Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-20-00000-115-0000 (Sarnia) Date: 2021-12-16 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: County of Lambton Community Development Corporation, Applicant And: The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and The Corporation of The City Of Sarnia, Respondents

Before: Justice George W. King

Counsel: Cynthia B. Kuehl and Lucy Sun, Counsel for the Applicant Sarah W. Corman and Hilary A. Brown, Counsel for the Respondent Municipal Property Assessment Corporation Olivia Nisbet, Counsel for the Respondent Corporation of the City of Sarnia

Heard: February 19, 2021 and April 7, 2021 plus written submissions dated April 20, 2021

Endorsement

Corrected Decision: Paragraph 39 of the original decision was corrected on November 30, 2022 and the description of the correction is appended.

[1] This is an application brought by the County of Lambton Community Development Corporation (“CLCDC”), pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31, and r. 14.05(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, seeking the following:

a) A declaration that the CLCDC is a “local board” as defined by the Municipal Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.46, as amended, and that the property located in the City of Sarnia and known municipally as 1086 Modeland Road, having assessment roll number 3829-300-036-23500-0000, is exempt from taxation pursuant to s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act, as amended;

b) Cost of this application; and

c) Such further and other relief as this honourable court may permit.

[2] The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) is one of the two named respondents to the application opposing the granting of the declaration sought. The other named respondent, The Corporation of the City of Sarnia (“Sarnia”), appeared, observed the proceedings, but did not make submissions.

[3] The CLCDC submits that a significant portion of the property is occupied by entities exempt from assessment pursuant to s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act on the basis that it is a “local board” as defined in the Municipal Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.46.

[4] The CLCDC also acknowledges that there are some commercial enterprises that occupy portions of the facility that would be subject to municipal taxation if they were owned by the tenant. The parties have agreed that the determination of which specific portions of the property would not be exempt from taxation, even if the application succeeds, will be deferred pending this decision.

BACKGROUND

[5] The facts are generally not in dispute. They are contained in the following documents:

a. The application record filed by the CLCDC, which includes an affidavit sworn by Mr. John Innis dated October 21, 2020. Mr. Innis is the former director and president of the CLCDC;

b. A transcript reflecting cross-examination of Mr. Innis on his supporting affidavit; and

c. Further documents supplied by the CLCDC in satisfaction of undertakings given during the cross-examination of Mr. Innis.

i. The Parties

a) CLCDC

[6] The applicant, CLCDC, was incorporated by the County of Lambton[^1] in 2003 as a not-for-profit corporation without share capital. The CLCDC emphasizes that this incorporation was done pursuant to the community development provisions in s. 109 of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25.

[7] It is useful to understand the background to incorporation. The County of Lambton was aware that the North American Free Trade Agreement had caused the petrochemical footprint in the area to contract. The CLCDC was created to explore alternate industries, economic growth, and environmentally sound business development to replace the lost petrochemical industry and hopefully expand the economic activity for the Sarnia-Lambton region.

[8] The applicant describes that the purpose of the CLCDC is to promote community economic development in Lambton.

[9] A facility known as Western Sarnia-Lambton Research Park (“Research Park”) was converted by the CLCDC from the former Dow Chemical head office. The CLCDC operates the facility as a research space.

[10] The CLCDC submits this renovation and retrofit of the premises were done for municipal purposes.

[11] There are a variety of tenants at Research Park. Their use of and purpose for Research Park vary. The tenants can be generally described as filling one of the following general categories:

i) Entities involved in research as incubators for alternative energy businesses;

ii) Non-governmental community organizations;

iii) Local municipal entities; and

iv) Commercial businesses.

[12] The stated objects of the CLCDC set out in Article A of the Letters Patent are as follows:

… to promote community economic development in the County of Lambton with the participation of the City of Sarnia, institutions of higher learning (in particular the University of Western Ontario) and community by facilitating and supporting community strategic planning and increasing self-reliance, investment and job creation within the community …

[13] The Letters Patent have not been amended, nor have there been any articles of continuation filed.

[14] Parenthetically, the CLCDC is not the economic development entity in this area. That entity is the Sarnia Lambton Business Development Corporation.

