Mark A. Radulescu

The court considered whether Aviva Insurance Company of Canada was required to defend or indemnify Udo Haan under a homeowner’s policy after Haan, found not criminally responsible for killing his wife and causing an explosion that damaged neighbouring homes, was sued by neighbours.

The court found that Haan’s actions were both intentional and criminal, triggering the policy’s exclusion clause.

As a result, Aviva had no duty to defend or indemnify Haan in the civil actions brought by his neighbours.

The plaintiff, Fady Dawood, brought a motion for summary judgment against Popes Property Holdings Inc. (PPH) and Nicholas John Pope, alleging breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The defendants agreed the matter should be resolved by summary judgment and did not oppose judgment against PPH, but Pope sought reverse summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him personally.

The court found PPH liable for the plaintiff’s losses but dismissed the action against Pope, holding that PPH had properly adopted the contract after incorporation and that there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil or impose personal liability on Pope.

The respondent, a lawyer, was convicted of contempt of court for failing to comply with an order requiring him to answer questions and fulfill undertakings regarding the administration of his mother's estate.

After five years of non-compliance, which the court characterized as a callous disregard for its authority, the court imposed a sentence of 5 days in gaol, a $5,000 fine, an order preventing further steps in the application until compliance, and substantial indemnity costs of $14,925 to the applicants.

The appellant appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The central issue was whether the relationship between the appellant and Bingemans was that of a licensee/licensor or a tenant/landlord, a question of contractual interpretation.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the "License to Occupy" agreement clearly established a licensor-licensee relationship.

As the appellant breached the license and refused to leave, he was deemed a trespasser, justifying police intervention.

Both appeals were dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The applicant trustee brought a motion for a final passing of accounts, approval of trustee compensation, approval of legal fees, and costs of prior related motions.

One of the respondent beneficiaries objected to the trustee's compensation and legal fees, and argued that the estate should bear the costs of the prior litigation.

The court approved the trustee's compensation and legal accounts, finding them reasonable given the complex and contentious nature of the estate administration.

The court ordered the objecting beneficiary to personally pay the costs of a doomed capital repairs motion and 80% of the original passing of accounts motion, but ordered the estate to bear the costs of a will interpretation motion as it raised a public policy issue regarding ambiguities in the will.

This decision concerns a motion for default judgment in a defamation action.

The plaintiff, Olivia Cyr, sought damages and injunctive relief against the defendant, Cassidy LeBlanc, for publishing defamatory statements on various websites.

The defendant was noted in default and failed to participate in the litigation.

The court found the statements to be clearly defamatory, causing significant harm to the plaintiff's reputation and well-being.

The court awarded general, punitive, and aggravated damages, along with a permanent injunction to prevent further publication.

Substantial indemnity costs were also awarded to the plaintiff.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will regarding the disposition of a cottage property and its sale proceeds.

The estate trustee sought directions on how to distribute the proceeds among the testator's grandchildren.

The motion judge ruled for equal distribution among the four surviving grandchildren.

The appellant, a grandchild, appealed, seeking a larger share based on a different interpretation of the will's clauses.

The respondents cross-appealed on the motion judge's reasoning, not the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the proceeds should be distributed equally among the four grandchildren alive at the end of the life interests, based on the testator's intention as determined through the "armchair rule."

The appellant appealed a sentencing order imposing 15 days in jail, to be served on weekends, for contempt of an order relating to the passing of accounts of his aunt's estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by considering that the appellant had not put forward a plan for adequate supervision of house arrest terms in concluding that a conditional sentence was not appropriate.

The court noted that the appellant had purged his contempt, was a lawyer with over 45 years of practice, was 73 years old with no prior convictions or contempt findings, and that his non-compliance arose from a failure to understand and appreciate the importance of complying with the order rather than callous disregard for court authority.

The sentence was suspended and set aside.

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation of legal costs following an unsuccessful motion brought by John Gordon Ross to amend the passing of accounts for the Estate of Sarah McMahon Grafton.

The Canada Trust Company, as executor, and three other respondents (Stewart, James Grafton, and James Henry Ross) sought costs against John Gordon Ross due to his non-compliance with prior court orders and the lack of merit in his motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to Canada Trust ($30,460.68) and partial indemnity costs to the other three respondents ($10,480), both payable personally by John Gordon Ross.

The decision emphasized that John Gordon Ross lacked standing and his claim was time-barred, and his conduct warranted the costs awards.

John Gordon Ross brought a motion seeking to amend a prior Judgment on Passing of Accounts to reflect a liability to Margaret's estate for capital expenditures made on a cottage property.

The court found that Margaret's estate's claim for reimbursement was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, as Margaret had knowledge of the claim more than two years before her death.

The court distinguished between a beneficiary's objection to accounts (not a "claim" under the Limitations Act) and a motion seeking to establish a liability from the estate to an alleged creditor (which is a "claim" subject to the Act).

