COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Tulloch C.J.O., Sossin J.A. and O’Marra J. (ad hoc)
BETWEEN
Nicolas Alexander Stingelin, in his capacity as Estate Trustee of the Estate of Monika Andrea Stingelin, Deceased
Plaintiff (Appellant)
and
Cynthia Woods
Defendant (Respondent)
Christopher Crisman-Cox, for the appellant
Amani Rauff, for the respondent
Heard: March 17, 2026
On appeal from the order of Justice Paul B. Schabas of the Superior Court of Justice, dated June 30, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONSC 3882.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
1The appellant appeals from an order granting summary judgment dismissing his negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the respondent, a lawyer retained to prepare the will of his aunt, Sabina Erlich.
2The motion judge concluded that the action could not succeed because the respondent owed no duty of care or fiduciary duty to the appellant, the appellant suffered no legally recoverable loss caused by the respondent, and the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B (the “Limitations Act, 2002”).
3The motion judge also held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.
4We see no error; accordingly, we dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.
Background
5In 1992, Monika Stingelin executed a declaration of trust under which she held legal title to four residential properties in Kitchener for the benefit of her sister, Sabina Erlich. Monika held no beneficial interest in those properties.
6Monika’s 2004 will purported to transfer her trusteeship of those properties into a new trust arrangement under which they would be held for Sabina during her lifetime and thereafter in a Henson trust for Sabina’s disabled son, Tony.
7Monika died in 2011. The appellant became estate trustee.
8Despite the trust arrangement, the appellant did not transfer the properties to Sabina.
9In 2015, Sabina retained the respondent to prepare her will. The appellant met the respondent only twice, at meetings attended by Sabina’s attorney for property, Penelope Chapman.
10Sabina died in 2016. Her will left her estate equally to her sons, Tony and Andrew. Neither the appellant nor Monika’s estate was a beneficiary.
11In 2017, Sabina’s estate demanded transfer of the properties.
12When the appellant refused, litigation followed. In 2019, Justice Sloan held that the 1992 trust remained valid, that the properties were beneficially owned by Sabina, and that Monika’s estate had no beneficial interest in them.
13The appellant subsequently commenced this action alleging that he relied on the respondent’s legal advice and suffered damages including legal costs, emotional distress, and reputational harm.
14The respondent moved for summary judgment and succeeded.
Analysis
1. No genuine issue requiring a trial
15The appellant submits that factual disputes concerning what the respondent said at the meetings and whether Sabina would have drafted her will differently required a trial.
16The motion judge correctly rejected that submission.
17Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidentiary record permits a fair determination on the merits and a trial would add nothing of value: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 49.
18Even accepting the appellant’s version of events, the claim fails because the respondent owed him no duty, the alleged losses were not caused by the respondent, and the claim is out of time.
19The motion judge, therefore, committed no error in proceeding in by way of summary judgment.
2. Duty of care
20It is undisputed that the respondent was retained by Sabina and not by the appellant. The motion judge found there was no solicitor-client relationship between the respondent and the appellant, and no basis on the evidence to conclude that the respondent undertook to act for him.
21A lawyer ordinarily owes duties only to the client. Courts have recognized a narrow exception in will-drafting cases where the testator’s solicitor negligently fails to confer an intended benefit on an identified beneficiary under the will: Ross v. Caunters, [1979] 3 All E.R. 580 (Ch. Div.); White v. Jones, 2 A.C. 207 (H.L.); *Hall v. Bennett Estate * (2003), 2003 7157 (ON CA), 64 O.R. (3d) 191 (C.A.), at paras. 49-52. But the existence and scope of any such duty remain dependent on the circumstances. In Hall, this court held that the retainer is fundamental to the proximity analysis and that, absent a retainer to prepare the will, no duty arose to the prospective beneficiary: at paras. 56-59.
22That exception does not apply here. The appellant was not an intended beneficiary of Sabina’s will. Sabina’s 2016 will provided equally for Tony and Andrew. It did not name the appellant or Monika’s estate.
23The appellant’s theory would require recognition of a new duty of care extending beyond the limited class recognized in the will-drafting cases. The motion judge made no error in declining to recognize such a duty. Such a duty requires foreseeability and proximity: Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v. J.J., 2018 SCC 19, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 587, at para. 18.
24First, it was not reasonably foreseeable that advice given to Sabina about her will would expose the respondent to liability to a stranger to the estate who, relying on a different will and trust arrangement, asserted control over property beneficially owned by Sabina.
25Second, proximity is not established. The respondent never undertook to act for the appellant and owed undivided loyalty to her client Sabina.
26Courts have repeatedly refused to extend the narrow will-drafting duty to beneficiaries under prior wills or to persons asserting that the testator would have made different testamentary arrangements if given different advice: Graham v. Bonnycastle, 2004 ABCA 270, 243 D.L.R. (4th) 617, at paras. 17-19, 22-23, 26, 29, leave to appeal refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 489; Harrison v. Fallis, 2006 19457 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 24-29; Johnston Estate v. Johnston, 2017 BCCA 59, 92 B.C.L.R. (5th) 223, at paras. 31-37.
27The motion judge, therefore, correctly concluded that no duty of care existed.
3. Fiduciary duty
28The appellant also alleges an ad hoc fiduciary relationship.
29Such a relationship requires an undertaking to act in the claimant’s best interests and defined beneficiaries vulnerable to the fiduciary’s discretionary power affecting their legal or substantial practical interests: Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261, at paras. 30-36.
30None of those elements are present.
31The respondent acted solely for Sabina and owed her undivided loyalty. She neither undertook to act in the appellant’s best interests nor exercised discretionary power over his legal or substantial practical interests.
32The fiduciary duty claim was, therefore, properly dismissed.
4. Causation and damages
33The appellant seeks damages arising from the prior litigation before Justice Sloan, including legal costs, emotional distress, and reputational harm.
34Those losses were not caused by the respondent.
35Justice Sloan determined that the 1992 trust remained valid, that Sabina was the beneficial owner of the properties, and that Monika’s estate had no beneficial interest in them.
36The consequences that followed flowed from that judicial determination.
37Both negligence and breach of fiduciary duty require proof that the defendant caused the loss complained of before awarding compensation: Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, at para. 3; Stirrett v. Cheema, 2020 ONCA 288, 150 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 65, leave to appeal refused, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 229.
38The motion judge, therefore, made no error in concluding that causation and damages were not established.
5. Limitation period
39The motion judge also concluded that the claim was statute-barred.
40Under s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, a claim must be commenced within two years of discoverability.
41Discoverability occurs when the claimant knows or reasonably ought to know the material facts giving rise to the claim: Espartel Investments Limited v. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 993, 2024 ONCA 18, 492 D.L.R. (4th) 659, at para. 14, citing Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick, 2021 SCC 31, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 704, at para. 29.
42By March 24, 2017, Sabina’s estate had demanded transfer of the properties. At that point, the appellant knew that the estate alleged that he had breached the trust and that litigation might follow.
43The appellant did not commence this action until August 2019.
44The motion judge rejected the appellant’s submission that discoverability awaited Justice Sloan’s ruling. He was entitled to conclude that the claim was discoverable by March 24, 2017, at the latest.
45The motion judge, therefore, properly concluded that the action was out of time.
Disposition
46The motion judge committed no reversible error.
47The appeal is dismissed.
48The respondent is entitled to her costs of the appeal, fixed in the amount of $6,300, inclusive of HST and disbursements.
“M. Tulloch C.J.O.”
“L. Sossin J.A.”
“A. O’Marra J. (ad hoc)”
