Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-19-00002956-0000 Date: 2022 01 13 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: MALHOTRA HOLDINGS INC. v. KRISH KUMAR VADIVALE

Before: Kumaranayake J.

Heard: In writing

Counsel: A. Sidhu, for Divya Jegasundaram and Rupasundar Jegasundaram (the Non-parties/moving parties) J. Chahal, for Malhotra Holdings Inc. (the Plaintiff/responding party) J. Laplante, for Krish Kumar Vadivale (the Defendant/responding party)

C O S T S E N D O R S E M E N T

Nature of the Motion

[1] By a letter dated July 1, 2021 that was submitted by their counsel, Divya Jegasundaram and Rupasundar Jegasundaram (“the Jegasundarams”) requested permission to bring their motion, dated July 1, 2021, on an urgent basis.

[2] On July 2, 2021, I reviewed the Jegasundarams’ request and directed that their motion be added to the next regular motions list, which was on July 6, 2021, and that their counsel inform counsel for Malhotra Holdings Inc. (“Malhotra”) and Krish Kumar Vadivale (“Vadivale”).

[3] The motion was heard on July 6, 2021, and July 12, 2021. The Jegasundarams requested a stay of the enforcement of the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, dated June 25, 2021, with respect to the real property municipally known as 15 Matagami Street, Brampton, Ontario (“the property”). Although not plead in their notice of motion, the Jegasundarams also requested an order to set aside the Order, dated October 29, 2020, by which leave was granted for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. This latter relief was contained in their factum that was filed on July 9, 2021.

[4] For the reasons set out in the Endorsement, dated July 16, 2021, (“the Decision”), I dismissed the Jegasundarams’ motion (see: Malhotra v. Vadivale, 2021 ONSC 5020).

[5] The parties have not been able to resolve the issue of costs and their respective counsel have filed written submissions as directed.

[6] For the reasons that follow, the Jegasundarams shall pay costs of the motion to Malhotra and Vadivale, fixed at $12,500 and $5,500 respectively. These costs are payable within 30 days.

Position of the Parties

[7] Malhotra seeks its costs from the Jegasundarams on a full indemnity basis, jointly and severally, fixed in the amount of $18,508.55 inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and taxes payable within 30 days of the release of this decision.

[8] Vadivale seeks his costs from the Jegasundarams on a full indemnity basis, jointly and severally, fixed in the amount of $8,041.08 inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and taxes, with interest thereon. In the alternative, Vadivale seeks his costs from the Jegasundarams on a substantial indemnity basis, jointly and severally, fixed in the amount of $6,433.32 inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and taxes. Vadivale requests that costs be payable within 30 days of the release of this decision.

[9] The Jegasundarams do not dispute that Malhotra and Vadivale are entitled to costs, but they disagree with the amount of costs that Malhotra and Vadivale are seeking. The Jegasundarams state that costs of $5,000 should be awarded each to Malhotra and Vadivale, on a partial indemnity basis.

Malhotra

[10] I shall summarize the position of Malhotra, Vadivale, and the Jegasundarams.

[11] In support of its position, Malhotra submits:

a) It was entirely successful on the motion.

b) The motion was complex given the interplay between staying a Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued by the Superior Court of Justice and a stay of eviction ordered by the Landlord and Tenant Board if certain conditions were met by the Jegasundarams.

c) The Decision was 35 pages.

d) The motion was brought on an urgent basis. Urgent motions result in higher costs and often the responding party incurs higher costs than the moving party.

e) Service of the Jegasundarams’ motion was effective on July 2, 2021, which was two calendar days before the scheduled date for the motion. The Jegasundarams’ motion record was 152 pages. Despite the Jegasundarams’ relying on Rules 21.01(3)(a) and 21.01(3)(c), no factum was served with their motion record.

f) The Jegasundarams’ book of authorities was only served at 9:33 a.m. on July 6, 2021, and motions court started at 10:00 a.m.

g) Malhotra’s responding motion record (170 pages) had to be prepared quickly and was served on July 5, 2021. In responding to the motion, Malhotra had to both respond and anticipate the legal arguments of the Jegasundarams as no factum had been served with the motion.

