Vaughan v. Chen, 2026 ONSC 4135

CITATION: Vaughan v. Chen, 2026 ONSC 4135

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00000065-0000

DATE: 2026-07-16

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Joanne Vaughan

Plaintiff

– and –

Jimmie Chen

Defendant

Self-represented

A. Rauff and V. Duarte Walsh, for the Defendant

HEARD: May 13, 2026, virtually

R.A. BELLOWS, J.

Reasons for decision

OVERVIEW

1Joanne Vaughan (the “Plaintiff”) has filed a statement of claim against Jimmie Chen (the “Defendant”), who had previously been retained to represent her as a defendant in an action brought by her former counsel. Ms. Vaughan is self-represented.

2I heard two motions on May 13, 2026. The first was brought by the Plaintiff, in which she seeks to strike the Defendant’s Statement of Defence entirely, or alternatively, as much as I deem necessary. She further seeks an order under r. 51.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”), “deeming the facts in the Plaintiff’s Requests to Admit to be admitted” by the Defendant.¹

3The Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff’s motion and moves for summary judgment dismissing the action pursuant to r. 20. He relies on four separate grounds, submitting that any one of them would be sufficient to dismiss the action. The Plaintiff seeks dismissal of this cross-motion.

Procedural/Filing Issues

4At the start of the day, the Plaintiff raised several procedural issues:

a. Late filing of materials by the Defendant: the Defendant sought to address this issue on January 16, 2026; the Plaintiff had been notified of same and did not attend court on that motion date. The appropriate time to address her objection to the Defendant's late filing would have been then. The matters were adjourned to this hearing date to proceed.

b. Filing of a revised factum by the Defendant: the Defendant advised that the revised factum contained the same arguments and was edited to reduce the number of pages to comply with the long motion protocol. To ensure fairness and assuage the Plaintiff’s concerns, I will only use the Defendant’s December 2026 factum and will not rely on the amended factum filed in March 2026. As to the length of the Defendant’s factum, I note that the Defendant addressed both motions in a single factum, whereas the Plaintiff filed separate factums for each. I take no issue with either approach in the circumstances.

c. Late access to Case Center: the Plaintiff only gained access to Case Center days before the hearing. It is unfortunate that she did not have earlier access, but as a self-represented party, the court staff uploaded her filings to Case Center. I confirm that I had her materials in advance of the hearing date. The Plaintiff had been properly served with the Defendant’s materials, so there is no concern on that front. This is a non-issue.

d. The r. 51.06(2) issue as to be decided first. As this issue is somewhat more complex, I will address it below.

Procedural Question: Rule 51.06(2) Motion

5The Plaintiff requested that I rule on her r. 51.06(2) motion before she submits on the balance of her motion, as she wishes to rely on admissions which she believes the Defendant ought to be deemed to have made to support her r. 25.11 motion.

6The Plaintiff has chosen to represent herself in this matter and has done so with great care to be informed and understand the Rules to the best of her ability. In doing so, she has brought her motion to address two issues in this hearing. Had those issues been separated, she may have been able to deal with the r. 51.06(2) motion on a short motion, receive a decision, and then determine her next steps on that basis. She has not done so. For that to happen at this point, an adjournment would be required for the r. 25.11 portion of her motion and for the Defendant’s cross-motion.

7After careful consideration, I decided that all matters would proceed to hearing at that time. I will consider and decide each matter in the appropriate order: first, deciding the Plaintiff’s r. 51.06(2) motion. Should the admissions sought be granted, those facts may apply to my assessment of her motion to strike the Statement of Defence pursuant to r. 25.11. Alternatively, should she not succeed in the former, her argument would be assessed in light of that finding.

8I find this approach fair to the Plaintiff, without prejudicing the Defendant. It effectively achieves the same procedural outcome as hearing the matters separately, but without the delay occasioned by an adjournment of the remaining matters. It supports the general principle in r. 1.04(1): “These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.”

DISCUSSION

Motion to Deem Admissions – Rules 51.06(2) and 51.03

9The Plaintiff’s r. 51.06(2) motion seeks to have the facts set out in her claim deemed admitted by the Defendant. She also relies on r. 51.03.

10Rule 51.06(2) states:

Where an admission of the truth of a fact or the authenticity of a document is made by a party in a pleading or is made or deemed to be made by a party in response to a request to admit, any party may make a motion in the same proceeding to a judge for such order as he or she may be entitled to on the admission without waiting for the determination of any question between the parties and the judge may make such order as is just.

