Solomon Ross Fischhoff

The respondents brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the applicant's application to rectify the parcel register and discharge a charge against his property, arguing the application disclosed no cause of action and was statute-barred.

The court held that Rule 21.01(1)(a) does not apply to applications, and the limitations issue involved mixed fact and law.

While Rule 21.01(1)(b) applies to applications via Rule 14.09, the court found the Notice of Application disclosed a valid cause of action for civil fraud against the moving parties.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, who are elderly homeowners, brought an action alleging a large-scale mortgage fraud scheme perpetrated by the defendants.

During an injunction motion, the plaintiffs moved to remove the defendants' counsel, Mr. Fischhoff, arguing he was a material witness regarding a disputed conversation with the plaintiffs about the impugned mortgages.

Mr. Fischhoff brought a cross-motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding that Mr. Fischhoff was a material witness to a critical disputed fact and could not cross-examine the plaintiffs on his own communications with them.

The cross-motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel was dismissed as entirely without merit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for injunctive relief regarding alleged systemic mortgage fraud linked to a specific company's sales tactics.

The court continued prior interim orders on consent and granted additional interim relief requiring the defendant to seek court leave before enforcing any residential mortgages originated by the implicated company.

The court also ordered the defendant to notify mortgagors of legal assistance options upon seeking enforcement.

The issue of whether defense counsel must be removed from the record for being a potential witness was adjourned to a case conference.

The plaintiffs commenced an action and sought urgent injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of notices of sale by the defendants.

The court granted an interim injunction preventing further steps in enforcing notices of sale against the named plaintiffs, finding the uncontradicted evidence justified the order.

The plaintiffs' requests for disclosure of other affected mortgagors and restrictions on future notices of sale, based on allegations of systemic conduct, were deferred to a return date to allow the defendants time to retain counsel and respond.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) were found entitled to costs.

The court determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis, as the appeal was not entirely without merit and the appellants' conduct was not criticized.

Costs were fixed at $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The Superior Court of Justice heard motions and cross-motions arising from four identical actions.

The primary motion was brought by the plaintiffs' lawyers (the "Lawyers") to strike counterclaims asserted against them by the defendants by counterclaim (the "Lenders").

The Lenders' counterclaims alleged conspiracy, intentional interference with economic relations, and champerty and maintenance, and they sought to add a new claim for breach of privacy/misappropriation of confidential information.

The court dismissed the Lenders' motion for leave to tender evidence and granted the Lawyers' motion, striking the counterclaims in their entirety without leave to amend, finding that the claims against the Lawyers were untenable at law and contrary to public policy.

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed a default judgment obtained against them for knowingly assisting in a client's fraud.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, treating the motion judge's decision as equivalent to a refusal to set aside a default judgment.

The Court upheld the motion judge's refusal to set aside the noting in default, citing the appellants' bad faith and deliberate delay tactics.

While agreeing that the negligence claim was not properly pleaded, the Court affirmed the finding of liability for knowing assistance in fraud, based on the lawyer's issuance of a misleading "comfort letter" and the disbursement of funds from his trust account despite knowledge of the property's prior sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) to halt power of sale proceedings on her home.

She alleged that a mortgage registered against her property was obtained by fraud when an unidentified individual approached her at her home and induced her to sign documents while she was intoxicated and visually impaired.

The respondents argued that a mortgagor cannot obtain a CPL to stop a power of sale without offering to redeem the mortgage.

The court held that where fraud goes to the very formation and enforceability of the mortgage, the rigid rule requiring redemption does not apply.

Balancing the equities, the court granted the CPL to protect the applicant from potential homelessness pending a determination on the merits.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a defamation action brought by the respondent.

They also appealed the motion judge's award of costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the impugned Facebook post did not relate to a matter of public interest, concluding it was a private business dispute despite references to masks and a potential class action.

The court also affirmed the costs award, finding no error in the motion judge's discretion to award costs given the perceived misuse of the anti-SLAPP provision.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which was denied.

In this costs decision, the plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants argued no costs should be awarded based on the presumption in s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found it appropriate to depart from the presumption and award costs to the plaintiff, noting the underlying dispute was purely private and the defendants' voluminous motion record was disproportionate, suggesting a misuse of the anti-SLAPP rule.

The defendants were ordered to pay $80,000 in costs.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' Small Claims Court appeal, the successful respondents sought costs of $21,001.05 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that an elevated scale of costs was warranted due to the respondents' offers to settle, the appellants' abandonment of arguments at the hearing, and the complexity caused by the appellants' materials.

However, applying the principle of proportionality, the court fixed costs at $15,000 all-inclusive.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 for damage to personal property.

The appellants had purchased a home and, when the occupants did not vacate on the closing date, removed their belongings and left them outside in the rain.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants acted as gratuitous bailees and were grossly negligent in their treatment of the property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant moved for security for costs against multiple corporate plaintiffs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held the moving party failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing good reason to believe the plaintiffs lacked assets in Ontario to satisfy a costs award.

In any event, the responding parties established they had a beneficial interest in a mortgage with residual value available to respond to any costs order.

The motion was dismissed.

The successful plaintiffs received partial indemnity costs, but their request for substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle was rejected for lack of genuine compromise.

The plaintiff dentist alleged that the defendants supplied defective dental equipment causing business losses, property damage from leaking equipment, and delays in opening a second clinic.

On competing motions relating to documentary production and discovery procedures, the court applied the relevance standard under Rule 30.02 and the proportionality principle under Rule 29.2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ordered various categories of document production from both sides, including financial records, repair invoices, equipment images, and documents relevant to alleged lost profits and misrepresentation.

The court also permitted the plaintiff to examine an individual defendant personally at discovery due to allegations that he was the directing mind of the corporate defendant and personally involved in the representations at issue.

A discovery plan was ordered to move the litigation forward.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision, arguing errors of fact regarding credibility findings and the treatment of a family physician's opinion, as well as an error in principle regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were available on the record and that he was not bound to accept every aspect of the medical opinion.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Simplified Procedure would not have been appropriate given how the defence was conducted.