Ryan Lax

The defendants in several related class actions brought motions for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' actions were statute-barred by limitation periods or were a nullity for failing to obtain leave to commence.

The court adjourned the limitation period motions, finding they overlapped with common issues in earlier certified class actions.

The court dismissed the motions based on the leave requirement, interpreting the certification orders' leave provisions as applying only to competing class actions representing the same class members, not to actions by different classes arising from the same factual matrix.

The plaintiff brought an unopposed motion to certify a class proceeding concerning the alleged improper payment of trailing commissions to discount brokers from CIBC mutual funds.

The court applied the five criteria under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, adopting previous judicial analyses for the first four criteria.

The court found the representative plaintiff capable and the proposed litigation and notice plans appropriate, granting the certification order.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against several discount brokers regarding the receipt of mutual fund trailing commissions.

The motion judge had found no basis in fact for the core proposed common issue of whether the receipt of such commissions contravened applicable Canadian securities law prior to their explicit prohibition in 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the 'some basis in fact' test, properly concluded that all pleaded causes of action relied on the allegation of illegality, and appropriately held the plaintiffs to their strategic concession that the entire action would fail if the core issue was not certified.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against seven discount brokers, alleging that their receipt of mutual fund trailing commissions prior to the 2022 prohibition was illegal.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the 'some evidence' requirement to show that the practice contravened applicable Canadian securities law.

The evidence filed by the plaintiffs themselves demonstrated that the practice, while controversial, was not illegal before the regulatory amendments took effect.

The motion for certification was dismissed.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving party defendants sought their costs.

The plaintiffs argued that the court should apply the appropriateness exception under s. 137.1(7) to award partial indemnity costs instead of the presumptive full indemnity costs.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding no basis to depart from the full indemnity presumption, and awarded the defendants their costs on a full indemnity basis (and substantial indemnity for one defendant on a pro bono retainer), totaling over $383,000.

The plaintiffs, a newspaper publisher and his company, brought an action for defamation, misfeasance in public office, inducing breach of contract, and wrongful interference with economic relations against several city councillors, school board trustees, and a media company.

The action arose from statements made by the defendants criticizing articles published by the plaintiffs as homophobic and transphobic, and advocating for the cessation of city advertising in the plaintiffs' newspaper.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The court granted the motions, finding that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the other claims had merit, and failed to show that the defendants had no valid defences, including fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication.

Furthermore, the court found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce appealed three lower court decisions in a class action initiated by Dara Fresco on behalf of 31,000 customer service employees.

The class action alleged that the Bank's overtime policies and record-keeping practices led to uncompensated overtime, contrary to the Canada Labour Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all three appeals.

It upheld the motion judge's interpretation of "permitted" overtime under s. 174 of the Code, affirming that the Bank's policies and record-keeping were "institutional impediments" to proper compensation.

The Court also confirmed the certification of aggregate damages, ruling that the Supreme Court's Pro-Sys decision allowed the trial judge to reconsider this issue despite a previous refusal at certification.

Finally, the Court upheld the motion judge's decision to defer a class-wide limitations order and a constitutional question regarding the extra-territorial application of the Class Proceedings Act, deeming them premature.

In a national class action for unpaid overtime, the defendant bank brought a motion for a class-wide limitations order to time-bar claims falling outside provincial limitation periods.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the reasonable discoverability of the claims—specifically whether taking legal action was appropriate—required individualized assessments.

Evidence of power imbalances, fear of reprisal, and reasonable reliance on the bank's misrepresentations rebutted the statutory presumption of discoverability on a class-wide basis.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to strike the limitations defence entirely was also dismissed.

This decision addresses cross-motions for summary judgment on damages issues in a class action for unpaid overtime.

The court previously found the defendant bank liable for breaching federal labour law regarding overtime.

In this stage, the court considered common issues related to unjust enrichment, remedies, and punitive damages, and crucially, whether to add aggregate damages as a common issue.

The court found that while the defendant was enriched, restitutionary relief was not available due to the breach of contract claim.

Punitive damages were denied as the bank's conduct, though careless, did not meet the "malicious, oppressive and high-handed" standard.

Most significantly, the court certified aggregate damages as a new common issue, finding a "reasonable possibility" that the plaintiff's proposed methodology, based on time-stamped computer data, could determine damages without individual proof, despite previous appellate court reservations about sampling.

The determination of the final aggregate damages quantum was adjourned pending expert reports and data access.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on the liability common issues in a class action for unpaid overtime on behalf of customer service employees of the defendant bank.

The court found that the bank's overtime policies, which required pre-approval, and its failure to record actual hours worked, violated the Canada Labour Code.

The court concluded that the bank permitted uncompensated overtime by failing to prevent it, thereby breaching its statutory and contractual duties to the class members.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review concerning the duty to consult on a wind farm project, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court noted the complexity of the issue, the significant financial stakes of the $240 million project, and the applicant's 15-month delay in commencing the application.

The court awarded costs of $50,000 plus disbursements and HST to each of the two respondent groups, while the respondent Minister did not seek costs.

The applicant sought to set aside an order quashing its application for judicial review of a renewable energy approval for a wind project.

The motions judge had quashed the application on the grounds of prematurity because the applicant had appealed the approval to the Environmental Review Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to set aside, agreeing that the application was premature as the administrative appeal process under the Environmental Protection Act had not yet been completed.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of the Director's issuance of a renewable energy approval, while simultaneously pursuing an appeal before the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT).

The respondents brought a motion to quash the judicial review application on the basis of prematurity.

The court granted the motion and quashed the application, applying the doctrine of exhaustion.

The court found that the ERT had the power to provide an effective remedy (revocation of the approval) and there were no exceptional circumstances justifying early recourse to the courts.

The moving party, Windlectric Inc., proposed a wind energy project on Amherst Island.

The Ministry of the Environment deemed the application complete, initiating the technical review phase.

The responding party, an association opposing the project, sought judicial review to quash the completeness determination, arguing the application lacked an adequate emergency response plan.

Windlectric brought a motion to quash the application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that a completeness check is an administrative step, not a statutory power of decision or a matter subject to public law remedies.

The court also held that the application for judicial review was premature, as the administrative process and available appeals had not been exhausted.