Jennifer M. Krotz

The applicant, Amanda Morden, sought a declaration that the respondent, Ingrid Niwranski, held certain investment accounts in joint ownership with the deceased, Giuseppe Lagana, subject to a resulting trust in favour of his estate.

The court considered whether the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of Lagana’s intention to gift the right of survivorship to Niwranski.

After reviewing affidavits, cross-examinations, and the testimony of a financial planner, the court found sufficient corroborative evidence that Lagana intended Niwranski to receive the accounts upon his death.

The presumption of resulting trust was rebutted, and judgment was granted in favour of the respondent.

This appeal addressed the correct analytical approach to interpreting a consent judgment, an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The case involved estate litigation concerning the sale of a farm, where the parties had signed Minutes of Settlement and a Consent Judgment.

The application judge had interpreted the Consent Judgment using a dictionary definition, concluding the farm sale provision was not included and that the appellants had repudiated the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal held that consent judgments should be interpreted using contractual principles, considering surrounding circumstances, but found the application judge's error immaterial as the Consent Judgment selectively incorporated terms from the Minutes of Settlement, excluding the farm sale.

The Court also upheld the finding that the respondents had accepted the appellants' repudiation of the Minutes of Settlement.

The appeal was dismissed.

This application concerned the enforceability of Minutes of Settlement regarding the sale of a farm property within an estate.

The applicants sought to enforce the Minutes of Settlement to purchase the farm, while the respondents sought to have the property sold on the open market.

The court determined that the Minutes of Settlement constituted a contract, not a judgment.

It found that the applicants had repudiated the contract through extreme and inordinate delays in fulfilling their obligations, including failing to obtain an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) or an Environmental Site Assessment (ESA) which they unilaterally imposed as conditions.

The respondents validly accepted this repudiation.

Consequently, the applicants were no longer entitled to purchase the farm property under the Minutes of Settlement, and the estate trustee was directed to sell the farm on the open market, with proceeds distributed according to the will.

This application involved the interpretation of several clauses (3(b), 3(h), and 3(j)) of a deceased husband's will.

The court was asked to clarify the scope of a spousal residence clause, the wife's entitlement to net income from sale proceeds, the definition of "net income," the extent of the wife's discretion to use income and encroach on capital, the requirement to consider her personal means, and the apportionment of accounting expenses.

Applying the "armchair rule," the court found that the residence clause extended to a property not physically occupied by the husband due to medical reasons, affirmed the wife's entitlement to net income, defined "net income" to include deductions for taxes and annual estate/trust expenses, and clarified that the wife's discretion to encroach on capital was limited to maintaining her accustomed lifestyle, requiring consideration of her personal means.

The applicant sought declarations of her mother's incapacity to manage property, personal care, and instruct counsel, and an order for a new capacity assessment, as well as removal of her mother's s. 3 counsel.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that previous assessments of incapacity for property and personal care were sufficient and that a further assessment for capacity to instruct counsel was unnecessary and intrusive.

The court affirmed the role of s. 3 counsel and the principle that counsel determines their client's capacity to instruct, absent strong evidence to the contrary.

An application was brought by a daughter against her brother, as estate trustee, seeking an order that a house, which passed to the brother by right of survivorship, be held in trust for the beneficiaries of their father's Will.

The applicant argued for a resulting trust, asserting that the father did not intend to gift the beneficial interest in the property to the brother.

The court examined the father's intention at the time of transfer, considering evidence from the father's solicitor and the services provided by the brother.

The application was dismissed, as the court found abundant evidence that the father intended the brother to have the entire beneficial interest in the house upon his death.

The executors of Recia Royston's estate sought court direction on the interpretation of clause 4(f) of her 2014 Will, concerning the distribution of the residue.

The dispute centered on whether the issue of a child who predeceased the testatrix (Alan) were entitled to a share, specifically Jacob and Jennifer.

Laura Royston, a living child, argued that only living children and their issue (if they predeceased) should benefit.

The court, applying principles of will construction, found that the plain meaning of the will, read in context with a previous will and other clauses, indicated an intention to benefit the issue of any deceased child, including Alan's children.

The court ruled that Jacob and Jennifer were entitled to share equally in one quarter of the residue.

The estate trustee of a deceased joint owner brought a partition application seeking the sale of a former matrimonial home still occupied by the deceased’s former spouse.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing that it would cause hardship due to her health conditions and financial circumstances.

The court reviewed the respondent’s financial position, housing suitability, and available alternatives, and found that the alleged hardship did not approach oppression.

The evidence showed the home was poorly suited to the respondent’s physical limitations and that sale proceeds would provide sufficient resources for alternative accommodation.

The court ordered that the property be listed for sale and directed that the net proceeds be held in trust pending agreement or further order.