Robert A. Gold

Two related actions challenged a municipality’s expropriation of commercial land that formed part of a 1,000‑acre assembly for a vehicle manufacturing plant.

The plaintiffs argued that the municipality unlawfully expropriated the property and conferred an illegal “bonus” on a private manufacturer by transferring the land at the expropriation price rather than its alleged fair market value, contrary to s. 106 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the municipality had lawful authority to expropriate the land for valid public purposes related to economic development.

Applying the contextual approach to s. 106 adopted in Friends of Lansdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), the court concluded that the transaction did not confer an “obviously undue advantage” on the private enterprise.

Accordingly, the expropriation and subsequent transfer did not breach the statutory prohibition on municipal bonuses.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a $500,000 promissory note and guarantee, arguing the action was barred by the limitation period and that the note should be treated as an advance on anticipated business profits rather than a loan.

The court held that, on the express terms of the note, the payee had a right but not an obligation to demand payment upon default, so the limitation period did not begin to run before the note’s maturity date.

The court also held that parol evidence could not be used to vary the terms of the promissory note.

The respondent’s cross-appeal seeking summary dismissal of the counterclaim as time-barred was also dismissed because the commencement of the limitation period for that claim remained a matter for trial.

Following the release of the court's reasons on an appeal, counsel advised the judge of an error regarding the agreed-upon costs.

The court issued a correcting endorsement to amend the costs award payable to the successful appellant from $15,000 to the agreed amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion for leave to amend its Statement of Claim to add claims of negligence and negligent misrepresentation regarding an adhesive product.

The Master had found the proposed amendments sought to plead new facts and causes of action that were statute-barred.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the original claim contained sufficient material facts to support the new legal theories, and the amendments merely sought alternative remedies based on the same facts.

The appellant, a third mortgagee, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for damages for an alleged improvident sale and for an accounting under s. 27 of the Mortgages Act.

The appellant argued the motion judge applied the wrong test, the sale was improvident, and the second mortgagee was not entitled to add the first mortgage payout to its claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the wrong test was applied, the respondent took reasonable precautions to obtain the true market value of the property.

The court also held the respondent was entitled to the payout amount under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.

The defendant lender brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a claim by a third mortgagee arising from a power of sale of residential property.

The plaintiff alleged the sale was improvident and challenged the defendant’s ability to add amounts paid to discharge a prior mortgage to its own mortgage debt.

The court held the sale price fell within the range of professional appraisals and did not demonstrate bad faith or fraud.

The court further held that the defendant was contractually and equitably entitled to add the payout of the prior mortgage to its own mortgage and recover that amount in priority to the plaintiff.

Finding the matter suitable for determination on a documentary record, the court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The plaintiff sued the corporate defendant and its principal for wrongful dismissal.

The defendants filed a joint statement of defence alleging cause, and the corporation counterclaimed.

The corporation later became insolvent, and its counterclaim was assigned to the principal.

After the corporation's statement of defence was struck for failure to attend discovery, resulting in deemed admissions of the plaintiff's allegations, the principal sought to amend his pleadings to continue the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision denying the amendments, finding that because the principal stood in the shoes of the corporation, the deemed admissions made the counterclaim legally impossible to succeed, rendering the proposed amendments an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed a trial decision dismissing their claim for personal liability against the individual respondent, Stewart.

The claim arose from home renovation contracts signed under the business name 'Renoclub', which failed to disclose the underlying numbered corporation in breach of the Business Corporations Act and Business Names Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that such breaches do not automatically result in personal liability, and that the evidence established the appellants knew they were dealing with a corporation rather than Stewart personally.

The appeal was dismissed.