Joshua D.A. Laplante

Following the dismissal of an estate application regarding beneficiary designations, the court determined the costs payable to the successful respondent.

The respondent sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the Estate argued for a reduced amount.

The court found no reprehensible conduct to justify elevated costs and noted that public policy considerations in estate litigation generally limit recovery to reasonable costs.

The court also disregarded the respondent's offer to settle, finding it lacked meaningful compromise.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $26,963.13 for fees and $2,081.76 for disbursements, payable by the Estate.

The applicant estate trustee sought a declaration that the deceased's TFSA and RRIF, which designated the respondent as beneficiary, were subject to a resulting trust in favour of the estate or were the product of undue influence.

The court held that the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore does not apply to beneficiary designations on registered accounts, preferring the reasoning in Amherst Crane and Mak Estate over Calmusky.

The court found no evidence that the deceased intended the accounts to form part of his estate, nor any evidence of undue influence by the respondent.

The application was dismissed and the funds were ordered paid to the respondent.

The sole beneficiary of an estate sought a motion for partial distribution of trust funds held by the estate trustee prior to reaching the age of 25 specified in the will.

The beneficiary invoked the rule in Saunders v. Vautier to argue entitlement to funds.

The estate trustee resisted distribution, citing pending litigation regarding the improper sale of estate property and the need to hold funds for potential legal costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the beneficiary could invoke Saunders v. Vautier, the estate trustee's discretion to withhold funds pending resolution of the litigation and for a reasonable holdback for legal costs was not unreasonably exercised.

An application by an attorney for personal care seeking a declaration that an incapacitated person lacks capacity for personal care and directions to restrict family visits.

The applicant, the wife of an 82-year-old man with advanced Alzheimer's disease, sought to deny visitation rights to their adult children.

The court declined to make a declaration of incapacity, finding that the applicant did not require such a declaration to exercise her powers as attorney.

The court found that the incapacitated person had expressed a wish to visit his children while still capable and that visits were in his best interests.

The court issued directions permitting the daughter to visit at specified times, finding that the applicant's personal animus toward her children had impaired her ability to make decisions in the incapacitated person's best interests.

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation and quantum of costs following a contested application to pass accounts in the insolvent estate of Christina Georgiou Psoma.

The court reviews the parties’ positions, the applicable legal principles, and the conduct of the litigation, ultimately awarding the applicant, Steve Georgiou, costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $23,000, payable by the objectors, Panayiotios Georgiou and Zevoulla Georgiou, jointly and severally.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, the impact of settlement offers, and the role of proportionality and party conduct in determining costs.

This decision concerns a contested application to pass accounts in the estate of Christina Georgiou Psoma.

The applicant, Steve Georgiou, as estate trustee, sought to have his accounts approved following an ex parte order obtained by the objectors, Panayiotios and Zevoulla Georgiou.

The court addresses threshold issues regarding the propriety of the ex parte order, the scope of the accounting required, and substantive disputes over the treatment of a life insurance policy, a "roofing agreement" debt, and a joint CIBC account.

The court finds that the life insurance proceeds did not form part of the estate, upholds the roofing agreement as a valid debt, and determines that the joint account funds are estate assets.

The estate is found to be insolvent, and the court urges the parties to resolve remaining issues by agreement.

The applicant, the deceased's former wife, sought equalization of net family property (NFP), a declaration that the deceased's 2018 will was invalid, and damages for personal property.

The court dismissed all claims.

The NFP equalization claim was found to be time-barred as it was brought outside the six-month limitation period under the Family Law Act, and even if timely, would have been unconscionable given the marriage's 75-day duration.

The challenge to the 2018 will based on undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

Claims for damages related to vehicles and other personal property were also dismissed for lack of corroboration and merit.

This application sought the court's opinion and direction on the interpretation and potential rectification of Shirley Cunningham's General and Limited Property Wills.

The core issue was whether Kimberly Cunningham, a grandchild born outside of marriage, should be considered a "child" of Tenny Clark-Drost for the purposes of a trust established in the wills, given an "Exclusion Clause" that defined "children" as not including those born outside marriage.

The applicant, Carrie-Lee Hofman, argued Kimberly was excluded.

The respondent, Kimberly Cunningham, sought rectification, arguing the clause was a drafting error contrary to the testatrix's true intent.

The court found that the drafting solicitor's inclusion of the Exclusion Clause and the use of a beneficiary class instead of specific names constituted a drafting mistake, as it did not align with Shirley's clear instructions to benefit both Carrie-Lee and Kimberly equally.

Rectification was ordered, deleting the problematic clauses from both wills, thereby including Kimberly as a beneficiary.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a motion brought by non-parties, Divya Jegasundaram and Rupasundar Jegasundaram, seeking a stay of enforcement of a Writ of Possession and to set aside a prior order.

The court ordered the Jegasundarams to pay costs to Malhotra Holdings Inc. ($12,500) and Krish Kumar Vadivale ($5,500), fixed on a basis approaching substantial indemnity.

The decision emphasized that the Jegasundarams' conduct, including bringing an urgent motion with late or missing factums and books of authorities, and shifting the requested relief, warranted elevated costs due to their non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the unnecessary consumption of court resources.

The non-parties, who occupied the subject property, brought an urgent motion to stay the enforcement of a Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate obtained by the plaintiff mortgagee against the defendant mortgagor.

The non-parties relied on Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the non-parties lacked standing to rely on Rule 21.01(3) as they were not defendants in the mortgage action.

The court also declined to set aside the order granting the Writ of Possession, noting the request was not properly before the court and constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion seeking an interlocutory order vesting title of a disputed property in their names to allow them to refinance and avoid eviction, as well as a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and an order setting aside the noting of default on the defendant's counterclaim.

The parties disputed the beneficial ownership of the property, which was registered in the defendant's name.

The Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) had previously found the plaintiffs to be tenants and ordered their eviction due to mortgage defaults.

The court set aside the noting of default due to the plaintiffs' former counsel's negligence.

However, the court dismissed the requests for a vesting order and a CPL, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

The court also found the motion constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the LTB's eviction order.