11On the effects of a request to admit, r. 51.03 states:

(1) Response required within 20 days – A party on whom a request to admit is served shall respond to it within twenty days after it is served by serving on the requesting party a response to the request to admit (Form 51B).

(2) Deemed admission where no response – Where the party on whom the request is served fails to serve a response as required by subrule (1), the party shall be deemed, for the purposes of the proceeding only, to admit the truth of the facts or the authenticity of the documents mentioned in the request to admit.

(3) Deemed admission unless response contains a denial or reason for refusal to admit – A party shall also be deemed, for the purposes of the proceeding only, to admit the truth of the facts or the authenticity of the documents mentioned in the request, unless the other party’s response,

(a) specifically denies the truth of a fact or the authenticity of a document mentioned in the request; or

(b) refuses to admit the truth of a fact or the authenticity of a document and sets out the reason for the refusal.

12The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant’s response to the request to admit does not satisfy the requirement to respond by failing to provide “specific, reasoned responses” to the request to admit. She does not claim that he failed to respond entirely.

13The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff misinterprets r. 51.06(2). He submits that it would apply if they had made admissions that would entitle the Plaintiff to relief. They have not. Instead, she seeks to have the Court deem the Defendant to have admitted things he denies. There is no authority to do this. He relies on r. 51.03 as above that requires a response – a denial or a refusal to admit with a reason for the latter precludes there from being deemed admissions. The Defendant acknowledges that there may be costs for failing to admit something that ought to have been admitted, if a court were to make that finding.

14The Plaintiff brought a similar motion in the matter before Justice Cullin in which she was the defendant. That motion was in writing and resulted in the decision of Hamilton v. Vaughan, 2025 ONSC 6776. At paras. 11-12, Justice Cullin writes:

[11] A request to admit is a vehicle through which to secure factual admissions in advance of trial. To the extent that factual admissions contradict pleadings, the admissions take precedence. It is not necessary, or an appropriate use of the court’s resources, to move to strike pleadings based on factual admissions obtained in advance of trial.

[12] It is possible, and in this case likely, that the parties will disagree upon what admissions, if any, have been made. To the extent there is disagreement, that is an issue to be determined by the trial judge. Determining that issue in a pretrial motion would be an improper incursion upon the trial judge’s exclusive jurisdiction to admit and exclude evidence and to find facts. [Emphasis added.]

15At para. 14, Justice Cullin concludes that the defendant’s motion was an abuse of process.

16I see no difference between the Plaintiff’s motion in this proceeding and the issue before Justice Cullin, where Ms. Vaughan was the defendant. Whether admissions are made due to the alleged insufficiency of the Defendant’s response is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a trial judge.

17Justice Cullin previously found the Plaintiff’s argument to be an abuse of process, yet she brings the same argument before me. I, too, find it to be an abuse of process, and I dismiss the motion.

Motion to Strike the Statement of Defence – Rule 25.11

18The Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Statement of Defence was largely based on the deemed admissions she sought in the motion that has now been dismissed. Having not succeeded in that motion, her request to strike based on the deemed admissions she sought must fail.

19The Plaintiff has clearly taken the time to research and provide me with caselaw. I appreciate this effort. Newton Crypto Ltd. v. Lebon, 2023 ONSC 5536, is a decision on a motion to strike the statements of defence. Associate Justice Robinson writes the following:

[4] It is well-established that the function of pleadings is to (i) define with clarity and precision the question in controversy between the litigants; (ii) to give fair notice of the precise case which is required to be met and precise remedies sought; and (iii) assist the court in its investigation of the truth and the allegations made [citation omitted].

[5] Rule 25.06(1) of the Rules requires that every pleading contain a precise statement of the material facts on which the party relies for the claim or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. The subrule has been held to mandate a minimum level of material fact disclosure, and if this level is not reached, the remedy is not a motion for particulars, but rather a motion to strike out the pleading as irregular. It is only where the minimum level of material fact disclosure has been reached, that the pleading becomes regular [citation omitted].

[6] Two other subrules are applicable here: subrules 25.07(3) and 25.06(8). Subrule 25.07(3) sets out that where a defendant intends to prove a different version of the facts from that pleaded by the plaintiff, a denial of that version is not sufficient and the defendant must plead its own version of the facts in the defence. Subrule 25.06(8), which applies to all pleadings, requires that full particulars be pleaded where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged [Emphasis added.]

