Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-00001163-00ES DATE: 2024-05-07

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JOY BUDGELL Applicant – and – BRIAN PAUL PRATT, HEATHER ANN PRATT, SHARON HELMECKI, CAROLYN RUTH ANN TRIPP and BRIAN PAUL PRATT, as Executor of the Estate of Paul Norman Hipel Pratt Respondents

Counsel: Self Represented, for the Applicant Joshua Laplante, for the Respondent Brian Pratt

HEARD: January 19, 2024

JUSTICE ANTONIANI

Reasons for Decision

Overview

[1] The Applicant is the former wife of Paul Pratt, now deceased (the “Deceased”). The Respondents are the executor and beneficiaries of the estate of the Deceased. The Executor of the estate is Brian Pratt, who is a son of the Deceased (the “Executor”). The Applicant seeks a variety of relief against the estate of the Deceased, including equalization of Net Family Property (“NFP”), a declaration that the last will of the Deceased be declared invalid, and damages against the estate for claims in relation to personal property.

[2] There are three wills of the Deceased in issue in this Application. The first is a will signed in 2014 (the “2014 Will”), wherein the Deceased left his residence to the Applicant; the second is a will signed in 2016 (the “2016 Will), signed after the Applicant and the Deceased separated, wherein he left nothing to the Applicant, and his will dated June 21, 2018 (the “2018 Will”) wherein he also left nothing to the Applicant.

The Hearing/Application Record

[3] At the time of making the Application, the Applicant was represented by counsel. The Applicant had counsel for cross examinations of the Executor on his affidavit, and to assist in the cross examination in her own affidavit. However, at the hearing of the Application she was self-represented. The Respondent Brian Pratt was represented by counsel, both individually and as the Executor of the estate.

[4] The Applicant advised that she is no longer in a position to have a lawyer retained for the proceeding. In the circumstances, I did not require her to prepare a factum. To mitigate any perceived disadvantage to her, the Respondent was directed to provide their submissions first. After the Respondent’s submissions, the Applicant was invited to seek an adjournment before providing her response, but she declined.

[5] The Application record is sparse. It includes the Notice of Application, and an Affidavit of the Applicant with 3 exhibits: a copy of the marriage certificate evidencing her marriage to the Deceased, the death certificate of the Deceased, and a copy of the 2018 Will, which the Applicant seeks to have declared invalid.

Background Facts

[6] After meeting on the dating application “Plenty of Fish” in March 2014, the 68 year old Joy Budgell (the Applicant) and 84 year old Paul Pratt (Deceased) began a relationship. They resided together intermittently at the home of the Deceased, located at 76 Sarah Street, Thedford, Ontario (“Sarah Street”).

[7] About two months after he met the Applicant, in May 2014, the Deceased changed his will, leaving Sarah Street to the Applicant. In this new will, the Deceased described the Applicant as his friend.

[8] The Applicant and the Deceased were married a little over a year after they met, on August 28, 2015. They were separated on November 9, 2015, 75 days later. No member of either person’s family was present for the wedding. Neither the Applicant’s daughter nor any of the Deceased’s children were invited.

[9] The relationship was tumultuous, and included brief periods of separation throughout, including two brief separations during the 75-days of marriage prior to the final separation on November 9, 2015.

[10] The Deceased had purchased Sarah Street with an ex-wife in 2004, many years prior to meeting the Applicant; however, there is no dispute that it was the matrimonial home during their brief cohabitation while married.

[11] It is also undisputed that the couple separated when the Deceased was taken to hospital in an ambulance on November 9, 2015, due to a head injury he suffered after he alleged that he had been assaulted by the Applicant.

[12] As a result, the Applicant was charged with assault, and was required to sign an Undertaking to stay away from the Deceased and the residence. Approximately six months later, in May 2016, the Applicant signed a common law peace bond agreeing not to communicate with the Deceased or be at Sarah Street for 12 months, and the charges were withdrawn. The peace bond expired on May 25, 2017.

[13] The Applicant admitted that she never again saw the Deceased again after she was charged with assaulting him in November 2015. On the date of the alleged assault, the Applicant took the Mitsubishi vehicle belonging to the Deceased, and the dog that had been gifted to him by his son, and left, never seeing the Deceased again.