h) The motion was not completed on July 6, 2021, and was adjourned to continue on July 12, 2021. All parties to the motion were ordered to serve factums but as they all had the same deadline, Malhotra had to anticipate Jegasundarams’ legal arguments.

i) Non-parties have been held liable for costs in which they take a direct role even though they are not parties to the proceedings.

j) Malhotra relies on the mortgage contract (the Standard Charge Terms 200433 filed with the Registered Charge dated January 10, 2017) (“Standard Charge Terms”) for the property in support of its request for costs on a full indemnity basis. The Standard Charge Terms for the recovery of legal fees on a full indemnity basis. It submits that the Jegasundarams were unsuccessful in their request to be added as a party to mortgage action and should be treated in the same way as if Vadivale had brought a motion in the mortgage action and was unsuccessful.

Vadivale

[12] Vadivale’s submissions are similar to Malhotra’s submissions. There is some overlap and some arguments are identical. In support of his position, Vadivale submits:

a) Jegasundarams motion was confirmed as a regular motion but required two to three hours to argue over two days.

b) Non-parties have been held liable for costs in which they take a direct role even though they are not parties to the proceedings.

c) The Court’s discretion to award costs should be exercised with respect to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, subject to the overriding principle of reasonableness. Costs must be fair and reasonable, and in an amount that the losing party should reasonably expect to pay.

d) As a result of the motion, Vadivale is responsible for legal fees on two fronts. First, he is responsible for legal fees for his own lawyer on the motion. Second, he is liable for Malhotra’s legal fees on a full indemnity basis under the Standard Charge Terms for the property.

e) By bringing their motion, the Jegasundarams chose to interject themselves into the mortgage action. Therefore, the Jegasundarams should have not only reasonably expected that they would be liable to two parties for costs but that they would be liable on a full indemnity basis as they had prior knowledge of the Standard Charge Terms.

f) As Vadivale will be liable on a full indemnity basis to Malhotra for enforcing the mortgage, he is entitled to his costs from the Jegasundarams on a full indemnity basis.

g) In the alternative, Vadivale submits that he is entitled to costs on a substantial indemnity basis given that there are special circumstances and that the Jegasundarams’ conduct on the motion was condemnable and went beyond merely advancing an unsuccessful case.

h) The Jegasundarams brought their motion on an urgent basis and urgent motions result in higher costs and often, the responding party incurs higher costs.

i) The Jegasundarams did not file a factum with their motion despite the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (“the Rules”) required a factum. Further, their book of authorities was provided by email on the morning of July 6, 2021, at 9:33 a.m. and the motions list started at 10:00 a.m.

j) The Jegasundarams provided a factum at the Court’s specific direction for the continuation of argument on July 12, 2021. Vadivale had to both anticipate and respond to the Jegasundarams’ arguments.

k) There has been a pattern of the Jegasundarams bringing urgent motions that are served late, without factums, and books of authorities also served late. Vadivale submits that the Jegasundarams behaved in the same manner in relation to another urgent motion heard by Justice Dennison in the ownership action (see: Jegasundaram v. Vadivale, 2021 ONSC 4505, and the related costs endorsement, dated July 29, 2021). Further, Vadivale refers to another attempt by the Jegasundarams to bring a motion on an urgent basis. [^1]

l) The Jegasundarams conducted themselves improperly at the continuation of the motion on July 12. On that day, the Jegasundarams sought relief that was not set out in their notice of motion. This new relief was set out in their factum and without prior notice to Malhotra or Vadivale. Vadivale submits that the Jegasundarams behaved in a similar fashion in the motion heard by Justice Dennison in the ownership action.

m) Vadivale submits that this disregard for the Rules should be sanctioned by costs payable on a substantial indemnity basis.

n) The motion was complex given the context of the multiplicity of proceedings related to the property and Vadivale points out that 60 paragraphs of the Decision addressed the procedural history of various proceedings.

o) The outcome of the motion was important to Vadivale as the longer the property goes without being sold, the more the equity in the property is eroded.

p) Malhotra and Vadivale tried to keep their costs down by coordinating submissions and submitting a joint factum

