Gerard Edward Robert McAndrew

The moving party brought a motion for further and better disclosure from MPAC regarding the adjustments made to the Fair Market Rents used to assess its industrial mall property.

MPAC responded that it had provided all documentation in its possession and that no further information regarding the adjustments existed.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the motion, finding that MPAC cannot be required to produce documentation that does not exist.

The moving party brought a motion for further and better disclosure from MPAC regarding the determination of Fair Market Rents and Occupancy Codes for its property.

MPAC responded that the requested documents do not exist and that it had already provided all documentation in its possession.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the motion, holding that a party cannot be compelled to produce documents that do not exist.

The Moving Party brought a motion for further and better disclosure from MPAC regarding the determination of Fair Market Rents and Occupancy Codes for the subject property.

MPAC responded that the requested documents do not exist and that it had already provided all documentation in its possession.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the motion, holding that MPAC cannot be required to produce documents that do not exist.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion to strike, the successful applicant sought costs of $5,085.

The respondent argued for costs in the cause, citing the simplicity of the motion and the applicant's failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding costs outlines and bills of costs.

The court agreed with the respondent's criticisms of the applicant's materials and the disproportionate time claimed.

However, the court declined to order costs in the cause, instead fixing the applicant's costs at a reduced amount of $1,000 payable within 30 days.

The respondent club brought a motion seeking to strike the member’s application or, alternatively, convert the proceeding to an action on the basis that material facts were in dispute regarding events leading to disciplinary proceedings and expulsion from membership.

The applicant argued that the application concerned the procedural fairness of the club’s disciplinary process rather than the underlying factual dispute.

The court held that the central issue was whether the club complied with its constitution and principles of natural justice, a matter capable of determination through the application process.

Applying the proportionality principles endorsed in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found it premature to require a full trial.

The motion was dismissed and the application permitted to proceed.

The moving lawyer defendants sought to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s expansive civil action alleging conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, Charter breaches, defamation, and other torts arising from criminal proceedings and child protection litigation.

The court held that the statement of claim lacked material facts linking the lawyer defendants to the alleged misconduct and improperly attempted to relitigate criminal convictions and child protection determinations.

Many claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the pleadings vague, speculative, and abusive, failing to establish recognized causes of action or the elements of torts such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of public office.

The action against the four lawyer defendants was struck or dismissed without leave to amend.

The moving party sought to remove the respondent municipality's counsel for alleged conflict of interest and also claimed extensive ancillary monetary and property-related relief arising from historic foreclosure proceedings concerning a lodge property.

The court found no evidentiary basis for any solicitor-client relationship between the impugned law firm and the moving party or its principals, and treated the motion as effectively a collateral attack on long-completed foreclosure proceedings.

The motion was dismissed in its entirety.

On costs, the court held that non-compliance with the costs outline rule was not fatal absent prejudice, but reduced the respondent's request and awarded proportionate substantial indemnity costs of $4,068 inclusive of HST.

The applicant corporation brought a motion to remove the respondent municipality's law firm, alleging a conflict of interest based on prior representation.

The court found as a fact that the law firm had never been retained by the applicant or its principals, but rather had acted for the parties who successfully foreclosed on the applicant's property.

Finding no evidence of a solicitor-client relationship or conflict of interest, the court dismissed the motion to remove counsel.

The court also granted leave for the applicant's principal to represent the corporation.

Neighbouring property owners disputed ownership and use of three narrow strips of land including a shared driveway, a storage area, and a backyard strip.

The plaintiffs claimed adverse possession and alternatively an easement under the doctrine of lost modern grant.

The court held that adverse possession failed for the driveway and storage area because the plaintiffs’ use was not inconsistent with the true owner’s use and their claimed mistaken belief of ownership was not credible.

However, adverse possession succeeded for a backyard strip where a fence had been erected under a mutual mistake as to the boundary.

The court also recognized a prescriptive easement over the driveway under the doctrine of lost modern grant, permitting parking and related maintenance rights.

Following a successful trial, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after obtaining a judgment exceeding its settlement offer.

The defendant argued that proportionality warranted a reduced costs award.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1).

The court held that the defendant could not rely on proportionality after forcing the plaintiff to prove every aspect of its claim despite an earlier favourable default judgment and an unaccepted settlement offer.

The requested costs were found to be fair and reasonable and were awarded in full.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive easement over a narrow portion of the defendants’ driveway used for parking.

The motion argued that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 20 years of continuous use prior to conversion to the Land Titles system, that mistaken belief in ownership defeated the “as of right” requirement, and that the claimed easement area was excessive.

The court held that evidence from neighbours and prior occupants could establish the required period of open, continuous, and peaceful use and therefore raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court further held that mistaken belief in ownership does not defeat a prescriptive easement claim and that “knowing trespass” is not required.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

Following multiple related motions arising from construction disputes concerning steel connections at a university project, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The motions involved claims for summary judgment, limitation defences, dismissal of counterclaims, and issues under the Construction Lien Act.

The outcomes of the underlying motions were divided among the parties.

The court held that the mixed results and the procedural posture of overlapping claims justified denying costs to all parties.

Multiple motions were brought in three related actions arising from the failure of steel connections on a construction project.

Tribury sought to declare Sandro's construction lien expired and dismiss the lien action.

The court declared the lien expired but allowed the action to continue as a breach of contract claim.

Edward and Tribury also moved for summary judgment to dismiss Sandro's claims, counterclaims, and crossclaims based on the expiration of the limitation period.

The court found that an agreement to mediate suspended the limitation period under section 11 of the Limitations Act.

Consequently, Sandro's 2010 action and its crossclaim for contribution and indemnity were timely.

However, Sandro's counterclaim and crossclaim for remediation costs in the 2009 action were delivered after the extended limitation period expired and were dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of ownership by adverse possession over a cottage property and a prescriptive easement over a right of way.

The property was originally owned by the defendant's father, who mistakenly believed he had gifted it to the defendant.

The court found that the defendant established adverse possession over most of the cottage property due to mutual mistake, which negated the requirement for inconsistent use.

However, the claim for adverse possession over an adjacent strip of land was dismissed for lack of actual possession.

The court also granted the defendant a prescriptive easement over the right of way based on over 40 years of uninterrupted use.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action seeking a declaration of entitlement to statutory accident benefits.

The plaintiff was injured when a hoisted vehicle fell on him while he was removing its engine as part of dismantling the vehicle for parts.

The court considered whether the incident constituted an "accident" within s. 2(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, applying the purpose test from the jurisprudence interpreting the use or operation of an automobile.

The court held that dismantling a vehicle destined for scrap fundamentally changes its character and is not an ordinary and well‑known activity to which automobiles are put.

The incident therefore did not arise from the use or operation of an automobile and did not qualify as an accident under the Schedule.