[14] In 2017, the Deceased commenced formal proceedings for annulment or divorce. Both parties were represented by counsel in those proceedings and prepared sworn financial statements. Some documentation from the divorce proceedings was included in the record on this Application. I am advised by court administration that the family court proceedings commenced by the Deceased were administratively dismissed for delay on December 27, 2018.

[15] The Deceased retained a lawyer, Michael Forrester, who prepared the Deceased’s 2014 will, in which he left the house to the Applicant, and also prepared a 2016 will after the separation, in which the Deceased left his estate to his children. Mr. Forrester prepared the Deceased’s final will, which was signed on June 21, 2018. The Applicant asks for a declaration that the final will is invalid (the “2018 Will”).

[16] The Deceased died on October 29, 2019. His son, Brian Pratt, was named executor in the 2018 Will. The Executor began to take steps to deal with and distribute his late father’s estate. The Applicant filed a Notice of Objection on February 28, 2020.

[17] This Application was not brought until September 8, 2020 more than six months after the death of the Deceased.

Proceeding by Application

[18] Rule 14.05(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 provides that a proceeding may be brought by application where the determination of rights depends upon the interpretation of a contract, or in respect of any matter where it is unlikely that there will be any material facts in dispute.

[19] The Applicant brought this matter by way of Application, but also asks for an Order for Trial of the issues in this proceeding.

[20] With respect to the facts, and to the extent that there are any in dispute, or credibility issues, these issues are also resolvable by the affidavit evidence and cross examinations on those affidavits.

[21] As set out in 2516216 Ontario Ltd. o/a NUMBRS v. AbleDocs Inc, 2023 ONSC 4713, at paras. 14-17, an order converting an Application to an Action is typically only made when there are complex and disputed questions of fact or credibility which require oral evidence. Here, the court also noted that, as with a summary judgment motion, a court may proceed on the basis that the parties have put their best foot forward.

[22] In Dubblestyne et al v. Town of Oakville, 2021 ONSC 2678, at para. 8, the court agreed that the enhanced fact-finding powers in Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, are applicable to Applications. Rule 20 provides that:

20.02 (1) An affidavit for use on a motion for summary judgment may be made on information and belief as provided in subrule 39.01 (4), but, on the hearing of the motion, the court may, if appropriate, draw an adverse inference from the failure of a party to provide the evidence of any person having personal knowledge of contested facts. O. Reg. 438/08, s. 12.

(2) In response to affidavit material or other evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment, a responding party may not rest solely on the allegations or denials in the party’s pleadings, but must set out, in affidavit material or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.

[23] This approach to hearing and determining Applications is consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. In Hryniak, at para. 28, the Court noted that a just adjudication of disputes does not require viva voce evidence in all cases, even those where there is some conflict in the evidence. The ultimate question is whether the process can achieve a fair and just outcome.

[24] Although there are some facts in dispute between the parties, those facts relate primarily to two areas: whether the relationship between the Applicant and the Deceased was a positive one, and the value of the Applicant’s personal property.

[25] I have decided that it is not necessary to determine whether the relationship between the Applicant and the Deceased was positive in order to determine the issues in this Application. The disputed facts as to value of personal property are due to the Plaintiff’s failure to provide any specifics, or corroboration of her affidavit evidence, and the conflict between her affidavit and other materials included in the application materials. The issues do not require a determination of credibility as between the parties.

Disposition

For the reasons given, I determined that this matter could proceed by way of application and that there can be a just determination of the issues between the parties on the paper record before me, and that a trial of issues is not required.

Issues

[26] At the time of the hearing, the Applicant sought a variety of substantive relief, which I have organized into four main issues:

Issue 1: Is the Applicant entitled to an Order pursuant to the Family Law Act that the Applicant's net family property be equalized with the property of the Deceased? ; or is she otherwise entitled to an Order to receive one-half of the value Sarah Street?

Issue 2: Has the Applicant suffered damages in the amount of $40,000.00, in relation to the Applicant’s Volkswagen motor vehicle, and for monies she spent on a Mitsubishi motor vehicle which had been purchased by the Deceased?