[15] The CLCDC Board is composed of the following members:

a) The Warden of Lambton;

b) The Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) of Lambton (who functions as Board Secretary);

c) The Treasurer of Lambton (who functions as the CLCDC Board Treasurer);

d) The CAO of the Sarnia Lambton Economic Partnership (“SLEP”);

e) The Mayor of the City of Sarnia;

f) The President of Lambton College;[^2]

g) A representative of Western University;[^3] and

h) Community members selected through an application process.

[16] The CLCDC receives financial assistance from Lambton. Lambton made a cash equity investment to the CLCDC. It also provides an annual operating grant and co-signs and guarantees borrowing done by the CLCDC.

[17] Western University initially provided the CLCDC with oversight management through a management agreement. Since 2014, there has been an affiliation agreement with Western University, Lambton College, and the CLCDC. As a result, Research Park is owned solely by the CLCDC but is branded as “Western University Research Park”.

b) MPAC

[18] The respondent, MPAC, is a corporation established under the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 43, Sched. G, as amended. MPAC is responsible for assessing and classifying all real properties in the Province of Ontario in compliance with the Act.

c) Sarnia

[19] The respondent, Sarnia, is a municipal corporation duly constituted pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Act. As indicated, counsel for Sarnia appeared on the hearing of this matter but did not participate.

ii. Research Park

[20] The Letters Patent indicate that the CLCDC is the registered owner of a property of approximately 77.78 acres in size. It is identified by its municipal address as 1086 Modeland Road in Sarnia, Ontario. The municipal assessment roll number is 3829-300-036-23500-0000. It is not disputed that the property is situated in an “upper-tier municipality” as defined in s. 1 of the Municipal Act.

[21] Research Park is the only property owned by CLCDC. The organization does not have any role or business other than operating Research Park.

APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

i. The Assessment Act

[22] Pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act, all real property in Ontario is liable to assessment and taxation, subject to a list of specified exemptions. A condensed list of the 29 exemptions is set out in Appendix “A” forming part of this decision. Reviewing and considering the nature and scope of the exemptions are fundamental to interpretation of the Act as a whole and the specific issue in the matter.

[23] Section 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act provides for an exemption from municipal property tax:

… land owned by a municipality, including an upper-tier municipality, a public commission or a local board as defined in the Municipal Affairs Act. The land is not exempt if occupied by a tenant who would be taxable if the tenant owned the land, except land owned by a harbour commission and used for parking vehicles for which a fee is charged.

[24] As indicated previously, s. 1 of the Municipal Affairs Act defines “local board” as follows:

“local board” means a school board, municipal service board, transportation commission, public library board, board of health, police services board, planning board, or any other board, commission, committee, body or local authority established or exercising any power or authority under any general or special Act with respect to any of the affairs or purposes, including school purposes, of a municipality or of two or more municipalities or parts thereof; (“conseil local”).

[25] Pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Assessment Act, any person assessed “may apply to the Superior Court of Justice for the determination of any matter relating to the assessment”, except a matter that could be the subject of a complaint to the Assessment Review Board under s. 40(1) of the Act, or a determination that lands are conservation lands for the purposes of s. 3(1)(9) of the Act.

ISSUE

[26] The issue on this application is whether the CLCDC has demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that it is entitled to rely on the exemption from assessment and taxation set forth in s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act on the basis that it is a “local board” as defined in s. 1 of the Municipal Affairs Act. This is the only exemption that has any application to this matter.

[27] The CLCDC submits it has established on the evidence that it is a “local board” as defined in the Municipal Affairs Act. Therefore, it is entitled to the exemption except with respect to that portion of the land occupied by tenants who would be liable to tax if the tenant owned the land.

[28] If the CLCDC can establish that it is a local board, then a significant portion of the Research Park property could be exempt from municipal taxation.

[29] MPAC submits the CLCDC is not a “local board” as defined in the Municipal Affairs Act. Therefore, the s. 3(1)(9) exemption under the Assessment Act does not apply.

PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

i. General Principles

[30] In determining whether the CLCDC is a local board, it will be necessary to apply various principles of statutory interpretation.

[31] Both parties submit that the issues raised by the CLCDC’s application turn on statutory interpretation in relation to the applicable legislative provisions as applied to the particular facts of this case, particularly in respect of legislated exemptions from assessment and taxation.

