Glenn Patrick Bogue

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their statement of defence.

The motion to strike had been adjourned to permit the appellants to pay a long outstanding costs award or file evidence of impecuniosity.

The appellants did neither.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision and upheld the striking of the statement of defence.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs of the appeal in the amount of $4,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to add additional defendants and seek damages of $76 million, punitive damages of $24 million, and an order striking down the Indian Act.

The motion was dismissed because it was brought without leave after the action had been set down for trial, in breach of Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant also objected to the composition of the appellate panel on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias, which the court rejected.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant moved to review an order dismissing his motion for a stay pending appeal of a Superior Court order that had dismissed his motion to pay monies into court or obtain an injunction preventing the sale of property in Tyendinaga Township by HSBC.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the property sale arose from proceedings between the appellant and HSBC that had been fully and finally resolved on consent.

The appellant's claim based on Simcoe Treaty 3.5 and alleged Métis rights was found to be unsupported by adequate evidence.

The defendants moved to quash the plaintiffs' appeal from a Master's decision, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction and that the appeal should be heard by the Divisional Court.

The plaintiffs contended that the Courts of Justice Act was inapplicable due to their Indigenous status and sought an adjournment, which was denied.

The court granted the defendants' motion, quashing the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and awarded full indemnity costs to the successful defendants due to the unmeritorious nature of the appeal route chosen by the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal for delay and refusing to add further defendants.

The Divisional Court found no error of legal principle or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Master's application of the four-part Reid test.

The Master had correctly concluded that the appellant failed to adequately explain the delay, failed to prove inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was struck by a vehicle while crossing the street and sued the driver.

Years later, after retaining new counsel, she moved to add the City of Kitchener and the Regional Municipality of Waterloo as defendants, alleging the crosswalk's design contributed to the accident.

The motion judge dismissed the motion as statute-barred, finding the appellant ought to have discovered the claim earlier.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the appellant failed to provide evidence explaining why the claim could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the limitation period expired.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs award.

The appellant sought a review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion for bail and refusing to expedite an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding.

The appellant had since been released on bail, rendering the habeas corpus proceeding moot.

The appellant also sought to have outstanding criminal charges dismissed due to alleged improper solitary confinement, which the court noted was a matter for the trial court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review and dismissed the underlying appeal as moot.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge dismissing their motion to expedite the hearing of two leave to appeal motions.

The underlying matters related to a Crown wardship order and a Habeas Corpus application.

The moving parties argued that as Aboriginal people, they had a right to have matters heard in a court of equity applying Aboriginal law, and that the children's aid society had no authority to apprehend their children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's procedural ruling that the matters were not properly before the court.

The respondent children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the parents' appeal of a Crown wardship order for delay.

The parents had failed to order transcripts or perfect their appeal within the required timelines under the Family Law Rules, instead engaging in numerous other unsuccessful legal proceedings.

The Divisional Court applied the factors for dismissing a child protection appeal for delay, finding that the parents had no prospect of ordering the transcripts, the delay prejudiced the children's need for permanency, and the appeal lacked merit.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 to the plaintiffs, Amanda Chalupnicek et al., advising their action might be stayed or dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Despite written submissions from the plaintiffs' counsel, the court found the action constituted a collateral attack on a judgment under appeal, relied on non-justiciable laws, and contained "sovereign citizen" type arguments.

The statement of claim lacked a recognizable cause of action and was an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his solicitor negligence action for delay and sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add his former lawyer and law firm as defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the dismissal, finding the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the delay, failed to prove inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant.

The court also dismissed the motion to add the former lawyer as a defendant, concluding that the proposed claims were either untenable or barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his professional negligence action for delay and sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add his former lawyers as defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the dismissal, finding the plaintiff made a deliberate decision not to pursue the litigation and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The court also dismissed the motion to add the former lawyers as defendants, concluding that the proposed claims were either statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 or legally untenable.