Issue 3: Should the court make a declaration that the 2018 Will is invalid and as such, make an Order giving directions with respect to the validity of the 2018 Will?

Issue 4: Has the Applicant suffered damages in the amount of $100,000.00 related to the loss of personal property that she allegedly left at Sarah Street, and should there be an Order that the Respondents return all property owned by the Applicant?

Decision

[27] For the reasons that follow, the Application is dismissed in its entirety.

Analysis

Issue 1: Is the Applicant entitled to an Order pursuant to the Family Law Act that the Applicant's net family property be equalized with that of the Deceased?; or is she otherwise entitled to an Order to receive one-half of the value of the Sarah Street?

[28] At the hearing of the Application, the Applicant focused on the matrimonial home. She seeks an order that the matrimonial home be transferred to her, based on her entitlement under the 2014 Will. I will address the issues relating to the validity of the 2014 and 2018 Wills below, but I begin here with a consideration of the Applicant’s request for equalization.

[29] Sarah Street was purchased by the Deceased as a cottage, or secondary home, years before he met the Applicant. The Applicant moved into Sarah Street and resided there intermittently over an 18-month period, including during their 2.5-month marriage, after which she left and did not return.

[30] There is no dispute that the parties separated on November 9, 2015, which is the valuation date for equalization purposes. The Applicant did not submit an appraisal of Sarah Street as at the valuation date.

[31] In her sworn financial statement from the matrimonial proceedings in 2018, the Applicant estimated that her one-half of the market value of Sarah Street as at the date of marriage to be $65,000 (valuing the home at $130,000), and on the valuation date, 75 days later, to be $75,000 (valuing the home at $150,000). With no evidence other than the sworn financial statement of the Applicant, I do not accept the proposition that the value of the home increased by 15% in 75 days.

[32] The Respondent Brian Pratt submitted an affidavit attaching a professional appraisal of Sarah Street, both present day, and on the valuation date. The appraisal values Sarah Street at $125,000 on the valuation date. Given my decision herein, the value of Sarah Street matters only peripherally.

Limitation Period for election expired; Deemed Election

[33] The Applicant's claim for an equalization of NFP was brought outside the limitation period prescribed in the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3, as am. (the “Act”) and the claim itself conflicts with the other claims made by the Applicant in respect of the Deceased’s wills.

[34] Under the Act, the spouse of a deceased person may elect to take under the deceased spouse’s will or to an equalization of NFP under s.5 of the Act. If no election is made within 6 months of the death of the first spouse, the surviving spouse is deemed to take under the will (s. 6(11). The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:

Equalization of net family properties Divorce, etc.

5 (1) When a divorce is granted or a marriage is declared a nullity, or when the spouses are separated and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation, the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5 (1).

Death of spouse

(2) When a spouse dies, if the net family property of the deceased spouse exceeds the net family property of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half the difference between them. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5 (2).

6 (1) When a spouse dies leaving a will, the surviving spouse shall elect to take under the will or to receive the entitlement under section 5. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 6 (1).

Effect of election to receive entitlement under s. 5

(8) When a surviving spouse elects to receive the entitlement under section 5, the gifts made to him or her in the deceased spouse’s will are revoked and the will shall be interpreted as if the surviving spouse had died before the other, unless the will expressly provides that the gifts are in addition to the entitlement under section 5. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 6 (8).

Idem

(9) When a surviving spouse elects to receive the entitlement under section 5, the spouse shall be deemed to have disclaimed the entitlement under Part II of the Succession Law Reform Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 6 (9).

Manner of making election

(10) The surviving spouse’s election shall be in the form prescribed by the regulations and shall be filed in the office of the Estate Registrar for Ontario within six months after the first spouse’s death. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 6 (10); 2014, c. 7, Sched. 9, s. 2.

Deemed election

(11) If the surviving spouse does not file the election within that time, he or she shall be deemed to have elected to take under the will or to receive the entitlement under the Succession Law Reform Act, or both, as the case may be, unless the court, on application, orders otherwise. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 6 (11).

[35] In this case, the Applicant is deemed to have elected to take under the Deceased’s will, under s. 5(11), as she did not elect to take under the Act within 6 months of his death.