[32] The general principle of statutory interpretation is that the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.[^4]

[33] That “modern principle” or approach to statutory interpretation, articulated by Driedger, has been cited and relied upon in innumerable decisions of Canadian courts. It was declared to be the approach preferred by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., 1998 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at p. 41. It was later reiterated and confirmed in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26.[^5]

[34] The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the courts cannot disregard the actual words chosen by a legislature and effectively rewrite legislation to accord with the court’s own view of how a perceived legislative purpose could be better promoted: see Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306.

[35] The Supreme Court of Canada emphasizes that a contextual approach may allow courts to depart from the common grammatical meaning of words where doing so is required by a particular context such as when words are “reasonably capable of bearing” a particular meaning: see R. v. McIntosh, 1995 124 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, at para. 27. However, the approach generally does not mandate courts to read words into a statutory provision. Reading words in is tantamount to amending legislation. That is not a judicial function. That function rests solely with the legislature.

[36] Legislation is deemed to be well drafted and to express completely what the legislature intended. Courts should not attempt to reframe statutes to suit their own individual notions of what is just or reasonable.[^6]

ii. Tax Legislation

[37] Since the seminal decision in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 1984 20 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, the Supreme Court of Canada has established a new approach to the interpretation of fiscal/tax legislation as identified by Leach J. in London Jewish Community Village v. The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 23 et al., 2020 ONSC 6794, at para. 18:

i. The Supreme Court of Canada has declared that an approach that fiscal legislation was merely a revenue-raising mechanism is no longer tenable. In the hands of modern government, taxation and exemption from taxation have become sophisticated and important tools to promote various economic and social policies and objectives.

ii. In keeping with that new appreciation, fiscal/tax legislation is to be interpreted in the same manner as other legislation, in an effort to discern and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Words found in tax statutes accordingly are no longer confined to a strict literal interpretation, but are also read in their entire context, having regard to the legislative purpose and scheme. Fiscal/tax legislation, like all legislation, is to be read and interpreted by courts in accordance with the modern principle or approach to statutory interpretation articulated by Driedger. Going forward, Canadian courts interpreting tax legislation, including provisions creating tax exemptions, are to rely on the same principles and techniques used to interpret other kinds of legislation.[^7]

[38] The points made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Stubart were reiterated, with further comments, in The Queen v. Golden, 1986 50 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 209, and Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, 1994 58 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3 (“Notre-Dame”). In Notre-Dame, the general principles regarding the interpretation of tax legislation were summarized with greater particularity, at p. 20, citing Symes v. Canada, 1993 55 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695:

i. The interpretation of tax legislation should follow the ordinary rules of interpretation;

ii. A legislative provision should be given a strict or liberal interpretation depending on the purpose underlying it, and that purpose must be identified in light of the context of the statute, its objective and the legislative intent: this is the teleological approach;

iii. The teleological approach will favour the taxpayer or the tax department depending solely on the legislative provision in question, and not on the existence of predetermined presumptions;

iv. Substance should be given precedence over form to the extent that this is consistent with the wording and objective of the statute; and

v. Only a reasonable doubt, not resolved by the ordinary rules of interpretation, will be settled by recourse to the residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer.[^8]

[39] However, later decisions – including decisions from the Court of Appeal for Ontario – have both reiterated and emphasized the overarching principle that taxing statutes, including exemptions within those statutes, are subject to the generally applicable rules of statutory interpretation. A provision in such fiscal/tax legislation must be read in its statutory context having regard to the meaning of the words used, the scheme and object of the statute, and the intention of the legislature.[^9]

iii. The Assessment Act

[40] The approach to statutory interpretation outlined above has been applied repeatedly to the Assessment Act. General principles emanating from the case law in that regard include the following:

i. The general purpose of the Assessment Act is obvious. It is expressed in s. 3(1) of the Act, namely that “[a]ll real property in Ontario is liable to assessment and taxation”. The purpose of s. 3(1) is “to impose upon all real property in Ontario a general obligation to pay a property tax so that the government can meet its expenditures”.[^10]

