Sarah Wilson Corman

The applicant, a non-profit environmental education centre, sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal taxation under section 3(1)5 of the Assessment Act as an 'educational seminary of learning'.

The respondent assessment corporation opposed the application, arguing the centre lacked a structured curriculum, regular students, and formal instructors.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the primary purpose of the centre, determined objectively, was educational.

The court held that a flexible approach to the definition of a 'seminary of learning' was appropriate, and the centre's workshops, symposiums, and experiential learning programs sufficiently constituted a focused educational agenda.

The applicant, a community development corporation, brought an application for a declaration that it is a 'local board' under the Municipal Affairs Act and therefore exempt from municipal property taxation under s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act.

The court applied principles of statutory interpretation, including ejusdem generis, and found that the applicant did not meet the definition of a local board.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a charitable non-profit corporation, sought a declaration that a portion of its property leased to a day school was exempt from municipal taxation under paragraph 5 of s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act.

The applicant argued that if it occupied the space itself, it would use it for the relief of the poor, thereby qualifying for the exemption under paragraph 12(iii).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory language requires an objective assessment of the owner's actual nature and operations, not hypothetical future uses, and that the applicant failed to demonstrate it was currently organized and engaged primarily in the relief of the poor or supported by public funds.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

A case management teleconference was held to provide procedural directions for a motion for leave to appeal.

The court ordered the motion to proceed in writing before a panel of three judges of the Divisional Court.

Directions were provided regarding the service of materials, the use of a password-protected drop box for electronic filing, and the formatting of factums and compendiums.

A case management teleconference was held to provide directions for a motion for leave to appeal from a decision of Faieta J. The court ordered the motion to proceed in writing before a panel of three judges of the Divisional Court and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of materials, including the use of a drop box, hyperlinked factums, and factum compendiums.

K.S.P. Holdings Inc. (KSP) appealed a Master's decision that dismissed its motions to quash a summons to examine its counsel and to strike an expert affidavit.

KSP's underlying motion sought to stay the action due to Tallman Truck Centre Limited's (Tallman) alleged late disclosure of a litigation agreement with co-defendant Secure Capital Advisors Inc. The court found that the Master erred by allowing the examination of opposing counsel and admitting expert evidence on issues irrelevant to the abuse of process analysis, which, according to Handley Estate, focuses on immediate disclosure and does not require proof of prejudice.

The appeal was granted, quashing the summons and striking the affidavit.

The defendant Kaszas brought a motion to exclude the plaintiff D'Onofrio from her examination for discovery, alleging intimidation.

The court reviewed the principles for exclusion, emphasizing that a party's inherent right to be present is lost only in exceptional circumstances, requiring the moving party to prove intimidation on a balance of probabilities.

The court found that Kaszas's evidence of anxiety and discomfort, based on a single past phone call, did not meet the objective standard required to demonstrate a real and substantial probability of intimidation.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that she holds a permanent easement over part of the respondent's property.

The two parties own neighbouring houses in Toronto.

The appellant claimed a right of easement over the passageway between the properties based on historical use by the former owner of her property for cleaning and repairs.

The application judge found that the historical use was permissive and infrequent, not "as of right" as required for a prescriptive easement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's characterization of the occasional permissive use and affirming that the threshold for establishing an easement is high.

The respondent, having successfully defended an application regarding a prescriptive easement and property damage, sought partial indemnity costs of $62,755.63.

The applicant opposed the quantum, arguing the file was overworked and the rates were excessive, noting her own costs would have been approximately $18,000.

The court agreed that the costs claimed exceeded what an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay for this type of litigation.

Costs were assessed and awarded to the respondent in the amount of $40,000 all inclusive.

The applicant sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a passageway on the respondent's adjoining property and damages for the pruning of an overhanging tree limb.

The court found that the historical use of the passageway by the applicant's predecessors was permissive and neighbourly, not 'as of right', and thus no prescriptive easement was established.

The court also dismissed the claim for damages, holding that the respondent was legally entitled at common law to prune the overhanging branches of the applicant's tree that intruded onto her property.

Former psychiatric patients alleged that experimental ‘social therapy’ programs at a provincial psychiatric facility between 1968 and 1979 constituted torture and unlawful experimentation.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to add five additional former patients as plaintiffs decades after the events.

The defendants argued the claims were statute‑barred under historical limitation provisions in the Medical Act, Health Disciplines Act, Mental Hospitals Act, and Mental Health Act.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that those limitation provisions applied where the alleged conduct amounted to torture rather than professional services or treatment.

The motion to amend and add the additional plaintiffs was granted without prejudice to the defendants’ right to later raise limitation defences.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in the forceps delivery of an infant who suffered catastrophic brain injuries due to an umbilical cord prolapse.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by disengaging the fetal head during the procedure.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in discharging the jury, finding negligence, and assessing causation.

The respondents cross-appealed the future care costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury was reasonable, his factual findings on negligence were supported by the record, and the damages award was fair.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and permitting the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include negligent design.

The class action concerned allegedly defective elevator sheave jammers that the defendants installed and later required replacement.

The defendants argued the motions judge misapplied the 'some basis in fact' test for certification by not weighing their evidence against the plaintiffs' evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting jurisprudence on the certification test and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision on either the certification or the pleading amendment.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action alleging vertical price-fixing conspiracies in the sale of engineering resins.

The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking to expand the class definition to include Tier 1 manufacturers.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary, fact-driven conclusions regarding the class definition and the common issues of loss and liability.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding no negligence by the respondent radiologist and ultrasound technician regarding a fetal ultrasound that failed to detect a congenital abnormality.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by reserving on a motion to strike the jury, failing to instruct the jury on the 'wrongful life' claim, and excluding OHIP billing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to reserve on the jury motion, holding that the jury's finding of no negligence rendered the legal distinctions between wrongful birth and wrongful life moot, and agreeing that the OHIP billing evidence was irrelevant.