The Jegasundarams

[13] In support of their position, the Jegasundarams submit:

a) Costs awards should be fair and reasonable and not the exact measure of the actual costs of the successful litigant.

b) Argument of the motion did not start until the afternoon of July 6, 2021, and approximately two hours was required on July 6, 2021. An additional 1.5 hours was required on July 12, 2021.

c) The amount of costs claimed by Malhotra is not reasonable as Malhotra’s counsel spent considerably more time preparing for the motion in comparison to Vadivale’s lawyer when Malhotra’s lawyer had considerably more experience.

d) The Jegasundarams’ should not have to pay, nor was it reasonable for them to expect to pay, for over-preparation by Malhotra’s lawyer.

e) Had the Jegasundarams been successful on the motion, then they would have sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, jointly and severally, fixed in the amount of $5,336.91 inclusive of all fees, disbursements and taxes. Therefore, Malhotra’s costs exceed the Jegasundarams reasonable expectations.

f) As the Jegasundarams were not a party to the mortgage registered on the property and were not provided with a copy of the mortgage contract/Standard Charge Terms and, therefore, they cannot be bound by those terms.

g) They should not be held responsible for Vadivale’s liability for costs to Malhotra on a full indemnity basis as that liability results from Vadivale’s default on the mortgage. They submit that Vadivale cannot rely on the mortgage contract in seeking costs on a full indemnity basis from them and that he is “the author of his own misfortune and should bear all costs stemming from his default.”

h) The motion was not complex.

i) There were no cross-examinations.

j) The motion could have been argued over one day and the responding parties to the motion were “well versed in the issues in dispute given the ongoing companion actions.”

k) The Jegasundarams treated the motion as being a very serious and significant matter.

l) The urgency of the motion arose because of the enforcement of the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate as the outstanding ownership action (between the Jegasundarams and Vadivale) would not have been adjudicated prior to the execution of the Notice to Vacate.

m) As set out in their costs outline, the motion was unnecessary given the Divisional Court Order of Justice Penny, dated June 8, 2021, which stayed the eviction of the Jegasundarams until July 30, 2021, provided that certain conditions were met. The Jegasundarams submit that by proceeding with enforcement of the Writ of Possession, Malhotra acted contrary to Justice Penny’s order.

Relevant Legal Principles

[14] Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, provides that

Subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid.

[15] Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules provides that

In exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs, the court may consider, in addition to the result in the proceeding and any offer to settle or to contribute made in writing,

(0.a) the principle of indemnity, including, where applicable, the experience of the lawyer for the party entitled to the costs as well as the rates charged and the hours spent by that lawyer;

(0.b) the amount of costs that an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay in relation to the step in the proceeding for which costs are being fixed;

(a) the amount claimed and the amount recovered in the proceeding;

(b) the apportionment of liability;

(c) the complexity of the proceeding;

(d) the importance of the issues;

(e) the conduct of any party that tended to shorten or to lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding;

(f) whether any step in the proceeding was,

i. improper, vexatious or unnecessary, or

ii. taken through negligence, mistake or excessive caution;

(g) a party’s denial of or refusal to admit anything that should have been admitted;

(h) whether it is appropriate to award any costs or more than one set of costs where a party,

i. commenced separate proceedings for claims that should have been made in one proceeding, or

ii. in defending a proceeding separated unnecessarily from another party in the same interest or defended by a different lawyer; and

(i) any other matter relevant to the question of costs.

[16] As set out in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), at para. 24, costs should be proportionate to the result obtained and should be reasonable from the perspective of the unsuccessful party:

[I]t is also necessary to step back and consider the result produced and question whether, in all the circumstances, the result is fair and reasonable. This approach was sanctioned by this court in Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier, [2002] O.J. No. 4495, 21 C.C.E.L. (3d) 161 (C.A.) at para. 4 where it said:

In our view, the costs award should reflect more what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful parties rather than any exact measure of the actual costs to the successful litigant.