ii. However, that purpose is not absolute. Section 3(1) of the Assessment Act expressly provides that the general purpose is “subject to the following exemptions from taxation”. A total of 29 exemptions follow, including exemptions for churches, public education institutions, public hospitals, houses of refuge, various charitable institutions, small theatres, and large non-profit theatres. Many of the organizations listed in the exemption paragraphs perform activities that are of great benefit either to discrete groups of disadvantaged persons or to society as a whole. The clear implication of these exemptions is that while there is a substantial public interest in generating revenue through the taxation of real property, in the context of the real property covered by these exemptions, that public interest is outweighed by the public interest in giving relief from property taxation to certain organizations.[^11]

iii. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that it was not the legislature’s intention to grant tax exemptions to all worthwhile charitable institutions, and courts accordingly must scrutinize exemption applications carefully. A charitable institution may carry out worthwhile and commendable work and still not be entitled to an exemption from municipal assessment and taxation. In relation to applications for an exemption pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act, the quality of work undertaken by an applicant is not the issue.[^12] A court should not be influenced by the sympathy it might feel for the laudatory aims and commendable activities of the organization requesting a s. 3(1) exemption, or the difficulties that the organization might face in obtaining funding for the tax liability if the exemption is not granted.[^13]

iv. When a court interprets one of the exemptions provided in s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act, the interpretive exercise comes down to a determination of the scope of the exemption. That interpretative process is informed by an appreciation that the exemptions reflect the legislature’s assessment of the competing policy considerations identified in the preceding sub-paragraph.[^14] It is also informed by ordinary principles of statutory interpretation requiring that legislation be interpreted in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of its words, and that every word in a statute is to be given meaning; i.e. that “when a court considers the grammatical and ordinary sense of a provision”, it bears in mind that “the legislator does not speak in vain”.[^15]

v. Accordingly, the test for determining whether an exemption should be granted is whether the primary purpose of the institution claiming the exemption comes within the words defining the exemption in the Assessment Act. This test would apply with respect to the interpretation of the specific exemptions set out in s. 3 of the Act. That “primary purpose” test is well established in the jurisprudence of this province and requires an objective determination of the principal purpose for which land is used and occupied, which must be distinguished from other purposes that are incidental to it.[^16]

vi. Where a court must interpret one of the exemptions provided for in s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act, reading the legislative provisions of that exemption in context includes having regard to the wording of other exemptions provided in s. 3(1).[^17]

vii. When a taxpayer claims an exemption from taxation, that taxpayer has the onus of showing that the situation comes clearly within the terms of the exemption clause in the relevant statute because every exemption from otherwise applicable taxation throws an additional financial burden on the rest of the community.

viii. While corporate objects may be of assistance in determining whether an institution is organized for a purpose consistent with an exemption, a statement of objects contained within incorporation documents is not conclusive in and of itself.[^18]

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

i. CLCDC

[41] The CLCDC asserts that it meets the definition of a local board as defined in s. 1 of the Municipal Affairs Act. Accordingly, it has established that the exemption prescribed in s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act applies.

[42] It meets this definition on a reading of s. 1 when considering the principle of noscitur a sociis.

[43] The noscitur a sociis interpretation principle applies in determining whether the CLCDC is a local board. That principle is described as follows:

A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase, esp. one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.[^19]

[44] In Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, 2012 SCC 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76, at paras. 40-41, the rule is defined as the meaning of a word or phrase being revealed with association such that the reader should look for common features among a list of terms to resolve ambiguity.

[45] At para. 46 of its factum, the CLCDC delineates this process as follows:

Thus, the definition of “local board” must be situated both within the list provided in the Act (municipality, including an upper-tier municipality, a public commission or a local board) as well as the list provided in the Municipal Affairs Act (board, commission, committee, body or local authority established or exercising power under an Act). In other words, what may be constituted as a “local board” must relate to both what constitutes as a “municipality” under s. 3(1)9 of the Act and what constitutes as a local authority exercising authority under an Act with respect to the purposes of a municipality.

[46] Establishing what constitutes a “local board” for the purposes of the exemption is not determined by the formal organizational structure of the entity. The question is whether the CLCDC achieves the same purpose as a municipality.

[47] The CLCDC concedes it is not a school board, municipal services board, transportation commission, public library board, board of health, police services board, or planning board as set out in s. 1 of the Municipal Affairs Act.

