CITATION: Bozek v. Drongosky, 2026 ONSC 4245
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: JENNIFER BOZEK and SUSAN BELZA, Applicants
AND:
MICHAEL DRONGOSKY and the ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER RINTOUL, Respondents
BEFORE: Justice B. Dietrich
COUNSEL: Joseph Figliomeni, for the Applicants
Heather Watson, for the Respondent, Michael Drongosky
HEARD: June 22, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1This matter involves the interpretation of provisions included in the last will and testament of the late Cheryl Rintoul (“Dr. Rintoul”).
2Dr. Rintoul died on June 27, 2023. She was survived by her two daughters, Jennifer Bozek and Susan Alana Belza (the “Applicants”), and her son Christopher Rintoul (“Christopher”)1, who died in 2024. The Estate of Christopher Rintoul is a respondent and represented by his widow, Sarah Jane Rintoul.
3Dr. Rintoul was also survived by her husband, Michael Drongosky (the “Respondent”), to whom she had been married for 28 years prior to her death. Dr. Rintoul’s three children are from a previous marriage.
4At issue is whether the Applicants, who are the principal designated beneficiaries of Dr. Rintoul’s registered retirement income fund (the “RRIF”), are responsible for a share of the income tax owing by Dr. Rintoul in her terminal year. For tax purposes, the date of death value of the RRIF would be included in Dr. Rintoul’s income in her terminal year.
5In 2018, Dr. Rintoul completed a National Bank RRIF beneficiary designation form (the “RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form”), in which she designated her children and the Respondent as beneficiaries. She designated her children as equal beneficiaries, as to 90 per cent, and the Respondent, as to 10 per cent.
6The RRIF designation revoked and replaced a designation in respect of Dr. Rintoul’s registered retirement savings plan (“RRSP”) that she made in her last will and testament executed August 23, 2001 (the “Will”). In the RRSP designation included in the Will, Dr. Rintoul designated her three children as the beneficiaries of the first $100,000 of the RRSP, and they were obligated to pay any income tax owing by Dr. Rintoul or her estate (the “Estate”) in respect of that $100,000 of RRSP income.
7Under the Will, the Respondent is the Estate Trustee of the Estate. Subject to a legacy payable to Dr. Rintoul’s children under the terms of the Will, the Respondent is also the beneficiary of the residue of the Estate.
8The Respondent asserts that based on the terms of the Will, the Applicants are liable to pay a share of the income tax owing as a consequence of Dr. Rintoul’s death and the inclusion of the value of the RRIF as taxable income in Dr. Rintoul’s terminal year.
9The Applicants contend that they are not liable to pay a share of such income tax because any tax obligation imposed on them in the Will relates to Dr. Rintoul’s RRSP, referred to in the Will, but not the RRIF, which is the subject of a separate designation, outside of the Will.
10In the alternative, the Applicants submit that if they are liable to pay a share of such income tax, the amount of tax owing by them would be less than the amount calculated by the Respondent.
11For the reasons that follow, I find that the Applicants are not liable for any income tax arising in respect of the RRIF and the inclusion of its value in Dr. Rintoul’s income in her terminal year.
Background Facts
12At the time Dr. Rintoul made the Will in August 2001, she had an RRSP, and she included in the Will a beneficiary designation of the RRSP benefits. The designation provided that her three children would receive $100,000 of the RRSP benefits, equally, provided they paid to the Estate an amount equal to the income tax payable by the Estate upon the realization and distribution of such RRSP benefits. In the Will, Dr. Rintoul designated the Respondent as the beneficiary of the remaining RRSP benefits.
13In a subsequent provision in the Will, Dr. Rintoul left a legacy of $150,000 to her three children, equally, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of her residence. She directed that if the children had not paid the Estate the amount equal to the income tax payable on account of the RRSP benefits that they received, that amount was to be deducted from their $150,000 legacy.
14The court issued a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will to the Respondent in August 2023.
15On September 15, 2023, National Bank distributed 90 per cent of the RRIF proceeds to the four designated beneficiaries in accordance with the RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form. National Bank did not withhold any amount for income tax on that amount, though Dr. Rintoul’s children had agreed that it could.
16Each of Dr. Rintoul’s children received $81,862.14, and the Respondent received $27,262.37. None of these funds passed through the Estate.