[17] The principle of reasonableness was reiterated in Davies v Clarington (Municipality) et al., 2009 ONCA 722, 100 OR (3d) 66, at para. 52:

As can be seen, the overriding principle is reasonableness. If the judge fails to consider the reasonableness of the costs award, then the result can be contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice. Rather than engage in a purely mathematical exercise, the judge awarding costs should reflect on what the court views as a reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party rather than any exact measure of the actual costs of the successful litigant.

[18] Further, at para. 28, the Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated when elevated costs should be awarded:

This court, following the principle established by the Supreme Court, has repeatedly said that elevated costs are warranted in only two circumstances. The first involves the operation of an offer to settle under rule 49.10, where substantial indemnity costs are explicitly authorized. The second is where the losing party has engaged in behaviour worthy of sanction.

Entitlement

[19] The Jegasundarams do not dispute that Malhotra and Vadivale are each entitled to costs. They were the successful parties on the motion.

Scale

[20] I do not accept the submissions that the Jegasundarams are liable for costs on a full indemnity basis based on the mortgage contract between Malhotra and Vadivale. In argument of the motion, repeated reference was made to the fact, and this was not disputed, that the Jegasundarams were not parties to the mortgage action, were not parties to the mortgage contract between Malhotra and Vadivale, and that they had no standing in the mortgage action.

[21] Even if there had been evidence before me that the Jegasundarams had been provided with a copy of the Standard Charge Terms, while those terms may bind Vadivale in regard to his ultimate liability for costs to Malhotra, I am not persuaded that it follows that the Jegasundarams are bound by terms of a contract that they were not parties to.

[22] I also do not accept the Jegasundarams’ submission that they should pay costs on a partial indemnity basis.

[23] In my view, because of the manner in which the motion was conducted, costs approaching substantial indemnity is warranted.

[24] The motion was brought on an urgent basis. I accept that urgent motions can result in higher expenses being incurred by all parties and often results in higher expense for the responding parties to a motion. The reason for this is succinctly explained in Forbes & Manhattan v. URSA Major Minerals, 2011 ONSC 3911, at para. 25:

Urgent motions operating under a compressed timetable by their nature result in higher costs than litigation conducted at a more leisurely pace. One reason is that a responding party needs to ensure that it has not overlooked some legal or factual matter in its response, and this usually requires more eyes to double-check work and think through the implications of various issues under tight time constraints. As a result, it is not at all unusual that the costs of a responding party to an injunction motion will exceed those of the moving party. The former has had the luxury of more time to formulate its plan of attack; the latter must canvass possible areas of response within a shorter time.

[25] While I appreciate that from the Jegasundarams’ perspective, they may be of the view that they did not have the “luxury of more time” to prepare their motion materials, Malhotra and Vadivale had even less time.

[26] The Jegasundarams received a Notice to Vacate, dated June 25, 2021, that required them to leave the property by July 7, 2021, at 8:30 am. As noted in the Decision, the Jegasundarams did not provide evidence of when they received the Notice to Vacate.

[27] Their motion was served on July 1, 2021, (a statutory holiday) and therefore, service was effective on July 2, 2021. Malhotra’s responding motion record was served on July 5, 2021.

[28] The fact that the motion was brought on an urgent basis is not what triggers elevated costs.

[29] The Jegasundarams moved under Rule 21.01(3)(a) and 21.01(3)(c). The Rules are clear – factums are mandatory. By the scheduling Endorsement, dated July 2, 2021, the Jegasundarams were given permission to proceed with their urgent motion and their motion was added to the regular motions list of July 6, 2021. The regular motions list is for motions that can be completed in 59 minutes or less. No explanation was provided as to why the Jegasundarams did not serve a factum prior to the motion date of July 6, 2021.

[30] Similarly, no explanation was provided as to why the Jegasundarams’ book of authorities was only served the day the motion was to be heard, less then 30 minutes prior to the start of the motions court. The book of authorities contained three cases.

[31] The motion was held down until the afternoon of July 6, 2021, as other matters on the motions list had to be dealt with first. This provided counsel for Malhotra and Vadivale with the opportunity to review the Jegasundarams’ authorities.

