaintiff had the meetings with Penny Chapman and the defendant in his capacity as Estate Trustee of his mother Monika’s Estate. He wanted Sabina to change her Will or otherwise take steps to ensure that the assets Monika had moved into a trust for Sabina in 1992 (four houses and several thousand dollars in cash in 2015) would be left as a Henson Trust for Tony and that 50% of the residue would go to charity. At these meetings, as the plaintiff has admitted, the plaintiff knew that Sabina could require him to transfer the trust properties to her, and that the defendant explicitly told him on March 7, 2016 that Ms. Chapman, as Ms. Erlich's power of attorney, could direct him as the executor of Ms. Stingelin's estate to transfer the trust properties to Ms. Erlich's estate.
33The plaintiff has seized on a reference to “advice” found in the defendant’s notes of her meetings where she wrote: "Discussed tax returns + they appear to not have been done - advised Nick to get on it - told him that was only advice I could give." Based on this notation, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was advising him on various tax issues relating to the 21-year deemed disposition rule. However, this is not supported by the defendant’s contemporaneous notes and her evidence. In cross-examination the plaintiff himself retreated from his claim, referring to them having “discussed” the deemed disposition rule, and that he recognized there were gaps in his memory as his only evidence on this issue is what he inferred from the defendant’s notes, as he took no notes at the tme himself. The plaintiff also said he understood that the defendant "wasn't pretending to know about taxes accurately anyway [so what she said about taxes] was not important" and "[the defendant] didn't present herself as a tax lawyer".
34There is also the context of the meetings and the reasons why Mr. Stingelin and Ms. Chapman had the meetings. Mr. Stingelin was there is his capacity as the trustee of his mother’s estate, who was concerned that Sabina’s Will might not reflect his late mother’s wishes. He had no legal relationship with Sabina’s estate, for whom the defendant acted. Mr. Stingelin was not a beneficiary of Sabina’s Will and he has no standing to assert the Ms. Woods owed him any duty of care in that or any other capacity. He is not even a disappointed beneficiary, nor can he be regarded as some kind of third party beneficiary as the interests of the parties were not aligned: see, e.g., Harrison v. Fallis, 2006 CarswellOnt 3545 at paras. 15-20 (SCJ). A lawyer may owe a duty of care to the testator’s intended beneficiaries to ensure the Will properly reflects the testator’s wishes, but that duty does not extend to people who are not, and never were intended to be beneficiaries, such as Monika’s Estate.
No Damage
35Even if the defendant had provided legal advice or owed the plaintiff a duty of care or was in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff and she breached her duty towards him, no damage has been suffered by Monika’s Estate as a result. Paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim asserts:
As a direct result of his reliance on the legal advice of the Defendant, the Plaintiff has suffered damages including but not limited to:
(a) the financial and other costs arising from the application by the Estate of Sabina;
(b) the potential loss of his status as a contingent beneficiary of the Estate of Monika,
(c) reputational harm and mental suffering arising from his having been declared in breach of his fiduciary duty; and
(d) reputational harm and mental suffering arising from the Estate of Monika having been declared in breach of trust.
36The essence of the claim for damages is the loss of the value of the Henson Trust to Monika’s Estate. This was also made clear in oral argument as Mr. Stingelin agreed that the loss to the Estate was the value of the Henson Trust which Monika had wanted to be for the benefit of Tony. He confirmed that he wanted the value of those assets and reimbursement for the legal costs Monika’s Estate incurred in opposing the Court application that was determine by Justice Sloan. However, as Sloan J. found, the only trust created was the one on 1992 transferring assets to be held in trust for Sabina which had not been varied in any way and remained valid. There was no Henson Trust established by Monika. In effect, then, this lawsuit is a collateral attack on the Order of Sloan J. and is improper.
37Further, nothing the defendant said to the plaintiff, or anything the defendant did in her capacity as the lawyer who assisted Sabina in drafting her Will, caused harm to Monika’s Estate. The assets Monika had placed in trust for Sabina in 1992 no longer belonged to Monika in 2015 and 2016. They may have continued to be controlled by her Estate, but they were owned by Sabina. Sloan J.’s Order confirmed this. Accordingly, there is no basis for the damage clams asserted in the Statement of Claim.
Limitations Act
38I also find that this action is barred by s. 4 of the Limitations Act 2002 which requires that a party commence a proceeding within two years of when the claim was discovered.
39As the cause of action is based on the loss of the value of the purported Henson Trust as the assets in the trust were included in Sabina’s Estate, the limitation issue must be determined by when Mr. Stingelin became aware that Sabina’s Estate would seek to have ownership of those assets.
40According to the Statement of Claim, on March 24, 2017, Frank Shostack, a lawyer acting for Penny, sent the plaintiff a letter requesting that he transfer title to the four properties to Sabina’s Estate. This was followed by the commencement of the application to the Court to have the properties transferred to Sabina’s Estate which, according to the Statement of Claim, was served on the plaintiff on August 2, 2017.
41In my view, the plaintiff was put on notice on March 24, 2017, that Sabina’s Estate was seeking to have the properties held in trust by the plaintiff transferred to her Estate, and not be placed in a Henson Trust. At that point, to the extent any valid claim could be asserted for that action, time began to run. However, as the plaintiff did not commence this action until August 6, 2019, the action is out of time. Even if the discovery date had been the date when the plaintiff was served with the application record, the action was still commenced more than two years after that date.
42I do not accept the position of the plaintiff that the claim only became discoverable after Sloan J. issued his Order on April 30, 2019. If that were the case, actions could be delayed for years while related matters wound their way through the courts. Indeed, this position simply drives home the point that the plaintiff’s complaint is not with the actions of Ms. Woods, but with the loss of the desired Henson Trust. This was due to the actions of Monika in only placing assets in trust for Sabina in 1992, and the confirmation of that by the Court, not by the defendant.
Conclusion
43The motion is granted. The action is dismissed.
44The defendant is entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis which I fix at $15,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements.
Schabas J.
Date: June 30, 2025