[36] This Application was brought, with the assistance of counsel, on September 8, 2020, 10 months after the death of the Deceased. The Application did not include an election in the prescribed form, indicating an election under the Act, nor did it include any prayer for relief from the limitation period. Instead, it included a conflicting claim that the Applicant is entitled to take under the 2014 Will, notwithstanding that there were two wills signed thereafter.

Equalization

[37] The Act allows a court to vary the share to a spouse in circumstances of a short-term marriage and where equalization would be unconscionable. The relevant provisions of the Act permit the court to award a spouse an amount that is more or less than one-half the difference between the parties NFP if the court is of the opinion that equalizing the NFP would be unconscionable, having regard to:

(e) the fact that the amount a spouse would otherwise receive ……… is disproportionately large in relation to a period of cohabitation that is less than five years;

[38] As noted by the court in Serra v Serra, 2009 ONCA 105, 93 O.R. (3d) 161 at para 47, “to cross the threshold, an equal division of net family properties in the circumstances must “shock the conscience of the court."

[39] In Kucera v Kucera, [2005] O.J. No. 1514 (SCJ), the court explained the policy rationale underlying s. 5(6)(e) at paras. 18 and 19:

Marriage is a form of partnership, and it is inherently fair that wealth accumulated during the life of that partnership should be shared equally.

Where the [Family Law] Act potentially becomes unfair is where the special provisions discussed above come into play. This is because the equalization process does not only share wealth accumulated during the marriage, but also shares the value of one specific asset, the matrimonial home, that was accumulated prior to the marriage. In very short marriages, this represents an unjustifiable windfall to the non-titled spouse. So long as the marriage is of a duration of less than give years, s. 5(6) is available to redress that unfairness.

[40] In Nossov v Shilo, 2017 ONSC 1599, the court declined to equalize property where the main asset to be equalized would have been the family home, and where the Respondent had purchased the home prior to the 13-month marriage and had paid all of the expenses throughout.

[41] In Cheung v Lim, 2020 ONSC 4387, the court considered whether to equalize in the context of a marriage of 18 months, where the couple had cohabited for about 3 years, including the time married. After a thorough review of cases where courts considered the exercise of its discretion, the court refused to equalize in favour of the non-owner spouse, who had not contributed anything to the matrimonial home.

[42] The examples of courts exercising the discretion to refuse to equalize are abundant.

[43] In the case before me, due to the extreme brevity of the marriage, Sarah Street is essentially the only asset that would have been subject to equalization.

[44] The circumstances do not suggest that the Applicant did anything to prejudice, or change, her premarital circumstances such that she should be entitled to any equalization. Shortly after the separation, she drove to Florida and spent the winter in her trailer there, as she had done in previous years.

[45] I find that equalizing Sarah Street after a marriage of only 75 days, in the context of all the circumstances of this case would present an unfair windfall for the Applicant and would shock the conscience of the court.

[46] The brief period of marital cohabitation included at least two periods of separation. The Applicant admits that she took the Deceased’s vehicle and his dog without his consent when she left the house, and she never made any attempt to communicate with him again after November 9, 2015.

[47] I had no evidence before me as to the value of the Deceased’s vehicle, which she kept for more than three years, and no submission as to what monetary value would be reasonable to attach to the taking of the Deceased’s dog. However, given these issues and all the circumstances, I would have reduced her equalization to zero. I also consider that even a nominal equalization would have been set off entirely against the value of having the use of the Deceased’s car for three years, and his dog. Although she suggests otherwise, I find the Applicant had no colour of right to take either.

[48] The Applicant is clearly out of time to elect to take under the Act; however, if she had not been out of time, I would have found that any equalization in her favour would be unconscionable, and I would not have ordered it.

Constructive Trust

[49] There is brief reference in the application materials that the Applicant is otherwise entitled to a constructive trust in relation to work she claims to have done to maintain and/or upgrade Sarah Street. The Applicant provided no evidence to support her claims for constructive trust, or unjust enrichment, in relation to Sarah Street, other than general statements in her Affidavit. There is no substantial or corroborated evidence of the claim. As a result, the Applicant’s claim under this heading is dismissed.

