François Sauvageau

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision granting the respondent's request for prompt payment under the Construction Act.

The adjudicator found jurisdiction on the basis that the contract was not completed because more than 1% of the contract price was owing.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, holding that the adjudicator was plainly wrong in law, as 'price of completion' under s. 2(3) of the Act refers to the value of uncompleted work, not the quantum of disputed payment claims.

The matter was remitted for a fresh determination before a different adjudicator.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to apply for judicial review of an adjudicator's interim and final decisions.

The Divisional Court granted leave to apply for judicial review and ordered that the adjudicator's decisions be stayed pending the final determination of the application.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a defamation action brought by the respondent.

They also appealed the motion judge's award of costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the impugned Facebook post did not relate to a matter of public interest, concluding it was a private business dispute despite references to masks and a potential class action.

The court also affirmed the costs award, finding no error in the motion judge's discretion to award costs given the perceived misuse of the anti-SLAPP provision.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which was denied.

In this costs decision, the plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants argued no costs should be awarded based on the presumption in s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found it appropriate to depart from the presumption and award costs to the plaintiff, noting the underlying dispute was purely private and the defendants' voluminous motion record was disproportionate, suggesting a misuse of the anti-SLAPP rule.

The defendants were ordered to pay $80,000 in costs.

The respondent requested the production of the applicant's employment records for July and August 2011 from her other employer, a third party to the proceeding.

The third party indicated it would produce the documents upon the applicant's consent or a Tribunal order.

As the documents were directly relevant to an issue in the hearing and neither the applicant nor the third party opposed the request, the Tribunal ordered the third party to produce the records to the respondent.

The applicant sought to amend her human rights application to include allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, and disability, and to add events that occurred after the initial filing, including her termination.

The respondent objected due to delay and prejudice.

The Tribunal allowed the amendments, noting that the respondent had already addressed the subsequent events in its Response, minimizing any prejudice.

The Tribunal deferred ruling on the respondent's request for third-party production until the third party was properly served.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of reprisal.

The respondent requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that, based on the applicant's representations concerning the evidence she intended to call, it could not conclude at this stage that she had no reasonable prospect of establishing a link between the incidents described and the ground of reprisal.

The Tribunal ordered the matter to proceed to a one-day hearing where the applicant would be required to call her case.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him and his corporation to pay $9,300 for a Persian carpet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by granting judgment against him personally without piercing the corporate veil, as the cheque was drawn on the corporation's account.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that both the individual and corporate defendants were involved in the transaction, having both issued cheques for the purchase price.

As the defendants denied any transaction occurred, the trial judge correctly found them jointly and severally liable as co-buyers.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her discrimination complaints as an abuse of process.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had fabricated letters from co-workers to support her claims and lacked credibility.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, well within its power to control its own process, and protected by a highly deferential standard of review.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, brought an action in Ontario alleging a conspiracy by the defendants to use fraudulent bankruptcy proceedings in Quebec to defeat the process of the Ontario courts.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action on jurisdictional grounds, and the trustee in bankruptcy moved for a stay because the plaintiff failed to obtain leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and was not forum non conveniens.

However, the Court allowed the trustee's appeal in part, holding that the action against the trustee must be stayed until the plaintiff obtains leave from the Quebec Superior Court.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision denying him long-term benefits for depression allegedly caused by a workplace injury.

The applicant argued he was denied natural justice because the Tribunal relied on a hearsay letter from his daughter, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal is permitted to admit hearsay evidence and the applicant had ample notice of the letter.

The Court also held that the Tribunal's conclusion that non-work-related factors outweighed the contribution of the workplace injury was reasonable and supported by ample evidence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision finding that two related corporations were privies, and that issue estoppel prevented the second corporation from re-litigating issues decided in a default judgment against the first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The companies shared the same controlling mind, business, location, and key employees.

The controlling mind knew the respondent had initially sued the wrong corporate entity but failed to disclose it, and the second corporation was bound by the first's deliberate choice not to defend the action.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly concluded that the appellants made a deliberate choice not to file a statement of defence.

Applying established jurisprudence, the court held that an intentional refusal to defend stands as a permanent bar to intervention.

The court also declined to interfere with the punitive damages award, noting the appellants provided no authority to support the contention that it was excessive.