Carole G. Jenkins

The moving parties sought to strike the plaintiff’s 213‑page statement of claim brought against numerous defendants arising from domestic conflict, criminal proceedings, and child protection litigation concerning the plaintiff’s child.

The court found the pleading defective for failing to clearly identify causes of action, material facts, or specific allegations against individual defendants.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., the court held that a Children’s Aid Society and its employees owe a duty of care to the child, not the parent, and therefore the negligence claims against the CAS defendants disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court further held the action constituted an abuse of process because it attempted to re‑litigate issues already determined in multiple prior child protection proceedings and collateral attacks on those orders.

The claims were also barred by statutory immunities, deficiencies in pleading intentional torts, lack of standing to sue on behalf of the child, and limitation periods.

The moving lawyer defendants sought to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s expansive civil action alleging conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, Charter breaches, defamation, and other torts arising from criminal proceedings and child protection litigation.

The court held that the statement of claim lacked material facts linking the lawyer defendants to the alleged misconduct and improperly attempted to relitigate criminal convictions and child protection determinations.

Many claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the pleadings vague, speculative, and abusive, failing to establish recognized causes of action or the elements of torts such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of public office.

The action against the four lawyer defendants was struck or dismissed without leave to amend.

On a Rule 21 motion, the court considered whether a child protection agency owes a duty of care to foster parents whose foster home was closed after abuse allegations against their biological child.

Applying the plain and obvious standard and the duty of care framework discussed in Syl Apps, the court held that no such duty is recognized in Canadian law.

The court rejected an attempt to distinguish biological parents from foster parents and found that imposing a duty to foster parents would conflict with the statutory mandate to treat the child’s interests as paramount.

The adult plaintiffs' claim in negligence against the agency was struck and the action dismissed as against that defendant.

The defendant Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion to strike the plaintiff mother's claim against it for negligent investigation.

The mother alleged the investigation was negligent due to a failure to provide French language translation services.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Syl Apps, holding that a Children's Aid Society owes its duty to the children and owes no duty of care to the parents during an investigation.

The mother's personal claim against the Society was struck without leave to amend, though the children's claims remain.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in the apprehension of his child by the Children's Aid Society.

The child had subsequently been made a Crown ward by a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the issues associated with the apprehension and wardship were central to the court judgment, and permitting the human rights application to proceed would be tantamount to an appeal of that judgment.

The application was dismissed as having been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding.

The defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim brought by a parent and a minor child against a child protection agency, its employees, and a school vice-principal.

The parent alleged negligence relating to the apprehension of the child, the child’s placement in foster care, and school disciplinary decisions.

The court held that child protection agencies and their staff owe a duty of care to the child, not to the parent, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., and found that the parent’s pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court also found statutory immunity under the Child and Family Services Act was not displaced due to the absence of pleaded particulars of bad faith.

The parent’s claim was struck without leave to amend, while the minor’s claim was stayed pending appointment of a litigation guardian represented by counsel.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by the Children's Aid Society and its employees when they took his child into care.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success, or alternatively, to defer it pending an ongoing child protection application before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Tribunal found that the same underlying events gave rise to both proceedings and that the child protection proceeding was well advanced.

To avoid inconsistent findings of fact, the Tribunal deferred the human rights application pending the conclusion of the child protection proceedings.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence action arising from the death of a resident at a group home.

The plaintiff commenced the claim more than two years after the death and argued that the limitation period under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act was tolled due to incapacity and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the plaintiff produced no medical evidence establishing incapacity under s. 7 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply because there was no evidence the defendant concealed material facts about the death.

As the underlying claim was statute‑barred, the derivative claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act was also barred.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint against the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB) and the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) alleging discrimination on multiple grounds following her arrest and detention after a fire at her residence.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the CAS as an abuse of process, finding it was an attempt to relitigate a custody arrangement settled in a Child Protection Proceeding.

The Tribunal also dismissed most allegations against the TPSB for having no reasonable prospect of success, as the applicant failed to point to evidence linking the police actions to prohibited grounds.

The Tribunal deferred its decision on the sole remaining allegation regarding the return of the applicant's hijab, ordering the TPSB to produce video evidence if available.

