Carole G. Jenkins

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action as frivolous under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The statement of claim failed to plead a legally recognized cause of action or material facts to support a viable claim against the defendant.

The plaintiff did not provide submissions when invited to do so.

The court found the claim to be devoid of merit and an abuse of process, and dismissed the action without costs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed a civil action brought by Stephen Massey, purportedly also on behalf of his two daughters (J.M. and C.M.), against 31 defendants including the Children's Aid Society, the Office of the Children's Lawyer, various lawyers, and his ex-wife.

The claim, a collateral attack on prior family law proceedings that concluded in 2016, alleged child abuse and professional misconduct.

The court dismissed the action against Mr. Massey with prejudice due to his failure to attend case conferences, non-compliance with court orders, and the action being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, largely barred by the limitation period.

The claim on behalf of J.M. and C.M. was dismissed without prejudice, acknowledging potential discoverability issues and the uncertainty of their authorization.

The court imposed a leave requirement for Mr. Massey to initiate future proceedings against these defendants and awarded costs against him.

The plaintiff, A.C., sought leave under section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue a civil action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Ontario.

This claim arose after criminal charges against A.C. for sexual misconduct, which had resulted in a mistrial, were subsequently withdrawn by the Crown due to no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that A.C. failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success, specifically by not providing sufficient evidence of malice on the part of the Crown.

The court emphasized that mere inconsistencies in evidence, lack of forensic evidence, or late disclosure (without proof of deliberate intent to subvert justice) do not meet the high threshold for proving malice required for malicious prosecution claims against the Attorney General.

The defendant requested a referral under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, leading the court to consider dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff failed to provide submissions explaining why the action should not be dismissed.

The court found the five-paragraph statement of claim lacked a legal basis and material facts to support the $25 million damages sought, concluding the action was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The defendant requested the court consider dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court gave notice to the self-represented plaintiff, inviting submissions, but none were provided.

The court found the plaintiff's three-paragraph statement of claim to be frivolous and vexatious, lacking a legal basis or material facts to support the $3 million damages sought.

The action was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The registrar's office referred a motion to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, following a request from the defendant's lawyers under Rule 2.1.01(6).

The court reviewed the plaintiff's statement of claim and found it appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The court ordered that the plaintiff be given notice (Form 2.1A) that the court is considering dismissing the action under Rule 2.1.01.

Pending the outcome of this written hearing, the plaintiff's action was stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and no further filings would be accepted from the plaintiff except for their written submissions.

The plaintiff was granted an opportunity to make submissions as to why the claim should not be dismissed.

The plaintiff, a declared vexatious litigant, commenced an action against the defendants, who were employees of the Children's Aid Society, without obtaining the required leave from a Superior Court judge.

The defendants requested dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 2.1.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the plaintiff was subject to a vexatious litigant order under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and had instituted the proceeding without leave.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

The registrar's office referred this motion, initiated by the defendant's request under Rule 2.1.01(6), for the court to consider dismissing the plaintiff's statement of claim as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01(7).

The court ordered notice to the plaintiff in Form 2.1A, stayed the plaintiff's action under s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act pending the Rule 2.1 hearing, and restricted further filings to only the plaintiff's written submissions.

The judge is seized of the matter.

The accused, P.H., was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The defence argued the sexual activity was consensual, while the complainant alleged force.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable and lacking credibility due to inconsistencies, evasiveness, and confusing answers, which persisted despite the provision of interpreters.

The judge noted that while stereotypical assumptions about sexual assault victims' behaviour are prohibited, the complainant's explanations for her actions and statements were often implausible and untruthful.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found not guilty.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown and the accused jointly sought to vary the accused's release conditions to allow unrestricted contact with the complainant and participation in a Ministry of the Attorney General-approved Partner Assault Response (PAR) program, with the understanding that the assault charge would be withdrawn upon successful completion and entry into a peace bond.

Justice Moore critically examined the "standard" PAR conditions proposed, finding them inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. Zora*.

The court ruled that such conditions were not justified to ensure court attendance or public safety, inappropriately delegated judicial authority, were not tailored to the individual, were overly onerous, and attempted to enforce civil debt through criminal sanction.

The application for variation was granted, but with the court's substituted, less restrictive conditions for the PAR program.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's action, alleging it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found the action lacked merit and constituted an abuse of process, as the plaintiff, previously declared a party under disability and subject to an order precluding him from bringing actions without leave, had disregarded court guidance and orders regarding his legal capacity and the involvement of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the claim was stayed.

The Crown applied to have Courtney Carter declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence under section 753(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour.

Carter pleaded guilty to ten charges including aggravated assault with a meat cleaver, mischief to public property, possession of weapons, carrying a concealed weapon, and multiple breaches of probation.

The court found that Carter met all statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation, including a serious personal injury offence, a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour demonstrating failure to restrain his conduct, a high likelihood of harmful recidivism, and intractable violent conduct.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence of detention in a penitentiary.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing claims in negligence and against an individual employee of a child protection agency.

The motion judge had relied on Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D. to conclude that the respondents' duty of care was owed to the children, not the parents, and therefore no duty of care existed toward the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's reasoning.

The court confirmed that both before and after apprehension of children, the respondents' duty of care was to the children, creating a conflict that precluded a duty to the parents.

The court also upheld the immunity provision under section 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act for the employee, finding no facts suggesting bad faith.

The appellant's claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering remained intact.

The appellants, Family and Children’s Services Niagara and Heidi Payne, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claims.

The original motion argued no reasonable cause of action and no duty of care owed by FACS to the parents.

The court dismissed the leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which appropriately distinguished the facts from precedents where parents were under investigation or children were in care.

The court emphasized the high threshold for granting leave to appeal and the caution required in striking claims.

Following the successful dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action against 78 defendants, six groups of defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered the complexity of the claims, the plaintiff's mental health, and principles of proportionality and fairness.

The court reduced several of the costs claimed to ensure comparability and fairness, ultimately awarding a total of $71,000 in costs across the successful defendants.

The moving parties sought to strike the plaintiff’s 213‑page statement of claim brought against numerous defendants arising from domestic conflict, criminal proceedings, and child protection litigation concerning the plaintiff’s child.

The court found the pleading defective for failing to clearly identify causes of action, material facts, or specific allegations against individual defendants.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., the court held that a Children’s Aid Society and its employees owe a duty of care to the child, not the parent, and therefore the negligence claims against the CAS defendants disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court further held the action constituted an abuse of process because it attempted to re‑litigate issues already determined in multiple prior child protection proceedings and collateral attacks on those orders.

The claims were also barred by statutory immunities, deficiencies in pleading intentional torts, lack of standing to sue on behalf of the child, and limitation periods.

The moving lawyer defendants sought to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s expansive civil action alleging conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, Charter breaches, defamation, and other torts arising from criminal proceedings and child protection litigation.

The court held that the statement of claim lacked material facts linking the lawyer defendants to the alleged misconduct and improperly attempted to relitigate criminal convictions and child protection determinations.

Many claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the pleadings vague, speculative, and abusive, failing to establish recognized causes of action or the elements of torts such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of public office.

The action against the four lawyer defendants was struck or dismissed without leave to amend.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence action arising from the death of a resident at a group home.

The plaintiff commenced the claim more than two years after the death and argued that the limitation period under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act was tolled due to incapacity and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the plaintiff produced no medical evidence establishing incapacity under s. 7 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply because there was no evidence the defendant concealed material facts about the death.

As the underlying claim was statute‑barred, the derivative claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act was also barred.