20Associate Justice Robinson goes on to acknowledge that a blanket denial of the entire claim is not permissible: Newton Crypto, at para. 9, as referenced by the Plaintiff. He also notes, however, that the defendants are not required to prove a different version of facts for every fact pleaded by the plaintiff that they deny: Newton Crypto, at para. 8. A defendant is required to set out its own version of the facts where they differ and any affirmative defences.

21Many of the Plaintiff’s reasons for seeking to have the paragraphs in the Statement of Defence struck rely on her assessment of the Defendant's candour and honesty. She is placing herself in the position of the trier of fact and asking that I accept her assessment or do the same in order to strike the Statement of Defence. For example, in relation to para. 4 of the Statement of Defence, the Plaintiff submits that it should be struck for “lack of honesty and candour.” She argues that other paragraphs are simply “not a defence” or “not relevant.”

22In reviewing the Statement of Defence, the Defendant provides a general statement in the first paragraph stating, “The defendant Jimmie Chen denies the allegations contained in the statement of claim, unless specifically admitted herein.” I agree with the Plaintiff that on its face, this is a bald denial. However, when read in the context of the rest of the Statement of Defence, the Defendant sets out the facts he relies on and the defences he intends to advance at trial.

23I find that the Defendant has not committed the errors noted by Associate Justice Robinson that would merit striking the statements.

24The Plaintiff appears to simply disagree with the Defendant's statements, which is to be expected and to be decided by the trial judge, as noted by Justice Cullin in her prior decision involving Ms. Vaughan. This motion seeks to have me put myself in the shoes of the trial judge and decide, as the Plaintiff has, that the Defendant is dishonest and that his defences will not succeed at trial. It is not appropriate for me to make such findings on a motion. This, too, is an abuse of process and is dismissed.

Motion for Summary Judgment – Rule 20

25The Defendant has moved for summary judgment dismissing the solicitor’s negligence claim against him. The grounds for his motion are that: (1) it is out of time; (2) there is no genuine issue for trial; (3) the action is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process; and (4) it is barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege. The Defendant submits that any one of these grounds is sufficient to dismiss the claim. The Defendant further submits that the alternate remedy of leave to amend the Statement of Claim would not be appropriate in the circumstances because no reasonable cause of action is reasonably foreseeable.

26Most of the Plaintiff’s response to the motion focused on her own questions, deflecting from the issues at hand and raising concerns about alleged procedural missteps. As she is self-represented, I granted her considerable leeway in her oral submissions.

(1) Limitation Period – Out of Time

27The Defendant submits that the action is statute-barred because it is outside of the limitation period. He argues that the Plaintiff was clearly aware of the cause of action when she filed her requisition for assessment on August 15, 2022. The defendant submits that the latest possible date for discovery was in August 2022, and she filed her claim in 2025.

28The Plaintiff submits that her requisition to the assessor was based solely on suspicion and that the basis for her claim did not become discoverable until April 4, 2023, during the examinations. She claims that he admitted to the allegations at that time. He disputes this alleged admission.

29The Defendant points to allegations contained in the Plaintiff’s requisition for assessment wherein she asserts that he acted without instruction, citing paragraphs 40 and 47-50 of that document. Regardless of whether she claims that he made this admission in 2023, the evidence before the Court is that she was aware of this claim in 2022 – 31 months before she filed her claim.

30I reject the Plaintiff’s submission that the action was not discoverable when she filed her requisition for assessment in August 2022. I note that the Plaintiff submits that there was a written contract between her and the Defendant that required instructions in writing – her claim that he did not act with the appropriate standard of care is grounded, in part, by the allegation that he sought verbal instructions in breach of that contract. If that is found to be accurate, the discoverability date would be even earlier than August 2022.

31That said, it is sufficient that the requisition was based on the same allegations as those being made in the matter before me to find that the Plaintiff’s claim was discoverable no later than August 2022, and likely much earlier. I find, therefore, that she filed her Statement of Claim at least 7 months after the 2-year limitation period.

32I find that her claim is outside the limitation period. The Defendant submits that this is sufficient to dismiss the action. Although that is correct, given that the Plaintiff is self-represented, and might be granted some latitude for the matter to be heard on its merits. I will consider further grounds raised by the Defendant.