The applicant estate filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal regarding the deceased's treatment at the respondent mental health centre.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer because a coroner's inquest and a civil proceeding regarding the same events were underway.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred pending the conclusion of the coroner's inquest to avoid concurrent proceedings and inconsistent findings of fact.

The applicant filed an application alleging that the respondent breached the minutes of settlement from a previous human rights application.

The settlement required the respondent to create a plain language information sheet outlining restrictions for youths applying for social assistance and to provide a copy to the applicant.

The applicant acknowledged receiving the document but objected to the substance of the respondent's policy.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the respondent fulfilled its obligations under the settlement and was not required to seek the applicant's approval regarding the policy's substance.

The infant plaintiff suffered hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy during childbirth, resulting in cerebral palsy.

The plaintiffs sued the hospital, physicians, and nurses for negligence during delivery.

The defendants refused to admit they owed a duty of care to the infant plaintiff, arguing that recent case law precluded such a duty.

The motion judge granted a declaration that a duty of care was owed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, affirming the well-established principle that an infant, once born alive, may sue for damages sustained as a result of negligence during labour and delivery.

The member was found guilty of professional misconduct for making an appalling sexual comment concerning a student in the presence of other students.

The Discipline Committee ordered a reprimand, a one-month suspension of the member's certificate, and imposed a condition requiring the successful completion of a course on student-teacher boundaries prior to returning to the classroom.

The Committee found this penalty appropriate given that only one of the several allegations was proven.

The Ontario College of Teachers alleged that the Member committed professional misconduct by making inappropriate and sexual comments in class and in the school hallway.

The Discipline Committee found insufficient evidence regarding the in-class comments due to flawed student interview procedures.

However, the Member admitted to making a highly inappropriate sexual comment about a female student in the hallway in the presence of other students.

The Committee found this conduct to be disgraceful, dishonourable, unprofessional, and unbecoming a member, resulting in a finding of professional misconduct.

The Ontario College of Teachers brought a motion seeking leave to withdraw allegations of professional misconduct against the member.

The member consented to the withdrawal in exchange for resigning his membership, surrendering his certificate, and undertaking never to seek reinstatement.

The Discipline Committee granted the motion, finding that the withdrawal of the Notice of Hearing in exchange for the member's undertaking was reasonable and protected the public interest.

The Ontario College of Teachers brought a motion seeking leave to withdraw allegations of professional misconduct against the member.

The member did not appear but consented to the withdrawal.

The Discipline Committee granted the motion pursuant to section 4.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, finding that the withdrawal was reasonable and served the public interest.

The member, an occasional teacher, pleaded guilty to professional misconduct after being criminally convicted of possessing child pornography and breaching a recognizance that prohibited contact with minors.

The Discipline Committee accepted an Agreed Statement of Facts and Guilty Plea.

Finding the member's conduct disgraceful and dishonourable, and noting the lack of forensic evidence suggesting he would not reoffend, the Committee ordered the immediate revocation of his certificate of qualification and registration.

The Member pleaded guilty to professional misconduct before the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers.

The Member admitted to making, possessing, and distributing child pornography, including superimposing students' faces onto explicit images, and using school equipment for these purposes.

The Member had previously pleaded guilty to related criminal charges and was sentenced to one year of incarceration.

The Committee accepted the joint submission on penalty, finding the Member's actions deplorable and a breach of trust.

The Committee ordered the immediate revocation of the Member's certificate of qualification and registration.

The applicant teacher was acquitted of criminal charges relating to alleged sexual misconduct with a former student in 1991.

The Ontario College of Teachers subsequently brought disciplinary proceedings against him under 1997 regulations.

The discipline committee refused the applicant's request for an adjournment, proceeded in his absence, admitted the criminal trial transcript and judge's obiter findings without adequate reasons, and found him guilty of professional misconduct.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding that the committee breached natural justice by arbitrarily refusing the adjournment and failing to provide adequate reasons for its decisions.

The Court also held that applying the 1997 regulations to 1991 conduct offended the rule against retrospective application of legislation.

The Member, an occasional teacher, pleaded guilty to professional misconduct and incompetence after assaulting a 10-year-old student.

The Member had previously pleaded guilty to criminal assault for the same incident.

The Discipline Committee accepted an Agreed Statement of Facts and a joint submission on penalty, ordering a reprimand and requiring the Member to complete a course on discipline techniques and classroom management before returning to teaching.