[48] However, the CLCDC submits that it meets the definition set out in that section of “any other board, commission, committee body or local authority established or exercising any power or authority under any general or special Act with respect to any of the affairs or purposes, including school purposes, of a municipality or of two or more municipalities or parts thereof.”

[49] That is, the CLCDC is a body exercising power or authority under a general or specific Act with respect to the affairs or purposes of a municipality or two or more municipalities as prescribed:

1. The CLCDC is a “body”. The vagueness and generality of that term means that the legislature intended the term “local board” to be interpreted broadly. As an organized group of people working together for a common good, the CLCDC is a body as referenced in s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act.

2. The CLCDC exercises powers under s. 109 of the Municipal Act.

3. The CLCDC exercises those powers with respect to the purpose of a municipality as it facilitates economic development of the Municipality of Lambton County.

[50] The CLCDC submits it satisfies all three prescribed in the definition of local board. As such, the exemption prescribed in s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act applies and the portion of Research Park not occupied by a tenant who would be liable to tax if the tenant owned the land is owned by a local board and is therefore exempt.

ii. MPAC

[51] The position of MPAC is that the interpretation of “body” suggested by the applicant is so broad that almost any entity would be considered a body. MPAC submits that the purpose of the CLCDC was to be the landlord and operator for Research Park. That purpose is entirely dissimilar to those of the local boards listed at the beginning of the definition of “local board” in the Municipal Affairs Act.

[52] It submits that the interpretation of “local board” suggested by the applicant is both overbroad and inconsistent with proper principles of statutory interpretation.

[53] The respondent relies on the principal of ejusdem generis with respect to the definition of “local board” prescribed in the Municipal Affairs Act.

[54] The phrase ejusdem generis is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary:

A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.[^20]

[55] That principle ensures that broad and general wording used at the end of a definition includes the same types of items listed at the beginning of the definition.

[56] As the purpose for the CLCDC was to be the landlord and operator for Research Park, that purpose is entirely dissimilar to those of the entities listed at the beginning of the definition of “local board”.

[57] More specifically, each of those enumerated entities carries out specific functions and provides services integral to the day-to-day operation of Sarnia-Lambton. The CLCDC does not perform (directly, indirectly, or even tangentially) the functions of a school board, a library board, a police services board, or a planning board.

[58] Utilizing the principle of ejusdem generis, the phrase “local board” must be interpreted as a local board pertaining to one of the entities listed above.

[59] Furthermore, when reviewing the full list of 29 exemptions to municipal taxation prescribed in s. 3(1), there is no evidence before the court that the CLCDC operations are governed by the provisions of the Municipal Affairs Act and/or the Municipal Act.

[60] Alternatively, MPAC submits that even if the court determines that the CLCDC is a “local board”, the applicant has not established that the subject land would be exempt from taxation if it was owned by the tenants. While that issue was raised by the respondent, it will not be addressed in this decision. It is deferred pending determination of the principal issue.

ANALYSIS

[61] For the reasons that follow, I find that the CLCDC is not a local board as defined in the Municipal Affairs Act. The CLCDC has not established that it is a local board and that it should be exempt from taxation as prescribed in s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act. Therefore, the application must be dismissed.

[62] MPAC’s interpretation of the phrase “local board” as set out in s. 1 of the Municipal Affairs Act is supported by the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words used by the legislature in the relevant statutory provision.

[63] The CLCDC attempted to establish that it satisfied all three conditions it considers essential to the definition of a “local board”. That is, the CLCDC is a “body” that is “exercising power or authority under an Act” (the former s. 109 of the Municipal Act) “with respect to the purpose of a municipality.”

[64] However, there are several interpretative issues with that explanation. Initially, the section must be read as a whole. The CLCDC interpretation of s. 1 reads the language at the end of the section in a stand-alone manner and ignores the specific list of entities set out above.

[65] The error of the applicant’s interpretation has been addressed previously. At para. 9 of the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in Ontario Ombudsman v. Hamilton (City), 2018 ONCA 502, the court stated as follows:

The Ombudsman’s submission would have considerable force if the general language at the end of the definition of “local board” stood alone. It does not. That general language follows the identification of several specific entities as “local boards”. As this court recently observed in Schnarr v. Blue Mountain Resorts Limited, 2018 ONCA 313, at para. 52:

Where a class of things is modified by general wording that expands the class, the general wording is usually restricted to things of the same type as the listed items (ejusdem generis).

