Michael Gayed

The appellants brought an application seeking wide-ranging relief regarding the operation of the respondent gun club and the finances of all three respondents.

The application judge dismissed the application on the basis of lack of standing, a full and final release previously signed by the appellants, and the expiry of the limitation period.

On appeal, the appellants attempted to argue the merits afresh without addressing the application judge's dispositive findings.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, holding the release barred the claims and the limitation period had expired, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $22,000 to the respondents.

This is a costs decision arising from an application for oppression remedies and wide-ranging relief that was dismissed in its entirety.

The respondents sought full indemnity costs of $273,584.40, with alternatives of substantial indemnity or partial indemnity costs.

The applicants sought partial indemnity costs of $60,000.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $169,000, finding that the applicants had pursued an unmeritorious application in breach of a prior settlement and enforcement order, with conduct that was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The court also addressed the personal liability of Roland Foch and the joint and several liability of Roland Foch and Frank Foch's estate.

The court dismissed the application by Roland Foch and the estate of Frank Foch against Sharon Gun Club and related entities.

The applicants sought various remedies including oppression, a declaration of illegal operation, and financial/accounting relief.

The court found the applicants lacked standing against two of the three respondents, that the application was barred by prior litigation and settlement, and that the claims were statute-barred.

On the merits, the court found no evidence of oppression, financial impropriety, or illegal operation.

The court also granted a limited sealing order for a redacted shareholder list exhibit.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, ordering the return of their deposit for an assignment of a property that was never built.

The defendant was not entitled to retain the deposit or deduct expenses, and the real estate agent (Hometown) was required to return its commission, as the underlying transaction did not close due to the builder's bankruptcy.

The decision turned on the interpretation of the relevant agreements and the application of contract law principles.

The plaintiff, Giuseppina Mari, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Mujeeb Sanjer and Genan Zamt, following a failed real estate transaction.

The court considered whether the original or amended agreement of purchase and sale should be used to assess damages, whether the plaintiff mitigated her damages, and what additional damages were recoverable.

The court held that the original agreement applied, awarded damages based on the difference between the original sale price and the ultimate resale price, and allowed certain additional costs.

The court also found that the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps to mitigate her losses.

The court considered the appropriate scale and quantum of costs following a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff, John Teljeur, sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the defendants' conduct was egregious and deserving of censure.

The court found the employer's failure to pay owed amounts and comply with statutory obligations justified an award of substantial indemnity costs, but made modest reductions for certain litigation steps.

The final award was $24,000 in substantial indemnity costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment in a commercial dispute where the plaintiff, Profit Professionals Inc., sought damages for breach of contract and on a quantum meruit basis.

The defendant, Tiger Drylac Canada Inc., argued that the plaintiff's claims were barred by a two-year limitation period.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the plaintiff's loss for the breach of contract claim, but granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's quantum meruit claim as statute-barred.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside default steps taken by the plaintiff and to strike, stay, or dismiss the action.

The court found that the plaintiff's counsel acted improperly in noting the defendants in default, as the defendants had promptly indicated their intention to bring a motion to strike/stay the action, which constitutes a defence.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's action was duplicative of an existing lien action by Prompt Builders Inc. and violated the corporate separateness principle (*Foss v. Harbottle*), as the plaintiff, as a sole shareholder, was suing for damages owed to the corporation.

The court granted the motion, setting aside the noting in default and dismissing the plaintiff's action, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to amend the original lien action to include any personal claims.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis for the default issue and partial indemnity for the rest, totaling $8,500.

This is an appeal from a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings on mitigation efforts, the award for lost benefits, and the award of moral damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the respondent made reasonable mitigation efforts, the calculation of lost benefits, or the award of moral damages, noting that the bases for moral damages were pleaded and the appellants' conduct warranted censure.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The case involved a dispute between brothers Domenic, Salvatore, and Bruno Rosso, and their wives, concerning minutes of settlement.

Bruno moved to enforce the minutes, alleging Domenic breached them.

Domenic cross-moved to set aside the minutes, claiming duress, fraudulent misrepresentation, or improvidence, and also arguing they were null and void under a specific contractual clause.

The court found that Domenic and Carmelina (Domenic's wife and a "Settling Party") validly exercised their contractual right under the minutes of settlement to declare them null and void due to an uncured default.

The court dismissed Bruno's motion to enforce and granted Domenic's cross-motion to set aside the minutes of settlement on this contractual basis, rejecting Domenic's other claims of duress, misrepresentation, and improvidence due to lack of credible evidence.

The plaintiff, a former General Manager, brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal, seeking damages for reasonable notice, lost fringe benefits, expense reimbursement, and moral damages.

The defendants conceded joint responsibility for damages and expense reimbursement but disputed the notice period, mitigation, and moral damages.

