Gemma Louise Charlton

The court considered a motion for contempt against the respondent for failing to comply with an order to vacate a property.

The applicant sought a declaration of contempt, arrest, imprisonment, and a fine.

The court reviewed the procedural and substantive requirements for civil contempt, emphasizing the need for bifurcated liability and penalty phases, and the discretionary and coercive nature of contempt powers.

The court declined to make a formal finding of contempt at this stage, adjourning the motion to allow for further notice and submissions, and to consider less punitive remedies to achieve compliance with the original order.

The applicants sought an order appointing section 3 counsel for the respondent, Joan Horneman, under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, due to her alleged incapacity to instruct counsel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction because Ms. Horneman already had legal representation.

The court further held that even if jurisdiction existed, appointing section 3 counsel would be inappropriate given Ms. Horneman's undisputed incapacity to instruct counsel, as section 3 counsel cannot act without instructions and their communications are privileged, making it difficult to assess the reliability of any information about the person's wishes.

The decision emphasized the distinction between the role of section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian.

The trustees of the estate of Anne Emily Janicek brought an application for advice and directions regarding the construction of the will's provisions concerning the sale of the "Home Farm." The will provided that the farm could be purchased by any of the testatrix's children, or a combination thereof, at 75% of appraised fair market value within one year of death, with an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to be concluded within that period.

If no such agreement was reached, the trustees could sell the farm at their discretion.

The trustees received competing individual offers from four children within the prescribed period but were uncertain which to accept and sought court guidance.

The application judge ordered that the trustees could sell the farm to whomever they chose at any price in their sole discretion.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding the will did not require the trustees to sell to him and that the trustees had acted appropriately.

Justice van Rensburg dissented, finding the application judge erred by failing to address whether the trustees had frustrated the appellant's purchase attempt and by failing to apply principles of will interpretation to determine the testatrix's intention regarding competing offers.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment against Stewart Title Guaranty Company for $223,555.74, alleging coverage under their title insurance policy due to structural defects in their home that violated the Ontario Building Code and rendered the property unmarketable.

The court found that while the property's title was unmarketable under Covered Title Risk (CTR) clause 19, coverage was excluded by exclusion clause 7, which pertained to structures not built in accordance with applicable building codes.

The court also found no coverage under CTR clause 20, as there was no evidence of a governmental authority forcing remedial work.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against Stewart Title was dismissed.