17The Respondent retained MNP LLP (“MNP”) to prepare Dr. Rintoul’s terminal return. MNP prepared and filed the return for the 2023 taxation year on April 4, 2024. The Respondent paid the tax owing by the Estate.
18According to MNP, Dr. Rintoul’s total taxable income was $292,244.77. Of this amount, the deemed receipt of the RRIF on Dr. Rintoul’s death was $272,858.03. According to the remittance voucher, the tax owing by Dr. Rintoul for her terminal year was $117,514.55.
19The Respondent’s evidence is that he wired US$120,000 to the Estate bank account to cover the tax liability. The Respondent did not respond to his undertaking in this regard until the day the Applicants delivered their factum in this proceeding. He responded to his undertaking to produce any notice of assessment regarding Dr. Rintoul’s taxes at the same time.
20The date of death value of the RRIF was $272,500.
21The total tax payable by Dr. Rintoul’s children, as calculated by the Respondent with the assistance of MNP, was $113,355.68.
22The Applicants retained a chartered professional accountant, Denis Kolkin (“Mr. Kolkin”). In November 2024, he opined that if Dr. Rintoul’s children owed any tax in respect of the RRIF, the tax would be $32,413 per child, or $97,239 in total.
23The principal difference between the two calculations is that the Respondent calculated the tax owing on the date of death value of the RRIF only and then allocated 90 per cent of that tax to Dr. Rintoul’s children. The Respondent then allocated the remaining 10 per cent of the tax on the RRIF (payable to himself) and the tax owing on the other Estate assets (OAS, CPP, other pension income and income from solar panels) to the Estate.
24By contrast, Mr. Kolkin calculated the tax payable by Dr. Rintoul’s children by calculating the percentage of the total Estate assets that Dr. Rintoul’s children’s 90-per cent share of the RRIF represented. He then multiplied that percentage by the total tax payable by the Estate for the terminal year. He ascribed the result to Dr. Rintoul’s children as their share of the tax liability.
25The Will directs that after the terminal return is filed, and one year following Dr. Rintoul’s death, the Respondent is supposed to sell the residence to fund the $150,000 payment to Dr. Rintoul’s children. Instead, the Respondent proposed that he would pay each of Dr. Rintoul’s children $4,151.68, as opposed to one-third of the $150,000 legacy.
26The Respondent had decided not to sell the residence. He calculated that each child’s one-third share of the legacy should be reduced by a) the taxes he said each owed in respect of the RRIF; and b) by a one-quarter share of Dr. Rintoul’s funeral and celebration of life costs. This calculation resulted in the $4,151,68 amount.
27When the Applicants objected, the Respondent abandoned his claim for a share of the funeral costs, and he offered $9,976 to each of Dr. Rintoul’s children. However, he included in the new amount a deduction from their respective shares of $6,718.19, which he described as interest (calculated at 10 per cent) on a $113,289.02 loan he claimed to have made to the Estate to pay the tax on the RRIF.
28The Applicants rejected the Respondent’s revised proposal, and the Respondent has since abandoned it also.
29The Respondent then retained Alison Barnes (“Ms. Barnes”) at MNP to calculate the entitlement of each of Dr. Rintoul’s children to a share of the legacy net of the tax owing by them. Ms. Barnes calculated their entitlement to be $14,949.54, but that analysis was not disclosed to the Applicants. It was only disclosed subsequently by court order over the Respondent’s objection.
30Later, at the Respondent’s request, Ms. Barnes provided another calculation, and the Respondent offered each of Dr. Rintoul’s children $10,436.87 in satisfaction of their legacy, if certain conditions were met. The Applicants rejected this offer.
31It has been more than three years since Dr. Rintoul’s death, and her children have not received any payment in respect of the $150,000 legacy.
The Relevant Provisions of the Will
32The relevant provisions of the Will are at paragraph 4 and clause 6(IV) as follows:
- I DESIGNATE my children, CHRISTOPHER RINTOUL, JENNIFER RINTOUL and SUSAN RINTOUL, in equal shares, as my beneficiaries of the first One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) held under any Registered Retirement Savings Plan, which I may own at the time of my death, to receive all refunds of premiums or contributions payable therefrom upon or as a result of my death, provided that my said children pay to my Estate an amount equal to the income tax payable by my Estate upon the realization and distribution of such benefits. I designate my husband, MICHAEL JOSEPH DRONGOSKY, as my beneficiary for the remaining balance of any Registered Retirement Savings Plan, which I may own at the time of my death, to receive all refunds of premiums or contributions payable therefrom upon or as a result of my death.