(2) No Genuine Issue

33The Plaintiff’s action is for solicitor’s negligence. The Defendant argues that there is no genuine issue about whether he met the standard of care on the pleadings before the Court. The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff baldly asserts negligence without providing evidence to support any breach(es) or a genuine issue as to the standard of care, and that the Court is entitled to take the record as it is. He further argues that the pleadings do not articulate damages as required by tort law.

34The Defendant submits that he met the standard of care and that the evidence available to the Court, including correspondence between the parties, supports that conclusion. He submits that the Plaintiff has produced no evidentiary record establishing that he did not meet the standard of care.

35In her factum, at para. 4, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant did not address the “two-step legal test and Summary Motions 1) are there live issues requiring a trial and 2) that the written record allows the Court to make a finding of fact.” She readdresses the issue at paras. 35 and following. At para. 45, she reviews what she believes are live issues for trial. She maintains that all claims are supported by “noncompliant requests to admit.” Her motion to deem the statements in her requests to admit admissions by the Defendant did not succeed; therefore, there are no admissions to support her claim.

36Unfortunately, the Plaintiff failed to make any submissions that assisted me in finding a genuine issue for trial that was not previously litigated – bald assertions are not helpful. She asserts that the Defendant’s motion omits the live issues that she pleaded, but does not state what those live issues are, nor does she refute the Defendant’s submission that the evidentiary record supports his request to dismiss the action.

37Moreover, the Defendant submits that he did not cause any harm to the Plaintiff. Damages are a necessary element of negligence. On the contrary, the Defendant submits that, if anything, he minimized the cost order against her after she had taken an unreasonable position in the litigation. The plaintiff in that case sought costs in excess of $40,000, and the Defendant was able to limit the cost order to $6,000.

38The solicitor-client relationship was terminated following the June 8, 2022 motions argued by the Defendant. The Defendant would not be responsible for any damages arising after the termination of their relationship.

39The Plaintiff submitted that damages are ongoing because the matter has not yet been completed. The Notice of Action indicates that damages are sought for malpractice in the amount of $16,000, fraud in the amount of $7,500, lost wages in the amount of $7,500, and punitive and aggravated damages in the amount of $5,000. Of note, the Notice of Action initially listed the malpractice amount as $15,000 but was later amended to $16,000.² This appears to be motivated by the fact that the claim would otherwise be in the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. There does not appear to be any other amendment sought to explain the recalculation. In fact, the Statement of Claim does not explain what the amounts represent or how they were arrived at.

40Moreover, the Plaintiff’s position regarding ongoing damages appears untenable, given that the professional relationship between the parties ended in June 2022 and he was removed as solicitor of record on August 6, 2022. In her Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff claims costs ordered against her in litigation she brought against the Defendant as damages in this action.³

41A prior decision found that the Defendant provided reasonable representation, which was later upheld on judicial review. I will address the prior litigation on this issue further below.

42I find that no new issue has been raised in the statement of claim, that the claims for damages are insufficient and unsupported or more appropriately an appeal against the costs awarded against her, and therefore that there is no genuine issue for trial. The action should be dismissed on this ground. However, I note that it ties into the third ground argued by the Defendant, and as such, I will review it as well.

(3) Frivolous, Vexatious, or Abuse of Process

43Rule 21.01(3)(d) provides that a defendant may move before a judge to have an action stayed or dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process. Extrinsic evidence is admissible on such a motion. The court further has the inherent and residual discretion to invoke the doctrine to control its own process.⁴

44At noted by Justice Vermette in Abrahams,⁵ at para. 36:

Under Rule 21.01(3)(d), the court can dismiss an action that “is frivolous or vexatious or is otherwise an abuse of process of the court”. Rule 25.11 provides for a similar power. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Currie at para. 17:

It is apparent that there is a degree of overlap in the meaning of the terms frivolous, vexation and abuse of process. What I take from the authorities is that any action for which there is clearly no merit may qualify for classification as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. The common example appears to be the situation where a plaintiff seeks to relitigate a cause which as already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.

