Melisa Rupoli

The applicant, a property owner leasing space to food trucks, sought an interim injunction to stay the enforcement of the City of Brampton's new Mobile Licensing By-law pending a judicial review application.

The new by-law removed a previous exemption that allowed food trucks to operate in the downtown area with the local BIA's consent, instead permitting them anywhere downtown provided they are 50 metres from a fixed food premise.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the RJR-MacDonald test.

The court found no serious issue to be tried as municipal by-laws cannot be challenged for unreasonableness and the City owed no duty of procedural fairness when acting legislatively.

The applicant also failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in enforcing the validly enacted by-law.

This appeal concerned a failed business venture between the appellants (Corridor Transport Inc. and Corridor Transport Limited Partnership) and the respondents (Vittorio Junior Lentini, LTI Logistics Inc., and Loblaw Companies Limited).

The appellants claimed breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty by a director.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no enforceable contract due to fundamental misunderstandings regarding the parties' identities and entitlement to business proceeds, and no conversion as the appellants lacked a possessory interest in the funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings or error in law, emphasizing the trial judge's reasonable conclusion that no meeting of the minds occurred on essential contractual terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Wilkinson J. dated July 6, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $3,500.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to add a real estate agent, his brokerage, and an undisclosed third party as defendants in an aborted real estate transaction.

The original defendant purchaser alleged he was merely a front for the third party, orchestrated by the real estate agent.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proposed claim for negligent misrepresentation disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the real estate agent, who owed a prima facie duty of care to the vendor regarding the identity of the purchaser.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment against them for unpaid freight services and breach of statutory trust.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal was convened to reconsider its prior decision in Umlauf v. Umlauf regarding deemed admissions on default.

The Court overruled Umlauf, holding that while facts pleaded in a statement of claim are deemed admitted when a defendant is noted in default, conclusions of law and mixed fact and law are not.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made no error in refusing to set aside the default judgment because the appellants failed to file an adequate record and the evidence supported the findings of a 2% monthly interest agreement and the director's personal liability for knowing assistance in the corporation's breach of statutory trust.

The appellants, operators of a cabinet-making business, appealed a permanent injunction that prevented them from causing a noise nuisance to an adjoining law office in a mixed-use condominium complex.

The injunction was initially granted by the Superior Court after the appellants failed to mitigate the noise despite multiple opportunities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower court's findings that an unreasonable nuisance existed, that the legal test for nuisance was properly applied, and rejecting the appellants' arguments that the respondents should have taken measures to reduce the noise or that statutory authority permitted the nuisance.

The appellants sought to appeal two judgments.

The Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the first judgment (October 2020 Judgment) because a prior appeal of that judgment had been dismissed for delay or abandoned, constituting an impermissible collateral attack.

The court declined to exercise its power to set aside the prior dismissal, emphasizing that proper procedural rules must be followed for such a request.

The appeal concerning the second judgment (February 2021 Judgment) was adjourned and will be rescheduled.

Costs thrown away were awarded to the respondents.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion and application where the applicant, Mohamed Khatau (operating as MAK Enterprises), was largely unsuccessful in preventing the respondent, Apra Development Inc., from removing or selling property after failing to vacate premises as per a consent order.

Apra sought full indemnity costs, citing Khatau's breach of the consent order and the motion's lack of merit.

Khatau argued for partial indemnity, asserting his conduct was not "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous" and that the motion was brought out of genuine concern for his livelihood.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Apra, finding Khatau's conduct did not warrant full indemnity, and reduced the requested fees due to potential duplication of counsel services and excessive hours for a non-complicated motion.

The applicant sought an extension of a consent order requiring them to vacate premises and remove property, or alternative relief regarding the sale of their property.

The respondent opposed, seeking to uphold the original order, permission to remove/sell the applicant's property, and compensation for occupation rent and costs.

The court denied the applicant's request for a lengthy extension, finding that the applicant had ample notice and had previously agreed to the vacation date.

However, the court granted a short extension until April 30, 2019, for the applicant to remove property, after which the respondent could remove or sell it, with the applicant remaining liable for occupation rent and removal costs.