6(IV). To sell my home at 1321 Fairway Court, Burlington, Ontario, and to pay the proceeds of such sale as follows:
(i) To divide the first One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) in equal shares among my children, CHRISTOPHER RINTOUL, JENNIFER RINTOUL and SUSAN RINTOUL (after deduction for an amount equal to the tax payable by my estate in respect to the realization of benefits under my Registered Retirement Savings Plans, if not already satisfied pursuant to paragraph 4 of this my Will).
The RRIF Designation
33When Dr. Rintoul attained the age of 71 years, her RRSP was converted to a RRIF. Dr. Rintoul signed a RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form on August 29, 2018. In the “Designation of Beneficiary” section of the RRIF Designation Form, Dr. Rintoul designated the following persons as beneficiaries of all proceeds payable under her RRIF, if they survive her:
Christopher Rintoul 30%
Jennifer Bozek 30%
Susan Belza 30%
Spouse Mike Drongosky 10%
34The RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form includes a statement that the annuitant/holder (Dr. Rintoul) revoked all previous beneficiary designations made with respect to the plan, including any such designation made in a will, and a statement that she acknowledged that the designation had legal and tax consequences.
Issues
35Following scheduling appointments before Sanfilippo J. on August 27, 2025 and September 2, 2025, the parties consented to an order in which the issues to be determined in the within application are stated as follows:
a) The amount payable to the Applicants pursuant to the terms of the Will, and whether the Applicants are liable to pay any taxes incurred by the Estate; and
b) Any other directions that the Court deems necessary and appropriate to ensure that the administration of the Estate is completed in accordance with the terms of the Will.
The Applicants’ Position
36The Applicants submit that because Dr. Rintoul did not own an RRSP at the time of her death, Dr. Rintoul’s children are entitled to the whole of the $150,000 legacy without any deduction or setoff for taxes referable to Dr. Rintoul’s RRIF.
37In the alternative, the Applicants submit that if the $150,000 legacy should be reduced by taxes referable to the RRIF proceeds received by them, the legacy should only be reduced by the amount of taxes paid by the Estate on the first $100,000 of RRIF proceeds received by them.
38In the further alternative, the Applicants submit that if the $150,000 legacy should be reduced by taxes referable to the whole of the RRIF proceeds received by them, the amount of the deduction should be calculated in accordance with Mr. Kolkin’s methodology.
The Respondent’s Position
39The Respondent submits that under the terms of the Will, he is obligated to deduct an amount of income tax liability associated with the RRSP/RRIF payable to Dr. Rintoul’s children from their $150,000 legacy. He rejects the Applicants’ theory that no amount should be deducted. He also rejects the Applicants’ theory that if any amount is to be deducted it should be deducted based on only the first $100,000 of the RRIF benefit they receive, and he rejects the Applicants’ position that the appropriate deduction should be calculated in accordance with Mr. Kolkin’s methodology.
40Specifically, the Respondent submits that clause 6(IV) of the Will directs him, as Estate Trustee, to pay from the $150,000 legacy the income tax liability on the benefit from the registered plan received by Dr. Rintoul’s children. The Respondent submits that, for this purpose, the registered plan refers to either Dr. Rintoul’s RRSP or her RRIF, both being registered plans in respect of which Dr. Rintoul’s children were named as designated beneficiaries.
41Regarding the calculation of the tax owing, the Respondent submits that it is within his discretion to rely on his calculation of the tax owing, based on the advice he received from MNP, and not the alternative calculation provided by the Applicants. He further submits that the court should not interfere with his discretion, exercised in good faith.
Law
42Part II of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, governs the designation of beneficiaries of an interest in funds or plans, including RRSPs and RRIFs. Section 51(1) of the Act states:
51(1) A participant may designate a person to receive a benefit payable under a plan on the participant’s death
(a) by an instrument signed by him or her or signed on his or her behalf by another person in his or her presence and by his or her direction; or
(b) by will
and may revoke the designation by either of those methods.
43The principles by which the court is guided in interpreting a will were set out in Pressman Estate (Re), (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 16-22.