45The doctrine of abuse of process is broad, flexible, and discretionary. “It is an intangible principle that is used to bar proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives of public policy.”⁶ It engages the “inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”⁷ The Supreme Court of Canada adopts this principle of flexibility. Abuse of process is not encumbered by specific requirements as is the case with res judicata and issue estoppel. The administration of justice and fairness are at the heart of the doctrine of abuse of process.⁸

46The issues raised by the Plaintiff have been reviewed a number of times. It is helpful to understand that prior history:

a. The Plaintiff challenged the Defendant’s representation when she sought an assessment of his accounts. In his April 10, 2023, decision, Mr. Sellers conducted a thorough assessment, considering not only the fees of the Defendant but also whether his representation was reasonable.⁹ It is a detailed, considered decision.

b. The Plaintiff disagreed, as she was entitled to do, and she sought judicial review of his decision. Justice Cameron heard that matter. The Plaintiff’s motion was dismissed with fulsome reasons released on January 15, 2024.¹⁰ In that matter, Justice Cameron later found that the Plaintiff attempted to relitigate the issues again in her cost submissions.¹¹

c. Following Justice Cameron’s decision, the Plaintiff further appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. There were several motions/proceedings. Ultimately, it was dismissed as it was not properly before the Court of Appeal and ought to have been brought before the Divisional Court.¹² The Court of Appeal made several cost orders in favour of the Defendant.

d. The matter was then brought before the Divisional Court. It was later dismissed without prejudice with costs to the Defendant on August 13, 2025. I am unaware of whether any further appeal has been brought before the Divisional Court.

47The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate issues that have already been decided and dismissed by the assessor, Mr. Sellers, Justice Cameron, the Court of Appeal and the Divisional Court. A clear example can be found in paragraphs 51 and 55 of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, in which she raises the same procedural issues she raised before Justice Cameron and later claims that the Court was biased, effectively, for making a decision she disagreed with.

48The Defendant argues that this attempt to relitigate is an abuse of process. I agree.

49This action amounts to nothing more than a collateral attack on the prior decisions. I find that it is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. As a result, the action is dismissed.

50As a result of this definitive finding, I will not proceed with a review of the final ground raised by the Defendant.

ORDERS

51The Plaintiff’s r. 51.06 motion shall be dismissed as an abuse of process.

52The Plaintiff’s r. 25.11 motion shall be dismissed as an abuse of process.

53The Defendant’s r. 20 summary judgment motion succeeds and, therefore, the action is dismissed as it was brought outside the limitation period, discloses no genuine issue for trial, and is found to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

COSTS

54The Defendant has already provided a Bill of Costs and submissions for both the Plaintiff’s motions and the action.

55The Plaintiff may file written submissions of up to 2 pages, double-spaced, in 12-point font as to costs, which shall be limited to issues related to r. 57.01(1) within 30 days. No submissions will be accepted beyond this deadline. No submissions unrelated to r. 57.01(1) will be considered.

Bellows, J.

Released: July 16, 2026

CITATION: Vaughan v. Chen, 2026 ONSC 4135

Footnotes

1. 1See Vaughan v. Chen, CV-25-00000065-0000 (“Vaughan”) (Factum of the Plaintiff (Moving Party) on Motion to Strike the Statement of Defence, at subpara. 7(c)).
2. 2See Vaughan (Defendant’s Motion Record, at Tab 3, Tab A).
3. 3See Vaughan (Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, at paras. 63, 65, 72, 79 – all refer to costs ordered against her as a foundation for damages).
4. 4See Hartmann v. Amourgis, [2008] O.J. No. 2388 (S.C.), aff’d 2009 ONCA 33, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 65, at paras. 17, 23-24, and 37.
5. 5Abrahams v. Attorney General of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 514.
6. 6Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 2000 CanLII 22340 (ON SC), 47 O.R. (3d) 446 (S.C.), aff’d (2000), 2000 CanLII 8514 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.) (“Canam Enterprises (ONCA)”), rev’d 2002 SCC 63. See specifically Canam Enterprises (ONCA), at para. 55. Despite the Supreme Court of Canada reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, it explicitly approved the dissenting reasons of Goudge J.A., from which this reference was made. See also Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, at para. 40, for a restatement of same by the Court.
7. 7Canam Enterprises (ONCA), at para. 55, as cited in Behn, at para. 40.
8. 8Behn, at para. 41.
9. 9See Vaughan (Defendant’s Motion Record, at Exhibit 2W).
10. 10See Vaughan (Defendant’s Motion Record, at Exhibit 2X).
11. 11See Vaughan (Defendant’s Motion Record, at Exhibit 2Z).
12. 12See Vaughan (Defendant’s Motion Record, at Exhibits 2CC, 2FF, 2JJ and 2LL). The decision dismissing the appeal is reported at 2024 ONCA 914.