Issue 2: Has the Applicant suffered damages, in the amount of $40,000.00, in relation to the Applicant’s Volkswagen and for monies spent on a Mitsubishi motor vehicle which was purchased by the Deceased?

[50] The Applicant admitted that on November 9, 2015, she took the Deceased’s Mitsubishi and his dog. She seeks damages in relation to the Mitsubishi vehicle, which, she says, required many repairs, and she claims to have paid storage fees.

[51] The Applicant claimed in her affidavit that the Respondents took the Mitsubishi vehicle from her.

[52] The Applicant’s position contradicts OPP records that the Mitsubishi was impounded because the Applicant was driving it while suspended and had 44 convictions in her driving history. Upon investigation the Applicant was arrested and charged with numerous offences. Police contacted the Respondents, and the vehicle was released to the Executor.

[53] This information from OPP records accords with the Affidavit of the Executor, which outlines the Applicant’s dealings with the Mitsubishi, his receipt of a call from the OPP on December 23, 2018, and the return of the vehicle to the Deceased’s family.

[54] In relation to her Volkswagen vehicle, for which the Applicant seeks $30,000 of damages, she admitted that she left the vehicle at Sarah Street on November 9, 2015 when she drove away in the Mitsubishi.

[55] The Applicant alleges that the Pratt family prevented her from recovering her vehicle after November 9, 2015. However, the Undertaking she signed on her arrest in November 2015 expressly permitted her to attend the residence in the presence of OPP on one occasion, for the express purpose of recovering her belongings. She did not exercise that right until 2020.

[56] The Respondent Brian Pratt inquired with the OPP about what to do with the abandoned Volkswagen. As a result of their inquiries, the Respondent had the vehicle towed and impounded.

[57] In her sworn financial statement in 2018, the Applicant valued the Volkswagen vehicle at $4,600. In these proceedings the Applicant’s affidavit lists the value of the vehicle at $30,000. The Applicant did not produce any invoices, or other evidence, as to her claims in relation to the value of vehicle.

[58] I find that the Applicant took the Mitsubishi without colour of right and is not entitled to any damages in relation to any costs she may have borne in relation to her possession of it. I find that the Applicant’s evidence fails to show that her Volkswagen was converted. As such, the claim for $40,000 in relation to the two vehicles is dismissed.

Issue 3: Should the court make a declaration that the 2018 Will is invalid and as such, make an Order giving directions with respect to the 2018 Will?

[59] The Applicant requests a declaration that the 2018 Will is not valid on the basis of suspicion of undue influence from his children, and on suspicion of a lack of testamentary capacity. The Applicant’s position is that the Deceased’s 2014 will is his last valid will.

[60] All of the Deceased’s wills from 2014 until 2018 were prepared by the Deceased’s solicitor, Mr. Forrester, and signed by two witnesses. The Respondent’s materials include an affidavit of Mr. Forrester, attaching unsigned copies of the wills.

[61] After the Applicant and the Deceased separated, the Deceased signed the 2016 Will, leaving his estate to his children and removing the Applicant as a beneficiary. The final 2018 Will also left the estate solely to his children.

[62] The onus is on the propounder of a will to prove that the will was duly executed. Once proven, the propounder is aided by a rebuttable presumption that the testator knew and approved of the will’s contents and had the necessary testamentary capacity: Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 SCR 876 at para. 26.

[63] If the presumption is rebutted, the onus is then on the propounder of the will to prove that the testator had knowledge and approval of the will’s contents, and that the testator had the requisite testamentary capacity: Vout at para. 27.

[64] In the case before me, the Respondent Brian Pratt provided a copy of the executed 2018 Will, and an affidavit from his solicitor, confirming that he prepared it. There is no evidence to suggest that the Deceased lacked capacity, and I find the materials provide some evidence that the Deceased was mentally competent until his death. The onus however, is on the Applicant. She has failed to raise any valid basis for concern about the Deceased’s capacity, on which to rebut the presumption and base an order for a trial on this issue.

[65] The Applicant’s own materials note that she had no communication with the Deceased after their separation in November 2015. In her Affidavit, she swore that the Deceased had capacity during their marriage.