44They can be summarized as follows: i) the court should attempt to ascertain the testator’s actual intent as opposed to an objective intent presumed by law; ii) this approach requires the court to consider the testator’s peculiar and unique use of language, all of the circumstances surrounding their life and all of the things known to them at the time the testator made their will, which might bear on the type of dispositions the testator actually intended to make; iii) the court should begin with the application of the “ordinary meaning” rule of construction in the context of the contents of the will as a whole; and iv) the court should avoid a “strict-construction” approach and should be prepared to “put itself in the armchair” of the testator at the time he or she signed the will, to give their words “ordinary meaning.”
45The Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed, in the case of Ross v. Canada Trust Company, 2021 ONCA 161, 458 D.L.R. (4th) 39, at para. 36, that the court’s task in interpreting a will is to determine the testator’s actual or subjective intention as to the disposition of his or her property.
46This task requires the judge to place him or herself in the position of the testator at the time the will was made, which involves construing the will in light of all the surrounding circumstances and studying the whole contents of the will. After considering all the provisions and language used in the will, the judge should attempt to determine what intention was in the mind of the testator: Ross, at para. 37, citing Burke (Re), , [1960] O.R. 26 (C.A.), at p. 30; Trezzi v. Trezzi, 2019 ONCA 978, 150 O.R. (3d) 663, at para. 13.
47This approach is known as the “armchair rule” and is the overarching framework within which a judge applies the various tools for will construction at his or her disposal: Ross, at para. 41.
48However, the armchair rule has specific limitations. While the court may consider extrinsic evidence of the testator’s circumstances and those surrounding the construction of the will, evidence by third parties which purports to directly address what a testator intended to include in the will is inadmissible.
49As stated by Professor A.H. Oosterhoff in his textbook, Oosterhoff on Wills, 9th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2021), at p. 481:
The function of the court of construction in interpreting a will is to ascertain the true intention of the testator within the limits of the law. These limits prevent the court from indiscriminately admitting evidence of the testator’s intention and of the circumstances surrounding the making of the will. Since it is the duty of the court to construe the document before it, it has traditionally been held that effect cannot be given to an intention that is neither expressed nor implied by the words of the will. To do otherwise would render meaningless the requirement that a will must be in writing, and would involve the court in making a new will for the testator, something which courts have repeatedly said they will not do. [Footnotes omitted.]
Analysis
50The Respondent asserts that the Will should be construed to interpret “Registered Retirement Savings Plan” as being synonymous with “Registered Retirement Income Fund”. He argues that both products are “registered plans” and that Dr. Rintoul intended that her children pay the tax referable to their share of any registered plan, whether it be an RRSP or a RRIF.
51I do not accept this argument. Clause 6(IV) does not refer to a “registered plan”. Dr. Rintoul could have referred to a “registered plan” in the Will, which would likely have encompassed both an RRSP and RRIF, but she did not. She referred to any RRSP which she “may” have. At the time of her death, she had no RRSP.
52When Dr. Rintoul attained 71 years of age, she was no longer eligible to own an RRSP. Her RRSP matured at this point, as is required pursuant to the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 146(2)(b.4). It was then converted it into a RRIF.
53Once she owned a RRIF, Dr. Rintoul elected to make a new beneficiary designation. In accordance with the Succession Law Reform Act, she could have made this designation in a new will, a codicil to the Will, or on a separate form provided by a financial institution. She opted for the latter.
54Dr. Rintoul made a fresh beneficiary designation on a National Bank form. The new designation does not track the language of the RRSP designation in the Will. Instead of limiting the amount of the benefit payable to her children to $100,000, Dr. Rintoul designated them as the beneficiaries of 90 per cent of the RRIF. Further, she did not condition the gift as she had done in the Will. She did not impose any liability on them to pay to the Estate any amount on account of the tax referable to their share of the RRIF.
55Dr. Rintoul was aware of the tax implications associated with registered plans. She considered them and planned for them when she made the Will. The notion that the Will imposed a tax liability on Dr. Rintoul’s children for a specific type of distribution instrument resulting from the matured RRSP without specifying that instrument is difficult to rationalize.
56When Dr. Rintoul made the RRIF Beneficiary Designation, she signed the RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form, in which she acknowledged that the beneficiary designation had legal and tax consequences. She chose not to address those consequences in the RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form or by amending the Will.