[32] Further, the Jegasundarams’ position on July 12, 2021, was not the same as what it had been on July 6, 2021. Different relief was being requested on July 12, 2021. On July 6th, the Jegasundarams were seeking a stay of enforcement of the Notice to Vacate until July 30, 2021. However, on July 12, 2021, they sought an indefinite stay.

[33] Further, by their factum, filed on July 9, 2021, the Jegasundarams sought additional relief to what was set out in their Notice of Motion. They also requested an Order setting aside the Order dated October 29, 2020, which granted leave for the Writ of Possession to be issued. Counsel for Malhotra and Vadivale learned of this additional relief on July 9, 2021, when they received the Jegasundarams’ factum, which was after their joint factum had been prepared. I accepted that Malhotra and Vadivale did not have the opportunity to address this new relief in either their joint responding motion record or joint factum.

[34] The Jegasundarams’ submission that the responding parties to the motion were well-versed in the issues, given the ongoing companion action, is not helpful and does not excuse their non-compliance with the Rules. The Jegasundarams’ requests for relief were a moving target, not only for counsel for responding parties but also for the Court.

Quantum

[35] The motion was important to Malhotra, Vadivale, and the Jegasundarams. It impacted Malhotra’s ability to enforce its rights under the mortgage action and ultimately for the sale of the property. Vadivale was impacted in two aspects. First, he remained liable to Malhotra for its enforcement costs on the mortgage action. Second, and this also applies to the Jegasundarams, the equity in the property would be reduced because of the costs related to the multiple proceedings, regardless of whether the Jegasundarams or Vadivale were ultimately successful in the ownership action. Further, for the Jegasundarams, the property was where their family lived with their two children. They had occupied the property since 2015.

[36] I reject the Jegasundarams’ submission that the motion was not complex. It was complex.

[37] To put the Jegasundarams’ request on the motion in context, it was necessary to review the interaction of these litigants in five different proceedings in three different forums (two SCJ matters and two Landlord and Tenant Tribunal matters which resulted in an appeal to the Divisional Court, and a motion to quash the appeal). Further, it necessitated argument and consideration of conflicting orders made at the SCJ and the Divisional Court.

[38] The Jegasundarams submit that the motion was not necessary but also allege that by filing a Writ of Possession, Malhotra acted contrary to Justice Penny’s Order. I do not accept that submission. I made no such finding. Further, I note that in quashing the Jegasundarams’ appeal of the eviction order, Justice Penny made no order with respect to the enforcement of the Writ of Possession.

[39] I do not find the Jegasundarams’ submission that there were no cross-examinations for the motion to be helpful to their position. Realistically, there was no time for cross-examinations to held.

[40] I was not made aware of any offers to settle that had been made.

[41] As stated earlier, the required factum was not served and filed with the Jegasundarams’ motion. The book of authorities was not served until the morning of the motion. In my view, both these deficiencies resulted in increasing the time needed for this motion. Not only did it increase Malhotra and Vadivale’s counsel’s time, but it also increased the court time required for the adjudication of the motion.

[42] It also impacted other litigants and their counsel who had motions on the July 6, 2021, motions list. There were at least two other motions that had to be adjourned. Those matters could not be reached as this motion had to be given priority. Just as the issues in Jegasundarams’ motion were important to the Jegasundarams, Malhotra, and Vadivale, the issues in the motions of the other litigants were important to them.

[43] In my view, this motion unnecessarily consumed a disproportionate amount of the court’s limited resources. This could have been avoided had a factum and book of authorities been served and filed in compliance with the Rules. This conduct is not acceptable and cannot be condoned.

[44] I now turn to the hourly rates and time spent by counsel.

[45] Mr. Chahal, counsel for Malhotra, was called to the bar in 2002 and his hourly rate is $300. All tasks related to the motion were completed by Mr. Chahal. He claimed 49 hours for review of the motion record, preparation of the responding materials, research, preparation of factum and book of authorities, and preparation for and attendance at the motion on July 6 and 12. He claimed an additional 8.6 hours for preparation of the costs submissions.

