Erin Kadwell

The applicant sought a declaration of adverse possession over a triangular strip of disputed land along a shared boundary between two neighbouring waterfront properties on Burlington Bay.

The disputed land was registered under the Registry Act until February 24, 1997, when it was converted to the Land Titles system; under s. 51(2) of the Land Titles Act, the applicant was required to establish actual, exclusive possession for the ten-year period prior to that date (1987–1997).

The court found that a large hedge occupied and effectively blocked access to the bulk of the disputed area throughout the critical period, and that the garage and shoreline were shared in a neighbourly fashion rather than exclusively possessed.

The applicant failed to establish all three requirements of adverse possession — actual possession, intent to exclude, and effective exclusion of the true owner — and the application was dismissed.

The applicant, Shelley Ottele, initiated an application challenging the validity of Powers of Attorney signed by her deceased father, Leo Racine, appointing Aimy Racine, and sought damages for fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.

This endorsement addresses two motions: the applicant's motion to stay proceedings pending an appeal, and the respondent Aimy Racine's motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to stay, finding no persuasive basis.

The court granted the respondent's motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the applicant's underlying application was frivolous and vexatious and that she had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, as required by Rule 56.01(1)(e).

The applicant was ordered to pay $75,000 as security for costs and $25,253.24 in costs for the motion.

The self-represented plaintiff, Peter Ronald Muir, brought two separate actions against his former criminal defence lawyers, Peter John Downing and Heather Rebecca Bracken, alleging professional negligence, breach of contract, and other claims related to his criminal proceedings.

Muir claimed Downing was negligent at his bail hearing and alleged a conspiracy, while Bracken was accused of unduly pressuring him to plead guilty to drug charges and deliberately withholding evidence at trial.

The defendants, Downing and Bracken, moved to dismiss Muir's claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Bracken also sought summary judgment on the guilty plea allegation.

The court dismissed both claims in their entirety, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the guilty plea and concluding that the claims constituted impermissible collateral attacks on previous criminal adjudications and were an abuse of process.

The court declined to grant leave to amend the pleadings due to the lack of supporting evidence.

The appellant appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The central issue was whether the relationship between the appellant and Bingemans was that of a licensee/licensor or a tenant/landlord, a question of contractual interpretation.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the "License to Occupy" agreement clearly established a licensor-licensee relationship.

As the appellant breached the license and refused to leave, he was deemed a trespasser, justifying police intervention.

Both appeals were dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Regional Municipality of Waterloo applied for an injunction to evict residents of a homeless encampment on Region-owned property, citing a by-law prohibiting the erection of structures.

The encampment residents brought a constitutional challenge, arguing the by-law violated their rights under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The court found that the number of homeless individuals in the Region exceeded the number of accessible shelter beds.

Consequently, the by-law's prohibition on erecting temporary shelters violated the residents' section 7 rights to life, liberty, and security of the person, and was not saved by section 1.

The section 15(1) claim was dismissed as homelessness is not an analogous ground.

The court declined to grant the injunction and declared the by-law inoperative insofar as it prevents homeless individuals from erecting temporary shelters when accessible shelter beds are insufficient.