57The Respondent agrees that the RRSP designation was revoked when Dr. Rintoul made the RRIF Beneficiary Designation. However, he states that notwithstanding the revocation of the beneficiary designation at paragraph 4 of the Will, the language in clause 6(IV) of the Will “directs the estate trustee to pay the income tax liability on the benefit from the registered plan received by the children of Dr. Rintoul from their legacies.” But this is not what clause 6(IV) states. Clause 6(IV) does not refer, generically, to a “registered plan”. It refers to a “Registered Retirement Savings Plan” and the “refunds of premiums or contributions payable therefrom”. This language makes clear that the “benefit” to which the tax relates is the refund of premiums or contributions from the RRSP and not a benefit that flows to a beneficiary from a RRIF.
58This interpretation of the Will is consistent with the principle of will interpretation that directs the court to apply the “ordinary meaning” rule of construction in the context of the contents of the will as a whole.
59The Respondent also submits that this court has confirmed that “RRIFs are connected to or derivatives of the RRSP from which they have been converted”, as stated in Boulos v. Duca Financial Services Credit Union, 2020 ONSC 1946, 57 E.T.R. (4th) 41, at para. 36. Accordingly, the Respondent submits that there is no merit to the Applicants’ claim that the clauses referring to the RRSP do not apply to the RRIF.
60In my view, Boulos is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Boulos, the court was not considering tax liability associated with a RRIF. The issue in that case was whether the beneficiary designation made on an RRSP should continue to be valid once the RRSP was converted to a RRIF. The court found that it should.
61In the Boulos case, the deceased, Yura Nicola Khagek (“Mr. Khagek”), had met Edward Joseph Boulos (“Mr. Boulos”) and his wife at church. They became close friends and Mr. Khagek treated Mr. Boulos as a brother. When Mr. Khagek’s mother died, Mr. Khagek had no close family members. He told Mr. Boulos that he planned to leave his estate to Mr. Boulos. When Mr. Khagek moved to California to live in a monastery, he asked Mr. Boulos to oversee his affairs.
62Mr. Khagek opened several joint accounts at Duca Financial Services Credit Union (“Duca Financial”) with Mr. Boulos, where he also opened RRSP accounts on which he named Mr. Boulos as the designated beneficiary. Mr. Khagek never revoked that beneficiary designation. In compliance with the Income Tax Act, when Mr. Khagek turned 71 years of age, Duca Financial converted the RRSP accounts to RRIF accounts, without any action by Mr. Khagek, including signing beneficiary designation forms.
63Justice Perrell found at para. 38, that Mr. Khagek’s designation of Mr. Boulos as the beneficiary of the funds constituting the RRSPs “would follow or trace the conversion of those funds into a RRIF, absent Mr. Khagek revoking the designation, which he never did.” At para. 40, Perrell J. concluded, based on the evidence, that “Mr. Khagek wished to gift to Mr. Boulos the funds in his RRSPs and in the conversion of those funds to be held in another type of registered account”, and that Mr. Khagek “effected a gift of his RRSP accounts and the derivative RRIF accounts to Mr. Boulos” (emphasis added).
64Critical to the decision in Boulos was the fact that Mr. Khagek had not revoked the RRSP designation. In the case at bar, Dr. Rintoul did revoke the RRSP designation, and she replaced it with a RRIF designation, which differed from the RRSP designation. Significantly, she made the RRIF designation outside of the Will. In my view, the RRIF designation cannot be affected by terms of a will made many years prior with reference to a different registered plan. While the beneficiaries of the RRIF were the same persons – Dr. Rintoul’s children and her spouse – their proportionate shares had changed, and Dr. Rintoul did not impose any condition on the entitlement of her children, including the payment of any tax liability, nor did she reference the Will or the $150,000 legacy in any way.
65The Respondent also submits that if the court is not satisfied that reliance on Boulos alone leads to the conclusion that Dr. Rintoul’s children are liable for the tax on their share of the RRIF, then the court must apply the armchair rule in its determination of the issue.
66In this regard, the Respondent submits that Dr. Rintoul wanted clause 6(IV) to apply to the RRIF because the Respondent and she had been together for 30 years and they had contributed to each other’s finances. Further, he submits that Dr. Rintoul and he had discussed the fact that the obligation on her children to pay the taxes on their share of the RRSP/RRIF was to balance any disparity as a result of the Respondent’s contributions to Dr. Rintoul’s RRSP/RRIF.