[66] The same principle of interpretation applies in this matter.

[67] Had the legislature intended for “local board” to apply to organizations like the CLCDC, it could have specifically legislated a further (30th) stand-alone exception in s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act worded, for example, as follows:

Any board, commission, committee, body or local authority established or exercising any power or authority under a general or specific Act with respect to any of the affairs or purposes of a municipality or two or more municipalities or parts thereof.

[68] However, it did not.

[69] Had this wording been set out as a stand-alone exemption, the analysis submitted by the applicant may have succeeded. However, in the overall context of the wording of the section and the Act, such an interpretation disregards the other words in the very section.

[70] As I review the words of the Assessment Act in their entire context and in their ordinary sense, it is clear that the legislature did not intend for entities such as the CLCDC to be exempt from being liable for taxation.

[71] In addition to the principle of ejusdem generis, I note the 29 exemptions set out at Appendix “A”. On a reading of the entire wording of the exemptions prescribed in s. 3, the legislative intent is apparent. The exemptions are specifically defined. The exempted entities listed are both clearly and specifically defined. There is no wording that expands the definition of the exemption beyond the referenced heading.

[72] The interpretation suggested by the applicant would effectively rewrite the legislation as it would create a 30th category of exemption.

[73] The general principles of statutory interpretation also have application in this instance.

[74] The teleological approach requires a strict interpretation, since the applicant is seeking a specific exemption to the otherwise all-encompassing principle that all land is liable to taxation. That is the overarching intent of the statute.

[75] In interpreting the specific provisions of the Assessment Act, I note that the jurisprudence requires the court to scrutinize exemption applications generally.

[76] As well, the scope of the intended exemption must be considered in the context of the entire statute and the wording of the other exemptions. In that respect, the CLCDC does not meet the definition of a specific exemption and, in particular, the exemption prescribed in s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act.

[77] Furthermore, MPAC’s interpretation of the relevant exemptions and their application to the situation of the CLCDC is harmonious with the scheme and object of the Assessment Act and furthers the purpose intended by the legislature.

Is the CLCDC a Community Development Corporation?

[78] The applicant also relies on the history of the CLCDC as being a community development corporation incorporated pursuant to s. 109 of the Municipal Act in support of the position that it is a body exercising power or authority under any general or specific act. The section provided the following:

Community development corporations

109(1) The council of a municipality, either alone or with one or more persons or municipalities, may incorporate a corporation under Part III of the Corporations Act as a community development corporation.

[79] Subsection (2) set out the necessary objects of a community development corporation:

Objects

(2) The community development corporation must be incorporated,

(a) with the sole object of promoting community economic development with the participation of the community by facilitating and supporting community strategic planning and increasing self-reliance, investment and job creation within the community; or

(b) with objects substantially similar to those described in clause (a).

[80] The applicant submits its incorporation was done pursuant to s. 109 of the Municipal Act (as it was then enacted) deliberately to provide maximum flexibility to achieve the objective of promoting community and economic development in Lambton.

[81] At the time of incorporation, there were no regulations in effect to govern such community development corporations.

[82] The position of the CLCDC is that it was incorporated as a community development corporation. When the new Municipal Act came into effect, the CLCDC was not converted from being a “community development corporation” under s. 109 into a “municipal service corporation” under s. 203 of the Municipal Act.

[83] When s. 109 was repealed, there were no legislative provisions enacted requiring that a community development corporation be reorganized under the Municipal Act or any applicable regulations.

[84] As the CLCDC remains a “community development corporation”, it is exercising a power of authority under the provisions of the Act prior to repeal:

Community development corporations

109(1) The council of a municipality, either alone or with one or more persons or municipalities, may incorporate a corporation under Part III of the Corporations Act as a community development corporation. 2001 c. 25, s. 109(1).

Local board

(8) If a municipality has appointed first directors or incorporators or nominated a person who has become a director of a community development corporation, the corporation is considered a local board for the purposes of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act. 2001, c. 25, s. 109(8).

