David Conn

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, Nathramdas and Premwattie Chateramdas, declaring that the transfer of their property and a subsequent mortgage were fraudulent instruments under the Land Titles Act.

The court found that Melissa Sanasie fraudulently transferred title to herself and registered a mortgage in favour of RiverRock Mortgage Investment Corporation, using the proceeds for her own benefit.

The court ordered rectification of title, deletion of the mortgage, and awarded punitive damages against Melissa for her egregious conduct, including the production of falsified documents and impersonation of counsel.

The claim against RiverRock was not dismissed, and the claim against Ziba Heydarian will proceed separately.

The endorsement addresses a motion by the defendant Melissa Sanasie to urgently set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on her property (Betony Property), which the plaintiffs (her parents) had obtained.

The CPL was granted because mortgage proceeds from the parents' fraudulently transferred home (Fawcett Property) were traced to Melissa's Betony Property.

Melissa needed to sell Betony to close on a new multimillion-dollar home.

The court denied the urgent scheduling of the motion, finding a strong triable issue for the plaintiffs and noting Melissa's conduct (failing to pay the Fawcett mortgage while having funds for her new build).

Instead, an expedited summary judgment motion was scheduled to determine the merits.

The court also ordered Melissa to provide further details and backup for the use of the mortgage proceeds.

The appellants, Pamella and Gregory Radwan, appealed a summary judgment granted to The Energy Credit Union Limited concerning a defaulted "on demand" mortgage.

The Radwans argued the motion judge failed to address their evidence regarding standard charge terms, Pamella Radwan's sophistication, and issues of credibility, and that the reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's findings that the Radwans signed a valid "on demand" agreement, benefited from the funds, and defaulted.

The court affirmed that the lender was not obligated to insist on independent legal advice and that the reasons adequately explained the decision.

The defendant Kaszas brought a motion to exclude the plaintiff D'Onofrio from her examination for discovery, alleging intimidation.

The court reviewed the principles for exclusion, emphasizing that a party's inherent right to be present is lost only in exceptional circumstances, requiring the moving party to prove intimidation on a balance of probabilities.

The court found that Kaszas's evidence of anxiety and discomfort, based on a single past phone call, did not meet the objective standard required to demonstrate a real and substantial probability of intimidation.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

Following reasons granting a motion to restore an action to the trial list, the court determined the issue of costs.

Although the moving party had succeeded on the motion, the court considered that the relief sought constituted an indulgence and that the responding party’s opposition was reasonable and helpful to the court.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the principle of proportionality, and the guidance from appellate authority that costs must be fair and reasonable, the court exercised its discretion to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The responding party was ordered to pay the moving party partial indemnity costs of the motion.

The plaintiff moved under rules 1.04, 2.01, and 48.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck off at a pre‑trial conference.

The underlying claim alleged wrongful dismissal and bad faith following the plaintiff’s termination as an auto body technician.

The court applied the test from appellate authority requiring the plaintiff to provide an acceptable explanation for delay and demonstrate that the defendant would suffer no non‑compensable prejudice if the action were restored.

Considering the litigation history, including the attempt to pursue additional defendants and the absence of a status notice from the registrar, the court found the explanation for delay acceptable.

As the defendants had participated extensively in the litigation and suffered no non‑compensable prejudice, the action was restored to the trial list.