67I cannot accept this submission. The Respondent has adduced no documentary evidence of contributions he made to Dr. Rintoul’s RRSP or RRIF. Further, as noted above, the armchair rule is limited in its application. Evidence by parties which purports to directly address what a testator intended to include in the will is generally inadmissible, and effect cannot be given to an intention which is neither expressed nor implied by the words of the Will: Rondel v. Robinson Estate, 2011 ONCA 493, 106 O.R. (3d) 321, at para. 27, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 536.
68The Respondent urges the court to conclude that, based on the Will, Dr. Rintoul “wanted to benefit him the most since she left the entire residue of her estate to him.”
69I do not agree that it follows that because Dr. Rintoul left the residue of the Estate to the Respondent, she intended to “benefit him the most.” Dr. Rintoul left 90 per cent of her RRIF to her children, and she also left them a $150,000 legacy. Between the time when she made her will in 2001 and when she revoked the RRSP beneficiary designation and made the RRIF beneficiary designation in 2018, it is conceivable that she reevaluated her estate assets and decided to allocate them differently.
70Further, s. 13 of the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23 provides that, “[i]n an action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposite or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on his or her own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence”. Accordingly, the Respondent’s own uncorroborated evidence does not assist him in this assertion.
71I also observe that the Respondent’s evidence is that he was with Dr. Rintoul when she executed the RRIF Beneficiary Designation Form. Seemingly, he would have had the opportunity to remind her, at that time, of the matter of the tax liability, if indeed it was her intention to include it as part of the RRIF beneficiary designation in favour of her children.
Conclusion
72For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the $150,000 legacy payable to Dr. Rintoul’s children pursuant to clause 6(IV) of the Will is payable to them without deduction for income taxes referable to their share of Dr. Rintoul’s RRIF.
73It is appropriate that Dr. Rintoul’s children receive interest on the $150,000 legacy based on the “rule of convenience”. Pursuant to this rule, interest on a pecuniary legacy begins to accrue if it is not paid within one year of the deceased’s death. This year is commonly referred to as the “executor’s year”2. Where the legacy remains unpaid after the first anniversary of the testator’s death, the beneficiary is entitled to simple interest at a rate of 5 per cent per annum. I am satisfied that the rule of convenience should be applied in this case in which the Respondent, as Estate Trustee, did not seek direction from the court regarding the matter of the taxation of the RRIF. Rather, Dr. Rintoul’s children, who have been awaiting payment of their legacy for more than three years, were required to commence an application to resolve the issue.
74Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to consider the alternative relief sought by the Applicants.
Disposition
75The following orders shall issue:
An order directing the Respondent as Estate Trustee to make payment forthwith of the $150,000 legacy payable to Dr. Rintoul’s children pursuant to clause 6(IV) of the Will, without deduction for income taxes referable to their share of Dr. Rintoul’s RRIF.
An order directing the Respondent as Estate Trustee to pay interest on the $150,000 legacy in accordance with the rule of convenience, such that Dr. Rintoul’s children shall be entitled to simple interest on their legacy, at a rate of 5 per cent per annum, from June 27, 2024, being the first anniversary of Dr. Rintoul’s death, to the date of payment.
Costs
76The Applicants have succeeded on their application, and they are presumptively entitled to their costs. I am advised that offers have been exchanged.
77The parties are strongly encouraged to agree on the matter of costs. If they cannot, the Applicants may submit written costs submissions not exceeding three pages, double spaced (excluding costs outlines and offers to settle) by July 30, 2026. The Respondent may submit like submissions by August 13, 2026. Reply submissions may only be made with leave. If costs submissions are not submitted in accordance with this direction, the matter of costs will be deemed to have been resolved.
B. Dietrich J.
Date: July 17, 2026
Footnotes
- For brevity and clarity, and because some of the parties share the same surname, I will use first names. In doing so, I intend no disrespect.
- In this case, the executor’s year coincides with the direction in the Will that Dr. Rintoul’s residence was to be sold one year from Dr. Rintoul’s death, and the $150,000 legacy was to be paid from the proceeds. However, the Respondent had decided that he was not going to sell the residence.