Heather McIvor

The Crown (appellant) sought costs of the appeal and the motion below after successfully appealing a decision and having the respondent's statement of claim struck as a nullity due to non-compliance with the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The respondent, acting in person, opposed the costs order, arguing the Crown's appeal lacked legal basis and that the relevant statutory provision (s. 18(6) of the CLPA) was added after her action commenced.

The Court of Appeal found the Crown was entitled to costs as it was completely successful and s. 18(6) of the CLPA expressly applied to actions commenced before its enactment.

The court awarded the Crown $7,500 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, a reduced amount from their actual costs to reflect the respondent's self-represented status and financial situation.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its motion to strike a statement of claim as a nullity.

The claim was brought by the respondent without the required 60-day notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA).

The motion judge dismissed the Crown's motion due to delay, but the Court of Appeal found this was an error in law, as the CLPA explicitly states such an action is a nullity from its commencement, and delay or estoppel cannot override this statutory provision.

The appeal was allowed, and the claim against the Crown was struck out as a nullity.

The plaintiff in a certified class action moved for an order approving the form, content, and distribution plan of short and long form notices to class members regarding a proposed settlement.

The court reviewed the motion record and granted the order as requested, noting the notice plan was similar to the one previously approved for certification.

The defendants brought a motion to strike parts of the plaintiff's statements of claim arising from alleged wrongful arrests related to an investigation into unpasteurized milk.

The Crown argued the claims against two police officers were statute-barred and the claims against a provincial investigator failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the claim against the officers was issued in time despite late service, and the pleadings against the investigator adequately alleged the necessary elements of the torts.

The applicant, Hudson's Bay Company, sought judicial review of a regulation that required its department stores to close during the COVID-19 pandemic while allowing big box stores that sell groceries to remain open.

The applicant argued the distinction was irrational and ultra vires the enabling statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the regulation was authorized by the Reopening Ontario Act and consistent with its purpose of balancing public health measures with economic concerns.

The court held that it is not the role of the judiciary to assess the wisdom or efficacy of the government's policy choices.

The appellants, two cottagers' associations, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that individual cottage sewage systems were subject to the Building Code Act rather than the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The central issue was whether the relevant "lot or parcel of land" for determining regulatory jurisdiction was the five registered parcels owned by the Grand River Conservation Authority or the individual cottage lots described in leases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that "lot or parcel of land" means land that is legally recognized for municipal and planning law purposes and for which title can be conveyed.

Since the individual cottage lots were not formally severed or registered, the five registered parcels constituted the relevant "lot or parcel of land" bringing the collective sewage systems (exceeding 10,000 litres per day) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment.

The applicant Ministry sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision reinstating a Transportation Enforcement Officer who was terminated after pleading guilty to off-duty indecent acts.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and upheld the termination, finding that the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Board misapprehended medical evidence regarding the employee's long-term risk of reoffending and unreasonably diminished the significance of the Millhaven criteria for off-duty conduct, particularly the negative impact on the employee's credibility as a peace officer required to testify in court.

The defendant Ministry moved under rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim for failure to provide the Crown with 60 days’ notice under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff had previously filed a judicial review application and affidavit outlining allegations against the Ministry and later indicated verbally that a civil action would follow.

The court held that the documentation provided sufficient particulars identifying the source of the complaint and communicated a dispute that could reasonably be anticipated to result in litigation.

Contextual verbal communication between counsel could be considered to provide context to the written materials.

The court concluded that the notice requirement had been satisfied and dismissed the motion.