Ondrej Sabo

The sole beneficiary of an estate sought a motion for partial distribution of trust funds held by the estate trustee prior to reaching the age of 25 specified in the will.

The beneficiary invoked the rule in Saunders v. Vautier to argue entitlement to funds.

The estate trustee resisted distribution, citing pending litigation regarding the improper sale of estate property and the need to hold funds for potential legal costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the beneficiary could invoke Saunders v. Vautier, the estate trustee's discretion to withhold funds pending resolution of the litigation and for a reasonable holdback for legal costs was not unreasonably exercised.

The applicants sought an order appointing section 3 counsel for the respondent, Joan Horneman, under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, due to her alleged incapacity to instruct counsel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction because Ms. Horneman already had legal representation.

The court further held that even if jurisdiction existed, appointing section 3 counsel would be inappropriate given Ms. Horneman's undisputed incapacity to instruct counsel, as section 3 counsel cannot act without instructions and their communications are privileged, making it difficult to assess the reliability of any information about the person's wishes.

The decision emphasized the distinction between the role of section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian.

The defendant, John Hogan, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff, Halton Electric Co. Limited, in a construction lien action.

Hogan argued procedural irregularity due to a faxed Notice of Intent to Defend going astray, and also sought discretionary relief.

The court found no procedural irregularity but exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, finding a plausible excuse for the default, an arguable defence on the merits (particularly regarding personal liability under s. 13(1) of the Construction Lien Act), and no significant prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court declined to impose conditions for setting aside the judgment.

This appeal concerns the applicable scale of costs when a municipality unsuccessfully appeals an expropriation matter to the courts.

The Ontario Municipal Board ordered compensation to the property owner.

The municipality appealed to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal but awarded only partial indemnity costs of $7,500 rather than full indemnity costs of $23,586.84.

The Divisional Court declined to apply section 32(1) of the Expropriations Act, ruling that ordinary court costs rules applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the principle reflected in section 32(1) should apply to court proceedings, entitling the successful respondent to full indemnity costs.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for specific performance regarding a commercial property, the defendant sought costs.

The plaintiff's motion was denied because it failed to disclose the purchase of an adequate replacement property.

The court found the plaintiff's non-disclosure inappropriate and awarded costs to the defendant on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court reduced the defendant's counsel's hourly rate from $700 to $350, fixing total costs at $32,238.35.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim arising from a real estate appraisal.

The plaintiff had relied on the appraisal to advance a second mortgage, but later discovered the property was worth significantly less.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as he knew or ought to have known he had suffered a loss more than two years before commencing the action.

The appellants, Family and Children’s Services Niagara and Heidi Payne, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claims.

The original motion argued no reasonable cause of action and no duty of care owed by FACS to the parents.

The court dismissed the leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which appropriately distinguished the facts from precedents where parents were under investigation or children were in care.

The court emphasized the high threshold for granting leave to appeal and the caution required in striking claims.

A property developer sued a municipal fire department and its officials alleging negligence and misfeasance in public office after inspectors issued fire safety inspection orders requiring upgrades to fire alarm audibility levels in residential buildings.

The orders were based on an Office of the Fire Marshal guideline recommending a 60 dBA audibility level, though that standard was not prescribed by statute or regulation.

The plaintiff argued the inspectors exceeded their statutory authority under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act and enforced a non‑binding guideline as if it were law.

The court held the inspectors acted in good faith, relied on guidance from the Office of the Fire Marshal, and believed they had authority to address potential fire safety risks.

The plaintiff failed to prove deliberate unlawful conduct or knowledge of lack of authority required for misfeasance, and negligence was also not established.

The applicants and respondents, siblings, settled an estate litigation matter regarding their mother's estate and the respondents' actions as attorneys for property and estate trustees.

The settlement left the issue of costs to be determined by the court.

Both the applicants and the respondents sought their costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the commencement of the application was reasonable and that the respondents had failed to adequately address the applicants' reasonable questions early on.

However, given the divided success in the settlement, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

A used car dealer brought an action for negligent misrepresentation after purchasing a vehicle from another dealer who represented that the vehicle had not been involved in an accident.

After resale to a consumer, the plaintiff discovered through vehicle history reports that the vehicle had previously been involved in an accident and ultimately repossessed and resold the vehicle at a significant loss.

The court accepted evidence that the seller had represented the vehicle as accident-free and that the buyer relied on that representation when deciding not to conduct its own search.

The court found the corporate seller liable for negligent misrepresentation but declined to impose personal liability on the individual agent who made the representation.

Damages were limited to the diminution in value of the vehicle rather than the plaintiff’s claimed financing-related losses.