Graham Andrews

The applicant sought damages of $80,000 alleging that the respondent, a non-profit corporation administering a self-employment benefit program, failed to sell two seized dump trucks at fair market value following the applicant's default on a loan.

The respondent sold the trucks for $12,000 after they sat in a bailiff's yard for approximately one year.

The court dismissed the application on two grounds: first, the applicant's claim was barred by the Limitations Act, as he had knowledge of the sale price no later than June 2, 2022, and commenced the application on November 6, 2024; second, on the substantive merits, the respondent acted in good faith and took reasonable steps to obtain the best value possible.

The trucks required significant capital investment to comply with new regulations and were not commercially viable.

The court awarded costs of $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis, in addition to a prior costs order of $500.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim for damages against the City for groundwater contamination caused by road salt, which allegedly prevented the development of a medical office building with underground parking.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence that it actually intended to build such a development and subsequently excluded the appellant's expert evidence, which was based on that rejected factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings, evidentiary rulings, or costs award.

The moving party, Windlectric Inc., proposed a wind energy project on Amherst Island.

The Ministry of the Environment deemed the application complete, initiating the technical review phase.

The responding party, an association opposing the project, sought judicial review to quash the completeness determination, arguing the application lacked an adequate emergency response plan.

Windlectric brought a motion to quash the application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that a completeness check is an administrative step, not a statutory power of decision or a matter subject to public law remedies.

The court also held that the application for judicial review was premature, as the administrative process and available appeals had not been exhausted.