Christopher Joe Crisman-Cox

The appellant appealed from summary judgment dismissing negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against a lawyer retained to draft a deceased relative’s will.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because, even accepting the appellant’s version of events, the claim failed on duty, causation, and limitation grounds.

It declined to recognize a novel duty of care to a non-client who was not an intended beneficiary under the will, and found no ad hoc fiduciary undertaking.

The court further held that the alleged losses flowed from prior judicial findings concerning beneficial ownership of trust property, not from the respondent’s conduct, and that the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondent.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of Susan Henderson’s motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment dismissing her will challenge application.

The court considered written submissions on costs, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs of $3,630.69 to the responding party, Wei Wang, rejecting arguments of financial hardship, public interest, and self-representation as reasons to deny costs.

The moving party, Susan Henderson, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment dismissing her application to challenge the validity of her late mother’s 2018 Will.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and noting a pattern of delay and unreasonable conduct by the moving party.

The court emphasized the need for finality in estate matters and awarded costs to the responding party.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment in a commercial dispute where the plaintiff, Profit Professionals Inc., sought damages for breach of contract and on a quantum meruit basis.

The defendant, Tiger Drylac Canada Inc., argued that the plaintiff's claims were barred by a two-year limitation period.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the plaintiff's loss for the breach of contract claim, but granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's quantum meruit claim as statute-barred.

The applicant, an estate trustee, brought an application to determine the ownership of joint bank accounts held by the deceased and the respondent, the other estate trustee.

The respondent argued the accounts passed to her by right of survivorship.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust and found that the bank signature cards and financial services agreements were insufficient to rebut the presumption.

The accounts were declared estate assets, and the respondent was ordered to provide an updated accounting.

The parties were also directed to discuss the disposition of the deceased's ashes.

The applicant brought a motion seeking further financial disclosure from the respondent, specifically bank statements and cancelled cheques, in the context of a motion to change child support.

The applicant argued the disclosure was necessary to ascertain the respondent's true income, noting discrepancies between his hourly rate and reported income.

The court dismissed the motion for bank statements, finding the request disproportionate and akin to a fishing expedition, as the respondent was a unionized T4 employee with reasonable explanations for income fluctuations.

However, the court ordered the respondent to produce a more detailed employment letter.

The respondent, Colin Jones, moved to consolidate an estate application commenced in Toronto with a related application commenced in Guelph, and to transfer the Toronto application to Guelph.

The applicant, Brian Jones, opposed the transfer, arguing the matter should remain in Toronto to benefit from the Toronto Estates List's mandatory mediation and case management.

The court granted the motion to consolidate and transfer the proceedings to Guelph, finding that Guelph had a much stronger connection to the parties and the estate assets.

However, the court imposed a condition requiring the parties to attend mandatory mediation.

The applicant brought an unopposed motion to enforce a final order for lump sum spousal support and equalization against the respondent and his wholly-owned corporation.

The court dismissed the request to transfer funds from the respondent's locked-in retirement account (LIRA) because the LIRA was not in pay.

However, the court pierced the corporate veil, allowing the order to be enforced against the respondent's corporation, as the respondent had arranged for his employment income to be paid to the corporation to avoid his family law obligations.

The court also ordered that the lump sum support be enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion and application where the applicant, Mohamed Khatau (operating as MAK Enterprises), was largely unsuccessful in preventing the respondent, Apra Development Inc., from removing or selling property after failing to vacate premises as per a consent order.

Apra sought full indemnity costs, citing Khatau's breach of the consent order and the motion's lack of merit.

Khatau argued for partial indemnity, asserting his conduct was not "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous" and that the motion was brought out of genuine concern for his livelihood.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Apra, finding Khatau's conduct did not warrant full indemnity, and reduced the requested fees due to potential duplication of counsel services and excessive hours for a non-complicated motion.

The applicant sought an extension of a consent order requiring them to vacate premises and remove property, or alternative relief regarding the sale of their property.

The respondent opposed, seeking to uphold the original order, permission to remove/sell the applicant's property, and compensation for occupation rent and costs.

The court denied the applicant's request for a lengthy extension, finding that the applicant had ample notice and had previously agreed to the vacation date.

However, the court granted a short extension until April 30, 2019, for the applicant to remove property, after which the respondent could remove or sell it, with the applicant remaining liable for occupation rent and removal costs.