The motion was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a construction lien registered by Erbsville Electrical, which had remained unperfected for almost three years.

Erbsville Electrical removed the lien the day before the motion was heard.

The court held that Erbsville Electrical was responsible for the defendants' costs of the motion, as it was unreasonable to register a lien, take no steps to perfect it, and then refuse to pay the costs of its removal.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $750 plus HST against Erbsville Electrical, but declined to make it jointly and severally liable for costs ordered against other lien claimants.

The estate trustee of a deceased joint owner brought a partition application seeking the sale of a former matrimonial home still occupied by the deceased’s former spouse.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing that it would cause hardship due to her health conditions and financial circumstances.

The court reviewed the respondent’s financial position, housing suitability, and available alternatives, and found that the alleged hardship did not approach oppression.

The evidence showed the home was poorly suited to the respondent’s physical limitations and that sale proceeds would provide sufficient resources for alternative accommodation.

The court ordered that the property be listed for sale and directed that the net proceeds be held in trust pending agreement or further order.

In this estate-related costs endorsement, the applicant had sought accounting relief concerning the respondent's dealings under a power of attorney and as estate trustee.

The court held it was reasonable to commence the application because key financial information only emerged through the respondent's responding affidavits, but it was not reasonable for the applicant to persist in demanding a formal accounting after disclosure was substantially provided and cross-examinations were offered.

Applying the costs discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, Rule 57.01, and considering the respondent's offer to settle, the court fixed partial indemnity costs on an offset basis.

Net costs of $3,750.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements were awarded to the applicant.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a $500,000 promissory note and guarantee, arguing the action was barred by the limitation period and that the note should be treated as an advance on anticipated business profits rather than a loan.

The court held that, on the express terms of the note, the payee had a right but not an obligation to demand payment upon default, so the limitation period did not begin to run before the note’s maturity date.

The court also held that parol evidence could not be used to vary the terms of the promissory note.

The respondent’s cross-appeal seeking summary dismissal of the counterclaim as time-barred was also dismissed because the commencement of the limitation period for that claim remained a matter for trial.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to enforce a $500,000 promissory note and dismiss a counterclaim.

The defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred and asserted that the loan was actually an advance against partnership profits.

The court held that the promissory note constituted a demand obligation, such that the limitation period under the Limitation Act, 2002 began to run only when demand for payment was made.

The court rejected attempts to introduce parol evidence contradicting the clear written terms of the promissory note and found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the validity of the debt.

Summary judgment was granted on the promissory note, but the counterclaim was permitted to proceed.

Following an unsuccessful estate application brought by the executor, the successful responding beneficiaries and a corporate trustee sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57 factors governing costs awards, including the reasonableness of the fees sought and the amount an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay.

Although both respondents were entitled to partial indemnity costs, the court reduced the corporate trustee’s claimed fees due to proportionality concerns and its more limited role in the litigation.

The court ordered that the costs be paid personally by the executor rather than from the estate, emphasizing that the estate should not bear the expense of unsuccessful litigation pursued by a trustee.

An estate trustee applied to remove a corporate co-trustee from administering an estate that held valuable Muskoka cottage property subject to life interests.

The applicant argued the corporate trustee obstructed efforts to obtain a reverse mortgage to fund repairs and maintenance after the estate’s capital maintenance fund was exhausted.

The court applied the established test for removal of trustees, emphasizing that a testator’s choice of trustee should not be lightly interfered with and that removal requires clear necessity and must promote the welfare of beneficiaries.

The proposed borrowing arrangement was vague and risked depleting the trust asset while primarily benefiting the life tenant at the expense of residual beneficiaries.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate that removal of the corporate trustee was necessary or that it was the only viable course.

Following a trial under the Construction Lien Act involving a commercial renovation contract dispute, the court had awarded judgment to the plaintiff contractor for the net unpaid contract balance after accounting for deficiencies.

The present decision addressed the issue of costs.

The court rejected the defendants’ submission that success was divided and held the plaintiff was the successful party because it obtained a monetary judgment.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis, but the court reduced the claimed counsel fees and expert disbursements to ensure proportionality with the modest amount in dispute and the relatively low to moderate complexity of the case.

A contractor commenced a construction lien action seeking payment for renovation and rehabilitation work performed on a 14‑unit residential building.

The owners disputed entitlement to several claimed extras and asserted set‑offs for incomplete and deficient work.

The court interpreted the contract documents collectively, finding certain alleged extras fell within the original contractual scope while others were compensable, including electrical work allowed on a quantum meruit basis and limited delay costs.

The court held the owners wrongfully terminated the contract prior to completion.

Damages were calculated as the contract price plus allowable extras, less completion costs and proven deficiencies, resulting in judgment for the contractor.