Deemed local board

(9) The Minister may by regulation deem community development corporations to be local boards for the purposes of specified provisions of this Act and the Municipal Affairs Act, and may prescribe the extent and manner of application of those provisions to corporations deemed as local boards. 2001, c. 25, s. 109(9).

Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.50, s. 1

1. In this Act,

“local board” means a school board, board of directors of a children’s aid society, committee of adjustment, conservation authority, court of revision, land division committee, municipal service board, public library board, board of management of an improvement area, board of health, police services board, planning board, district social services administration board, trustees of a police village, board of trustees of a police village, board or committee of management of a long-term care home, or any other board, commission, committee, body or local authority established or exercising any power or authority under any general or special Act in respect of any of the affairs or purposes, including school purposes, of one or more municipalities or parts thereof, but does not include a committee of management of a community recreation centre appointed by a school board or a local roads board; (“conseil local”).

[85] The CLCDC concedes that s. 109(8) relates to the definition of “local board” for the purposes of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.50 (“MCIA”).

[86] However, counsel suggest the similarities in the wording are relevant because the definition of “local board” in the MCIA do not reference “corporations.” Rather, the wording of s. 1 of the MCIA references specific entities and includes

any other board, commission, committee, body or local authority established or exercising any power, or authority under any general or special Act in respect of any of the affairs or purposes including school purposes, of one or more municipalities or parts thereof, but does not include a committee of management of a community recreation centre appointed by a school board or a local roads board.

[87] Accordingly, a corporation can considered be a local board. The CLCDC is a “body” and as such can, and must, be interpreted as including a corporation.

[88] The issue can be decided on the basis of the connection between the CLCDC and the municipality.

[89] MPAC responds by saying there is no relevant correlation between ss. 109(8) and 109(9) of the Municipal Act. That is, s. 109(8) does not provide a definition of “local board” for any purpose other than the MCIA. That definition includes many entities (i.e. children’s aid societies, public library boards and committees of adjustment), which are not “local boards” for the purposes of the relevant statutes. However, s. 203 of the Municipal Act indicates that corporations are not local boards for the purposes of the applicable statutes. It does not follow that because the MCIA applies to all community development corporations (and all municipally created corporations) that results in the CLCDC being considered a local board for the purposes of s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act.

[90] I agree with the interpretation of MPAC. The definition of “local board” in the MCIA is not the same as or even relevant to the issue before the court.

[91] The definition of local board in the MCIA is intended to define those municipal entities or agencies to whom conflict of interest provisions apply. It is not intended to define what constitutes a “local board” for the purposes of the Assessment Act.

[92] The reference to “local board” before the court pertains to whether the CLCDC fits within a specific exemption to the Assessment Act. Not only is the definition of “local board” different in the MCIA and the Assessment Act, but I find that the Assessment Act language is not ambiguous. Accordingly, I do not need to look at the MCIA, any other source, or the behaviour of the parties to determine the meaning of the applicable provisions.

[93] Collectively, if not individually, such considerations and concerns are more than sufficient to persuade me that the CLCDC has not satisfied its onus of demonstrating that it is entitled to the exemption it seeks. It accordingly is not entitled to the consequential relief requested – namely an order directing alteration of the City of Sarnia’s assessment roll, and the refund of paid municipal taxes that would follow on such an alteration.

[94] For reasons outlined above, the application brought by the CLCDC is dismissed.

COSTS

[95] The parties have advised they have agreed on the issue of costs. If required, they may notify the court of the quantum of costs so that they can be set out in an order of this court.

“original signed and released by King J.”

George W. King

Justice

Original Released: December 16, 2021

Corrected Released: November 30, 2022

Corrected Decision

Paragraph 39 previously read:

[39] However, later decisions – including decisions from the Court of Appeal for Ontario – have both reiterated and emphasized the overarching principle that taxing statutes, including exemptions within those statutes, are not subject to the generally applicable rules of statutory interpretation. A provision in such fiscal/tax legislation must be read in its statutory context having regard to the meaning of the words used, the scheme and object of the statute, and the intention of the legislature.