[46] Mr. Laplante, counsel for Vadivale, has two years experience and his hourly rate is $200. While the bulk of the tasks related to the motion was completed by Mr. Laplante, some tasks were also completed by another associate (at hourly rate of $275 and five years experience), as well as articling student and summer students (at their hourly rate of $145). For review of the motion record, preparation of the Vadivale’s affidavit, research, and preparation for and attendance at the motion on July 6 and 12, the time claimed is 23.5 hours for Mr. Laplante, and 2.5 hours for the students. For preparation of costs submissions, including research, the time claimed is 13 hours, which is comprised of 7.9 hours for Mr. Laplante, 0.9 hours for his colleague, and 4.2 hours for the students.

[47] By comparison, Mr. Sidhu, counsel for the Jegasundarams, is a 2012 call and his hourly rate is $375. The majority of the tasks were completed by Mr. Sidhu. However, a law clerk (hourly rate of $100) assisted with research and the preparation of the book of authorities and cost outline. For preparation of the motion record, review of the responding motion record, research, preparation of factum and book of authorities, and preparation for and attendance at the motion on July 6 and 12, the time claimed is 19 hours (14.3 hours for Mr. Sidhu and 4.7 hours for the law clerk). For preparation of costs submissions, the time claimed for Mr. Sidhu is 1.5 hours. I note that no time was included for the factum filed for the appearance on July 12, 2021.

[48] Each counsel’s time also included communication with each other.

[49] The hourly rates of Mr. Chahal and Mr. Laplante are reasonable. Malhotra and Vadivale coordinated their efforts by Malhotra filing a responding motion record that included Vadivale’s affidavit and then filing a joint factum for continuation of the motion on July 12. By doing so, this avoided any argument of whether Vadivale was entitled to file any materials on the motion given that he had been noted in default in the mortgage action. This issue was not raised by any counsel.

[50] I am not persuaded by the Jegasundarams’ submission that Mr. Chahal over-prepared for the motion. Mr. Chahal took the lead on responding to the motion.

[51] I do accept that the coordinated efforts of Mr. Chahal and Mr. Laplante may have reduced some expense for Malhotra and Vadivale, but there still was some overlap and duplication by Mr. Chahal and Mr. Laplante. I also find that the time claimed for their preparation of the cost submissions is also a bit on the high side.

[52] With respect to disbursements, I have no issue with the disbursements claimed by Malhotra ($66.95). Vadivale makes no claim for disbursements.

[53] Taking into consideration of the circumstances of the motion, the relevant legal principles, and what the Jegasundarams would reasonably be expected to pay for the motion, in my view, it is fair and reasonable that the Jegasundarams pay costs to Malhotra in the amount of $12,500 and costs to Vadivale in the amount of $5,500. These amounts are inclusive of fees, disbursements, and applicable H.S.T.

[54] In their submissions, the Jegasundarams did not request additional time to pay costs nor did they oppose the request for interest. I see no reason to depart from Rule 57.03. Therefore, these costs shall be payable within 30 days of the release of this costs decision and the costs order shall bear interest of 2.0% annually.

Order

[55] For the reasons outlined above, the following Order shall issue:

1. Divya Jegasundaram and Rupasundar Jegasundaram are jointly and severally liable for paying costs to Malhotra Holdings Inc. These costs are fixed in the amount of $12,500 (inclusive of fees, disbursements and applicable H.S.T.) and are payable within 30 days of the release of the costs decision.

2. Divya Jegasundaram and Rupasundar Jegasundaram are jointly and severally liable for paying costs to Krish Kumar Vadivale. These costs are fixed in the amount of $5,500 (inclusive of fees, disbursements and applicable H.S.T.) and are payable within 30 days of the release of the costs decision.

3. This Order bears interest of 2% annually.

Kumaranayake J. DATE: January 13, 2022

[^1]: Following dismissal of their motion, the Jegasundarams sought permission to bring a second urgent motion for an order to set aside the order by which leave was granted for the writ of possession to be issued, to be added as parties to the mortgage action, and to set aside the default judgment and noting in default of Vadivale in the mortgage action. Their request was dated July 26, 2021. For the reasons set out in the Endorsement, dated July 28, 2021, I explained why I determined that their proposed motion was not urgent and directed the Jegasundarams to bring that motion in the usual manner.