Dawn Phillips-Brown

This decision addresses costs in an estate dispute where the Applicant sought enforcement of Arbitration Orders.

The court had previously ruled in favour of the Applicant, enforcing Minutes of Settlement as amended by an Arbitrator's Orders.

The Applicant requested full indemnity costs, alleging the Respondent's conduct was vexatious, inappropriate, obstructionist, and involved "scorched earth litigation tactics" and "abusive tactics." The Respondent, self-represented, did not address the quantum but continued to criticize the Applicant and her counsel.

The court found the Applicant entirely successful and the Respondent's conduct egregious, warranting full indemnity costs.

The Respondent was ordered to personally pay $19,930.26 in costs, not from the Estate.

The applicant estate trustee sought directions regarding the interpretation of a will where a named beneficiary predeceased the testator.

The will directed the residue to be distributed 'per capita' and explicitly defined it as the antithesis of 'per stirpes'.

The court found this indicated a contrary intention to the anti-lapse provisions of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court determined the gift was not a class gift and therefore the predeceased beneficiary's share lapsed and must be distributed on an intestacy.

The applicant sought an order under s. 9 of the Estates Act to compel the deceased's lawyer to produce her file to determine if an unexecuted draft will could be validated under s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court considered whether this constituted an impermissible fishing expedition or breached solicitor-client privilege.

Given that the estate trustee did not oppose the relief and the primary beneficiary under the prior will consented, the court ordered the lawyer to produce the file relating to the deceased's 2022 estate planning.

The self-represented plaintiff, Peter Ronald Muir, brought two separate actions against his former criminal defence lawyers, Peter John Downing and Heather Rebecca Bracken, alleging professional negligence, breach of contract, and other claims related to his criminal proceedings.

Muir claimed Downing was negligent at his bail hearing and alleged a conspiracy, while Bracken was accused of unduly pressuring him to plead guilty to drug charges and deliberately withholding evidence at trial.

The defendants, Downing and Bracken, moved to dismiss Muir's claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Bracken also sought summary judgment on the guilty plea allegation.

The court dismissed both claims in their entirety, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the guilty plea and concluding that the claims constituted impermissible collateral attacks on previous criminal adjudications and were an abuse of process.

The court declined to grant leave to amend the pleadings due to the lack of supporting evidence.

The plaintiff brought an action under Simplified Procedure for damages sustained from a trip and fall on a city-owned sidewalk, alleging non-repair.

The parties agreed on damages, and the trial proceeded solely on liability.

The court found that the sidewalk's discontinuity, measured between 17.462 mm and 18.5 mm, did not exceed the 20 mm threshold set by the Minimum Maintenance Standards (O.Reg. 239/02), and thus was deemed to be in a state of repair.

Consequently, the plaintiff failed to prove non-repair, and the action was dismissed.

Despite the dismissal, the court also found the plaintiff 20% contributorily negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout on a familiar sidewalk.

The plaintiff commenced an action against five lawyers and their law firms for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence arising from the sale of a matrimonial home and payment of debts.

Four of the lawyers and their firms brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as she had discovered the material facts of her claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The court also noted that the action against opposing counsel in the family law proceedings would have been dismissed regardless, as no duty of care is owed to an opposing party.

This application involved the interpretation of several clauses (3(b), 3(h), and 3(j)) of a deceased husband's will.

The court was asked to clarify the scope of a spousal residence clause, the wife's entitlement to net income from sale proceeds, the definition of "net income" the extent of the wife's discretion to use income and encroach on capital, the requirement to consider her personal means, and the apportionment of accounting expenses.

Applying the "armchair rule" the court found that the residence clause extended to a property not physically occupied by the husband due to medical reasons, affirmed the wife's entitlement to net income, defined "net income" to include deductions for taxes and annual estate/trust expenses, and clarified that the wife's discretion to encroach on capital was limited to maintaining her accustomed lifestyle, requiring consideration of her personal means.

The applicant, as estate trustee of Doreen Honour Stuart's estate, brought an application to pass accounts for the estate of Andrew Hargrave Stuart.

The beneficiaries objected.

This endorsement provides directions for the trial and mediation of the application, resolving disagreements between the parties regarding identification of parties, issues to be tried, documentary disclosure, interpretation of the will, mediation timing and costs, examinations for discovery, manner of leading evidence at trial, production of personal income tax returns, and amounts to be retained by the estates.

The court ordered a separate application for will interpretation, permitted examinations for discovery, and set out a summary trial procedure.

The appellant was struck by a vehicle while crossing the street and sued the driver.

Years later, after retaining new counsel, she moved to add the City of Kitchener and the Regional Municipality of Waterloo as defendants, alleging the crosswalk's design contributed to the accident.

The motion judge dismissed the motion as statute-barred, finding the appellant ought to have discovered the claim earlier.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the appellant failed to provide evidence explaining why the claim could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the limitation period expired.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs award.

The plaintiff tripped and fell over a surface-mounted tennis post sleeve while playing cricket on a municipal tennis court.

The defendant municipality moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue for trial because the plaintiff admitted to knowing the posts were there but momentarily forgot about them, and the municipality's standard of care requires reasonableness, not perfection.

The applicant, a black man of African origin, alleged racial discrimination in employment after being excluded from a collaborative pilot project by the respondent organizations.

The respondents claimed the exclusion was due to the applicant's inappropriate behaviour and the unworkability of the arrangement.

Following a summary hearing, the Tribunal declined to dismiss the application, finding that the factual disputes regarding the reasons for the applicant's exclusion required a full hearing to resolve.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming the respondent failed to accommodate her workplace injury and terminated her employment.

The respondent requested an adjournment of the scheduled mediation on the basis that the applicant was pursuing a WSIB appeal.

The Tribunal treated the request as a request to defer but found no basis for deferral.

The Tribunal denied the adjournment request, noting it was made outside the 14-day period following the Notice of Mediation and the respondent failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances.

The respondents requested the removal of the personal respondent and sought production of documents from another Tribunal file to support a request for early dismissal under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal refused to remove the personal respondent, finding a compelling basis to continue the proceeding against him given his central role in the alleged discrimination.

The Tribunal also ordered the applicants to confirm whether they would disclose any loss of income payment received in the other Tribunal file to prevent double recovery.