Paragraph 39 now reads:

[39] However, later decisions – including decisions from the Court of Appeal for Ontario – have both reiterated and emphasized the overarching principle that taxing statutes, including exemptions within those statutes, are subject to the generally applicable rules of statutory interpretation. A provision in such fiscal/tax legislation must be read in its statutory context having regard to the meaning of the words used, the scheme and object of the statute, and the intention of the legislature.

APPENDIX “A”: Exemptions Under s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act

The exemptions to the general proposition that all land in Ontario is liable to assessment and taxation are as follows:

1. Land owned by Canada or any province.

2. Various cemeteries and burial sites.

3. Churches.

4. Public educational institutions, including child-care centres.

5. Philanthropic lands.

6. Public hospitals, including children’s treatment centres.

7. Care homes, non-profit hospices, and long-term care homes.

8. Highways, including toll roads.

9. Municipal property (as defined).

10. Boy Scouts and Girl Guides land.

11. Houses of refuge.

12. Charitable institutions.

13. Children’s aid societies.

14. Scientific or literary institutions.

15. Battle sites, including Royal Canadian Legion.

16. Exhibition buildings.

17. Machinery for manufacturing or farming.

18. Machinery for producing electric power, energy conservation.

19. Forestry.

20. Mineral land and minerals.

21. Telephone and telegraph lands.

22. Improvements for seniors and persons with a disability.

23. Amusement rides.

24. Airports.

25. Conservation land.

26. Small theatres for drama, comedy, music, or dance.

27. Large non-profit theatres.

28. Hydro-electric generating stations.

29. Public utility poles and wires.

[^1]: The County of Lambton is a municipal area located at the confluence of the southern tip of Lake Huron and the St. Clair River in Southwestern Ontario. It comprises the Corporation of the City of Sarnia and other municipalities in the area.

[^2]: Lambton College is a Community College principally located in Sarnia, Ontario.

[^3]: Western University (formerly known as The University of Western Ontario) is a university based in London, Ontario.

[^4]: See Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 1

[^5]: See also Ruth Sullivan & Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham and Vancouver: Butterworths, 2002), at p. 1 (“Sullivan & Driedger”).

[^6]: See e.g. R. v. McIntosh, 1995 124 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, at paras. 26 and 28.

[^7]: See also Sullivan & Driedger, at pp. 446-447.

[^8]: See also Ottawa Salus Corp. v. Municipal Property Assessment Corp. (2004), 2004 14620 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), at para. 23 (“Ottawa Salus”).

[^9]: See e.g. Anglican Church of Canada, Diocese of Toronto Camps v. Municipal Property Assessment Corp. Region No. 16 (2004), 2004 34918 (ON CA), 191 O.A.C. 278, at para. 15 (“Anglican Church”).

[^10]: See Ottawa Salus, at para. 25, quoting, with approval, Canadian Mental Health Association v. Ontario Property Assessment Corp., [2002] O.J. No. 2199 (S.C.), at para. 42.

[^11]: See Ottawa Salus, at para. 26.

[^12]: See LDARC Corp. v. London (City) (1985), 1985 2148 (ON SC), 50 O.R. (2d) 677 (Div. Ct.), at para. 14.

[^13]: See Causeway Foundation v. Ontario Property Assessment Corp., Region No. 3, [2002] O.J. No. 2482 (S.C.), at para. 49, aff’d [2003] O.J. No. 1640 (Div. Ct.), aff’d (2004) O.A.C. 218.

[^14]: See Anglican Church, at para. 16.

[^15]: See Young Men’s Christian Association of Greater Toronto v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2015 ONCA 130, at paras. 13-14.

[^16]: See Buenavista on the Rideau v. Ontario Regional Assessment Commissioner, Region No. 2 (1996), 1996 11792 (ON SC), 28 O.R. (3d) 272 (Div. Ct.), at p. 276; Anglican Church, at paras. 11-12.

[^17]: See e.g. Anglican Church, at paras. 17-18.

[^18]: See London Jewish Community Village v. The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 12 et al., 2020 ONSC 6794, at para. 19.

[^19]: Bryan A. Garner, eds., Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th ed. (2019), sub verbo “noscitur a sociis”.

[^20]: Black’s Law Dictionary, sub verbo “ejusdem generis”.