[66] The entirety of the Applicant’s evidence on the issues of undue influence or lack of capacity is found in her Affidavit at paras. 11, 23, and 25, reproduced here:

[11] I have concerns about the ability of the deceased to properly consider all of his legal obligations and draft a Will in which all his property went to his four children who he had already benefited significantly during the course of his life.

[23] I believe that my husband’s children exerted undue influence on him and turned him against me. We had had many wonderful occasions together during the course of our relationship and subsequent marriage.

[25] I further have concerns about the intellectual capacity of my late husband. He was fine at the time we married. However, I had no contact with him for a period of almost three years, during which time he had his Will prepared. I have concerns that my late husband did not have the capacity to prepare a Will and understand the ramifications of his new Will at the time the document was signed. [sic]

[67] I find that there is no evidence to support the Applicant’s position that the 2018 Will should be declared invalid. As such, I dismiss the Application as it relates to the 2018 Will.

[68] The Applicant did not reference or provide any evidence regarding the 2016 will. Her position is that the 2014 Will is the last valid will of the Deceased. However, even if I had found that the 2018 Will was invalid on the basis of incapacity, or undue influence, the 2016 Will would govern the distribution of the estate. Under the 2016 will the Applicant also received nothing.

[69] My findings that there was no evidence to support the Applicant’s assertion of undue influence or lack of capacity regarding the 2018 Will, would also to the 2016 will: I see no basis on which to find the 2016 Will invalid.

Issue #4: Has the Applicant suffered damages in the amount of $100,000.00 related to personal property that she allegedly left at Sarah Street and was not permitted to recover, and should there be an Order that the Respondents return all property owned by the Applicant, and located at Sarah Street at the time of the Deceased’s passing?

[70] In her 2018 sworn financial statement, the Applicant valued her personal property – other than the Volkswagen - at $10,000. In this Application, she seeks $100,000 for personal property left behind at Sarah Street. She has provided no evidence or explanation whatsoever for the discrepancy. Further, in cross examination, the Applicant admitted to attending to remove her personal belongings in 2020.

[71] I concur with the Respondent’s position that, for all categories of damages sought by the Applicant, including this claim regarding personal possessions, she has failed to produce sufficient corroboration pursuant to section 13 of the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23.

[72] Section 13 provides that in an action against a deceased person, an opposite person may not obtain judgment on their own evidence unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence (Emphasis added).

[73] I reject the position that the Applicant ever had $100,000 worth of personal property at Sarah Street, or that she left $100,000 worth of property at the residence after she attended in 2020 for the express purpose of retrieving her personal property. There is no evidence to support this claim, and it is dismissed.

Decision

[74] The Notice of Objection filed by the Applicant, Joy Budgell, with respect to the Estate of the late Paul Norman Hipel Pratt on or about February 28, 2020 is hereby dismissed.

[75] The Applicant’s claim for an equalization of NFP is dismissed.

[76] The Applicant's claims for damages in relation to vehicles and other personal property are dismissed.

[77] The Application is dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

[77] I would urge the parties to agree on costs. If they are unable to do so, then costs submissions may be made as follows:

a. The Respondents shall serve and file their written costs submissions, not to exceed three pages, double-spaced, together with a draft bill of costs and copies of any pertinent offers, within 21 days of the release of these reasons; and

b. The Applicant shall serve and file its responding costs submissions of no more than three pages, double-spaced, together with a draft bill of costs and copies of any pertinent offers, within 30 days of the release of these reasons; and

c. The Respondent’s reply costs submissions, if any, are to be served and filed within 35 days of the release of these reasons and are not to exceed two pages.

d. If no costs submissions are received by the deadlines specified herein, the parties will be deemed to have resolved the issue of costs, and the issue will not be determined by me.

[78] If the parties settle the question of costs or if a party does not intend to deliver submissions, counsel are requested to advise the court accordingly.

Justice Antoniani

COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-00001163-00ES DATE: 2024-05-07 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE B E T W E E N: JOY BUDGELL Applicant - and – BRIAN PAUL PRATT, HEATHER ANN PRATT, SHARON HELMECKI, CAROLYN RUTH ANN TRIPP and BRIAN PAUL PRATT, as Executor of the Estate of Paul Norman Hipel Pratt Respondents REASONS FOR DECISION S. Antoniani, J. Released: May 7, 2024