Meagan J. Swan

The appellants, two cottagers' associations, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that individual cottage sewage systems were subject to the Building Code Act rather than the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The central issue was whether the relevant "lot or parcel of land" for determining regulatory jurisdiction was the five registered parcels owned by the Grand River Conservation Authority or the individual cottage lots described in leases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that "lot or parcel of land" means land that is legally recognized for municipal and planning law purposes and for which title can be conveyed.

Since the individual cottage lots were not formally severed or registered, the five registered parcels constituted the relevant "lot or parcel of land" bringing the collective sewage systems (exceeding 10,000 litres per day) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment.

The defendants moved for security for costs against the plaintiff, Hockeyfest Incorporated, under Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied a two-stage test: first, whether the plaintiff was a corporation with insufficient assets (which was conceded), and second, whether justice demanded the case proceed without security, considering impecuniosity and the merits.

The court found Hockeyfest failed to provide adequate financial disclosure to prove impecuniosity and that its claims against all defendants had very little chance of success due to its own non-compliance with contractual terms and misrepresentations.

Consequently, the court ordered Hockeyfest to post significant security for costs to each defendant, prohibiting further steps until paid, and allowing for dismissal if not posted within 30 days.

The executors of Recia Royston's estate sought court direction on the interpretation of clause 4(f) of her 2014 Will, concerning the distribution of the residue.

The dispute centered on whether the issue of a child who predeceased the testatrix (Alan) were entitled to a share, specifically Jacob and Jennifer.

Laura Royston, a living child, argued that only living children and their issue (if they predeceased) should benefit.

The court, applying principles of will construction, found that the plain meaning of the will, read in context with a previous will and other clauses, indicated an intention to benefit the issue of any deceased child, including Alan's children.

The court ruled that Jacob and Jennifer were entitled to share equally in one quarter of the residue.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for damages arising from the defendants' breach of a real estate purchase agreement.

The defendants failed to close the transaction to purchase the plaintiff's property for $310,000.

The plaintiff relisted the property and eventually sold it for $260,000.

The court found that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to mitigate her damages and awarded $59,135.72, representing the $50,000 difference in purchase price plus carrying costs, legal fees for the aborted sale, and prejudgment interest.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a decision of the Inquiries Complaints and Reports Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had decided not to refer a patient's complaint to discipline, but instead cautioned the applicant and required him to take an educational program on patient communication after he insisted on a written apology from a patient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable regarding the adequacy of the investigation, the characterization of the applicant's conduct, and the consideration of his prior complaints history.

The plaintiff landlord brought a motion for summary judgment for damages arising from an alleged breach of a commercial lease and sought dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim.

The defendants alleged, among other things, that a large upfront payment characterized by the plaintiff as a lease commission was in fact a security deposit and raised claims of coercion, breach of trust, unequal bargaining power, and improper calculation of damages.

The court held that numerous genuine issues requiring a trial existed, including the nature of the disputed payment, credibility issues regarding the parties’ intentions, and the accuracy of damage calculations.

The court also dismissed summary judgment motions brought by third parties seeking dismissal of the third party claim.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal (LAT) denying him an extension of time to request a hearing regarding the Registrar's proposal to revoke his motor vehicle dealer registration.

The appellant had missed the 15-day deadline by three days.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the LAT's decision, finding that the LAT reasonably applied the Frey v. Macdonald factors, including the lack of a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, the absence of a reasonable explanation for the delay, and the lack of merit to the appeal.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment awarding the respondent a financing fee of $249,547.49 under a contract.

The appellants argued the contract was ambiguous as to whether the fee was payable upon securing financing or only upon the closing of an acquisition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contractual language clear that fees were payable at two different points in time, including immediately upon raising capital, regardless of whether the transaction closed.

The plaintiff and defendant in a construction dispute entered into an agreement capping the plaintiff's damages to whatever the defendant could recover from the third party.

The fourth party appellant discovered the agreement months later and moved to dismiss the third and fourth party claims as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while the agreement was not champertous, the failure to immediately disclose it to the other parties and the court constituted an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed and the third and fourth party proceedings were stayed.

The applicant, an anesthesiologist, sought judicial review of an interim order made by the respondent's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee that effectively shut down his practice following a patient's death.

The court found that the Committee's decision to issue the interim order was unreasonable because there was no evidence of probable harm to future patients, only speculation based on a single incident.

Furthermore, the court held that the Committee breached procedural fairness by relying on undisclosed materials and improperly considered evidence protected under the Evidence Act.

The application was allowed and the interim order was quashed.