The court assessed the reasonable notice period at seven months, dismissed the defendants' mitigation arguments due to lack of evidence, and awarded moral damages of $15,000 due to the employer's bad faith conduct during termination, including failure to provide written notice, delayed ESA payments, and unfulfilled severance promises.

The defendant, State Farm, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Lynnette Dalton James, to attend a defence psychological examination in Mississauga.

The plaintiff agreed to the examination but requested it be held in Markham, where she resides, or by videoconference, citing vehicular anxiety and pain stemming from a motor vehicle accident.

The court, applying principles for determining the location of defence medical examinations, found that the plaintiff's choice of location was reasonable given her diagnosed Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with vehicular anxiety/avoidance.

The defendant failed to demonstrate why the examination could not be conducted at the more convenient Markham location.

The motion to compel attendance in Mississauga was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to attend the examination in Markham or by videoconference.

The plaintiff's separate request for leave to set the action down for trial before mandatory mediation was refused.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for default judgment after noting the defendants in default in an action for investment fraud.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to set aside the noting in default.

The court found that the defendants had engaged in a concerted effort to delay the proceedings and failed to provide any substantive evidence of a meritorious defence.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the noting in default and granted default judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the primary individual defendant liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract, and the defendant lawyer liable for negligent misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, Sapex Canada Inc., brought an urgent motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging that the sale of a property by one of the individual defendants, Dieneen Lepp, indicated an attempt to dissipate assets to avoid judgment.

The defendants argued that the action, proceeding under Simplified Procedure, precluded injunctive relief and that the requirements for a Mareva injunction were not met.

The court found it had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in Simplified Procedure actions but ultimately dismissed the motion, concluding there was no real and genuine risk that the defendants were dissipating assets for the purpose of avoiding judgment.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant at trial, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay damages for a breached vehicle lease.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge failed to properly consider a preliminary motion regarding a prior dismissed action and treated the appellant unfairly throughout the trial.

The trial judge repeatedly interrupted, made sarcastic and denigrating comments, and elicited irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.

The Divisional Court concluded that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, rendering the trial unfair.

The trial judgment and the underlying order reinstating the action were set aside.

Following the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal in writing, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The court had previously fixed costs at $7,500 payable by the moving parties to the responding parties.

The moving parties sought to vary the costs award, arguing they were prejudiced because the responding parties had not filed costs submissions prior to the hearing date.

The court declined to change the costs award, noting the new practice for written leave motions and finding the $7,500 award fair and reasonable based on the volume of materials and complexity of the matter.

This is a costs decision following the successful setting aside of an Anton Piller Order in an employer-employee dispute.

The defendants sought full indemnity costs of over $450,000, alleging the plaintiffs' principal engaged in reprehensible conduct and failed to make full disclosure on the ex parte motion.

The plaintiffs argued no costs should be awarded due to an unaccepted settlement offer, or alternatively, costs should be significantly reduced.

The court found the defendants' costs claim to be grossly excessive and noted that both parties engaged in acrimonious and uncooperative conduct.

The court awarded the defendants $100,000 in partial indemnity costs, less $10,000 awarded to the plaintiffs for a production motion, payable in any event of the cause.

The appellants sued the respondent consulting firms for failing to deliver an approved environmental Risk Assessment on time.

After discovery, the appellants moved to add an individual employee of the respondents as a necessary defendant, which the Master refused.

The appellants appealed the Master's decision and brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence and would not be conclusive.

The court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the Master made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the individual was not a necessary party, as the corporate respondents were fully insured and capable of responding to the claims.

In a recruitment-industry dispute, the plaintiffs sought to continue and expand interlocutory relief after obtaining an ex parte Anton Piller order and interim injunction against a former consultant and related defendants alleged to have used client and candidate information to compete.

The court held that the extraordinary Anton Piller remedy should not have been granted, found material non-disclosure on the ex parte motion, and concluded the allegedly confidential information was largely public, outdated, and of overstated value.

Applying the interlocutory injunction framework, the court found there may have been a serious issue to be tried, but no irreparable harm and no balance of convenience favouring injunctive relief.

The court also refused a sealing order, declined to schedule a contempt motion, dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, and granted the defendants' cross-motion.

The parties appealed a master’s decision concerning defence medical examinations in a personal injury action involving a minor who sustained serious injuries after falling from an apartment window.

The master granted leave for a second motion and ordered the plaintiff to attend a defence neuropsychological assessment, with the plaintiff’s mother required to participate by questionnaire and interview.

The master refused to order an in‑home future care cost assessment by a nurse practitioner.

On appeal, the court held the master made no reviewable error, finding the neuropsychological assessment was justified to respond to the plaintiff’s expert evidence and that the second motion was not barred by res judicata or abuse of process.

The refusal to order the in‑home assessment was upheld because the proposed assessor was not a statutory “health practitioner” and the evidence did not demonstrate necessity.