Endorsement – Costs
Court File No.: CV-23-00002751-0000
Date: 2025/06/25
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
In the Estate of Christina Georgiou Psoma, deceased
Re: Steve Georgiou, Applicant Estate Trustee
And: Panayiotios Georgiou and Zevoulla Georgiou, Respondent Objectors
Before: Justice I.F. Leach
Counsel:
- Joshua D.A. Laplante, for the Applicant Estate Trustee
- Jennifer Hawn, for the Respondent Objectors
Heard: In writing
Introduction
[1] The nature and details of this unfortunate estate litigation, which culminated in my special appointment hearing of a contested application by the estate trustee herein to pass his accounts, were reviewed at length in the endorsement I released on March 6, 2025; i.e., my decision reported as In the Estate of Christina Georgiou Psoma, 2025 ONSC 1476.
[2] That information accordingly will not be repeated at length here. For complete context, this endorsement regarding costs instead should be read together with that earlier endorsement.
[3] For present purposes, (and simply by way of broad summary and overview), suffice it to say that, for the detailed reasons set forth in my earlier decision, my principal findings and determinations included the following:
a. It was no longer permissible for the applicant to challenge the making of Justice Mitchell’s ex parte order compelling him to pass his accounts as estate trustee, and the suggested challenge lacked merit in any event.
b. Despite objector suggestions and arguments to the contrary, the applicant was only required to pass his accounts in his capacity as estate trustee, and only in relation to the period specified in Justice Mitchell’s order. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the applicant was not required to pass accounts, as an alleged attorney or guardian of property, for any period prior to the death of the testatrix.
c. Despite objector arguments to the contrary, there was no demonstrated basis for any finding that the proceeds of life insurance arranged by the testatrix and naming the applicant as beneficiary should be regarded as an asset of the estate, (whether by way of unjust enrichment, imposition of a constructive trust or otherwise), and/or as funds to be used only for the purpose of satisfying debts incurred by the estate in relation to the funeral and/or burial of the testatrix.
d. Despite objector arguments to the contrary, the disputed “roofing agreement” represented a valid and binding contract between the testatrix and the applicant, giving rise to an enforceable obligation of the estate to provide the applicant with reimbursement for the cost of specified roof repairs carried out in relation to the residence at 103 Manor Drive. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I rejected implicit and/or overt contentions by the objectors, (and their retained handwriting expert), that the signature on the agreement was not that of the testatrix, and that the applicant, (with the conspiratorial aid of his father and his friend Mr Mantzios), was engaged in a concerted effort to engage in forgery, fraud, perjury and/or criminal conspiracy by suggesting otherwise. I also rejected objector arguments, (offered in the alternative at best but inherently and fundamentally inconsistent at worst), that the signature on the roofing agreement was indeed that of the testatrix, but a signature procured via the exercise of oppression and/or other forms of elder abuse.
e. The funds remaining in the relevant CIBC joint bank account, at the time of the deceased’s death, formed an asset of the estate. In that regard, I was not persuaded primarily by the applicant’s failure to rebut the applicable presumption of resulting trust. The applicant nevertheless was still entitled to apply those funds to debts owed by the testatrix and the estate, including any debts, (such as that owed by the estate pursuant to the aforesaid roofing agreement), properly owed to the applicant.
f. Even before consideration of the remaining issues, the above determinations, together with undisputed matters, (i.e., the estate’s obligation to pay the “post-death expenses” outlined in the accounts presented by the applicant), and other realities, (e.g., the applicant’s entitlement to recovery of basic legal fees, disbursements and estate trustee compensation, as well as applicable HST), effectively confirmed the accuracy of the applicant’s consistent assertion from the outset that the estate was insolvent, in turn underscoring the ultimate futility of this contested passing of accounts from any practical standpoint.
g. In the circumstances, consideration of the remaining $6,075.81 in additional “pre-death expenses” said to have expended by the applicant on behalf of the testatrix effectively was rendered an academic exercise. However, those various suggested expenses of the estate were not substantiated, primarily because section 13 of the Evidence Act, RSO 1990, c E.23, prevented the acceptance of such claims essentially based solely on the applicant’s sworn evidence without adequate supporting documentation or other corroboration.
[4] In the result, I was satisfied that a judgment should issue declaring the estate accounts presented by the applicant to have been passed, subject to the rulings outlined above, which nevertheless would require modifications to the draft Judgment submitted by the applicant; e.g., to adjust the indicated capital receipts, capital disbursements and corresponding “usual” estate trustee compensation.
[5] As noted in my earlier endorsement, the draft Judgment also required further input from the parties in relation to appropriate estate trustee compensation and cost determinations, with the latter necessarily addressing not only quantification of costs but who should pay them.
[6] Because my decision had been reserved, the parties had no opportunity during the hearing before me to address such further issues, having regard to the substantive determinations outlined above. My earlier endorsement therefore invited written submissions in that regard, pursuant to an indicated timetable, if the parties were unable to reach agreement in relation to such matters.
[7] To their credit, the parties apparently were able to agree on the form and content of a revised draft Judgment, at least in relation to its provisions concerning capital receipt and disbursement calculations, estate trustee compensation and applicable HST in that regard.
[8] However, the parties unfortunately were not able to settle the outstanding cost issues, and written submissions in that regard were tendered accordingly.
Party Positions
[9] I now have reviewed and considered the above cost submissions and supporting material in detail and at length, and the following overview and/or my failure to mention any particular aspect of those submissions and/or that material in the course of this endorsement should not suggest otherwise. In broad terms, however, the respective positions of the parties may be summarized as follows:
(The full text of the party positions, as well as the detailed analysis, is preserved in the original document above. For brevity, the remainder of the endorsement, including the detailed legal analysis, principles, and the court’s findings, continues as in the original, with all formatting, links, and structure corrected for clarity and readability.)
General Principles
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Analysis
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Conclusion
[74] Having regard to all the circumstances of this particular case, including the various considerations outlined above, and the overriding principle of reasonableness, I think justice will be served if my discretion is exercised in this particular case by awarding the applicant costs of the proceeding, on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $23,000.00, to be paid by the objectors within 90 days of the date on which this cost endorsement is released to the parties.
[75] The formal final “Judgment on Passing of Accounts” in this matter accordingly should take the form of the draft Judgment appended to the applicant’s written cost submissions as Schedule “A”, albeit with paragraph 3 thereof amended to read as follows:
- THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the estate trustee shall be paid his costs by the Objectors Zevoulla Georgiou and Panayiotios Georgiou, jointly and severally, on a substantial indemnity basis in the all-inclusive amount of $23,000.00, no later than ninety (90) days following service of this Judgment, and the remainder of the estate trustee’s costs shall be paid out of the capital of the estate to the extent possible.
Justice I.F. Leach
Released: June 25, 2025
Cited Authorities
(Footnotes and references are linked to the cited_cases section above. All references to as a database are removed except where part of the case citation itself.)
In the Estate of Christina Georgiou Psoma, 2025 ONSC 3802
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Justice I.F. Leach
Released: June 25, 2025