Carole G. Jenkins

The appellant, a former foster parent, appealed the striking of his claims against child welfare agencies for negligence, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches arising from an investigation into allegations of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the negligence and Charter claims, confirming that child welfare agencies do not owe a duty of care to foster parents.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, restoring the misfeasance in public office claim against one agency, finding that the pleadings and particulars sufficiently alleged bad faith and collaboration with malicious adoptive parents.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action as frivolous under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The statement of claim failed to plead a legally recognized cause of action or material facts to support a viable claim against the defendant.

The plaintiff did not provide submissions when invited to do so.

The court found the claim to be devoid of merit and an abuse of process, and dismissed the action without costs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed a civil action brought by Stephen Massey, purportedly also on behalf of his two daughters (J.M. and C.M.), against 31 defendants including the Children's Aid Society, the Office of the Children's Lawyer, various lawyers, and his ex-wife.

The claim, a collateral attack on prior family law proceedings that concluded in 2016, alleged child abuse and professional misconduct.

The court dismissed the action against Mr. Massey with prejudice due to his failure to attend case conferences, non-compliance with court orders, and the action being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, largely barred by the limitation period.

The claim on behalf of J.M. and C.M. was dismissed without prejudice, acknowledging potential discoverability issues and the uncertainty of their authorization.

The court imposed a leave requirement for Mr. Massey to initiate future proceedings against these defendants and awarded costs against him.

The plaintiff, A.C., sought leave under section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue a civil action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Ontario.

This claim arose after criminal charges against A.C. for sexual misconduct, which had resulted in a mistrial, were subsequently withdrawn by the Crown due to no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that A.C. failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success, specifically by not providing sufficient evidence of malice on the part of the Crown.

The court emphasized that mere inconsistencies in evidence, lack of forensic evidence, or late disclosure (without proof of deliberate intent to subvert justice) do not meet the high threshold for proving malice required for malicious prosecution claims against the Attorney General.

The defendant requested a referral under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, leading the court to consider dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff failed to provide submissions explaining why the action should not be dismissed.

The court found the five-paragraph statement of claim lacked a legal basis and material facts to support the $25 million damages sought, concluding the action was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The defendant requested the court consider dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court gave notice to the self-represented plaintiff, inviting submissions, but none were provided.

The court found the plaintiff's three-paragraph statement of claim to be frivolous and vexatious, lacking a legal basis or material facts to support the $3 million damages sought.

The action was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, a declared vexatious litigant, commenced an action against the defendants, who were employees of the Children's Aid Society, without obtaining the required leave from a Superior Court judge.

The defendants requested dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 2.1.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the plaintiff was subject to a vexatious litigant order under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and had instituted the proceeding without leave.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

The registrar's office referred a motion to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, following a request from the defendant's lawyers under Rule 2.1.01(6).

The court reviewed the plaintiff's statement of claim and found it appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The court ordered that the plaintiff be given notice (Form 2.1A) that the court is considering dismissing the action under Rule 2.1.01.

Pending the outcome of this written hearing, the plaintiff's action was stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and no further filings would be accepted from the plaintiff except for their written submissions.

The plaintiff was granted an opportunity to make submissions as to why the claim should not be dismissed.

The registrar's office referred this motion, initiated by the defendant's request under Rule 2.1.01(6), for the court to consider dismissing the plaintiff's statement of claim as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01(7).

The court ordered notice to the plaintiff in Form 2.1A, stayed the plaintiff's action under s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act pending the Rule 2.1 hearing, and restricted further filings to only the plaintiff's written submissions.

The judge is seized of the matter.

The appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated August 20, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no respondent filed responding motion materials, the court made no order as to costs.

The court addressed scheduling for a package of motions, including the defendant's motion to strike and the plaintiff's motions to add parties and seek leave to plead malicious prosecution.

The court determined that the two hours booked were insufficient and that the motions needed to be sequenced, with pleadings finalized before the motion to strike could be heard.

The plaintiff's motion to lift a publication ban from related criminal proceedings was directed to the criminal court judge who issued it.

The remaining motions were adjourned and scheduled for future dates.

The accused, P.H., was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The defence argued the sexual activity was consensual, while the complainant alleged force.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable and lacking credibility due to inconsistencies, evasiveness, and confusing answers, which persisted despite the provision of interpreters.

The judge noted that while stereotypical assumptions about sexual assault victims' behaviour are prohibited, the complainant's explanations for her actions and statements were often implausible and untruthful.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found not guilty.

The applicant, a 16-year-old sibling of five children in foster care, filed an application alleging the respondent society failed to give her an opportunity to be heard and failed to provide reasons for restricting her in-person access to her siblings.

The society had suspended in-person access due to COVID-19 protocols and offered virtual access instead.

The adjudicator found that the society had provided a detailed response acknowledging the applicant's concerns and had given meaningful reasons for its decision based on pandemic restrictions.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants filed complaints with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the apprehension of their children, sibling access, and the placement of the male applicant on the Child Abuse Register.

The respondent children's aid society argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the issues were currently before the court in child protection proceedings.

The Board agreed, finding that all issues raised in the complaints were squarely before the court, and dismissed the applications pursuant to section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The applicant, the adult sister of five children in care, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent Society failed to provide reasons for its decision to terminate her in-person access and deny her request for unsupervised outdoor access.

The Board found that the Society did not provide meaningful reasons, as it relied on the applicant's father to relay information and failed to explain why access needed to be supervised or how outdoor access contravened COVID-19 restrictions.

The Board ordered the Society to provide written reasons for its decisions.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The applicant, a minor hockey coach, sought judicial review of a Children's Aid Society (CAS) decision verifying that six children were at risk of emotional harm due to his coaching conduct.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the CAS decision.

The Court found that the CAS breached procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with adequate notice of the specific allegations and the legal standard being applied.

Furthermore, the CAS's investigation was inadequate and its decision was unreasonable, as it failed to properly apply the legislative criteria for emotional harm and lacked a logical, reasoned basis for its conclusions regarding each child.

The applicant filed two complaints with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the services provided by the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the issues raised in the complaints were already before the court in an ongoing child protection proceeding.

The Board reviewed the materials and found that all the issues raised by the applicant, including concerns about access, disclosure, and staff conduct, had been presented to the court.

Consequently, the Board concluded it was precluded from reviewing the complaints under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and dismissed the applications.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown and the accused jointly sought to vary the accused's release conditions to allow unrestricted contact with the complainant and participation in a Ministry of the Attorney General-approved Partner Assault Response (PAR) program, with the understanding that the assault charge would be withdrawn upon successful completion and entry into a peace bond.

Justice Moore critically examined the "standard" PAR conditions proposed, finding them inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. Zora*.

The court ruled that such conditions were not justified to ensure court attendance or public safety, inappropriately delegated judicial authority, were not tailored to the individual, were overly onerous, and attempted to enforce civil debt through criminal sanction.

The application for variation was granted, but with the court's substituted, less restrictive conditions for the PAR program.