Daniel Maurice Joseph Mayer

The plaintiff, A.C., sought leave under section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue a civil action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Ontario.

This claim arose after criminal charges against A.C. for sexual misconduct, which had resulted in a mistrial, were subsequently withdrawn by the Crown due to no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that A.C. failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success, specifically by not providing sufficient evidence of malice on the part of the Crown.

The court emphasized that mere inconsistencies in evidence, lack of forensic evidence, or late disclosure (without proof of deliberate intent to subvert justice) do not meet the high threshold for proving malice required for malicious prosecution claims against the Attorney General.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action and striking his amended statement of claim.

The motion judge had concluded that the action was outside the Superior Court's jurisdiction and that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the Divisional Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the issues raised, as the action fundamentally concerned the enforcement of statutory powers subject to judicial review, not a matter for the Superior Court.

The defendants brought a motion seeking leave to amend their Statement of Defence to plead a jurisdictional bar under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 (WSIA), and an adjournment of the trial.

The proposed amendment argued that the plaintiff's action was barred by WSIA sections 28 and 31, which grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) for workplace injury claims against employers.

The court granted leave to amend the Statement of Defence, finding that while the delay was unfortunate, any prejudice to the plaintiff could be compensated by costs and an adjournment.

The trial was adjourned to allow for the amendment and a determination by WSIAT.

The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff partial indemnity costs and an additional amount for trial preparation efforts, totaling $28,578.28.

The Durham Regional Police Service (Applicant) sought to prohibit the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (Commission) from disclosing two workplace investigation reports (Shearer Reports), claiming they were privileged.

The Commission, along with the Durham Regional Police Service Association (Intervenor), opposed these restrictions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Shearer Report 1 was not privileged, and while Shearer Report 2's privilege was uncertain (as it was not produced for review), any privilege over either report had been waived or lost due to prior disclosures.

The court ordered the reports to be produced to the Commission without restriction, emphasizing the public interest in disclosure to protect employees from harassment and a toxic workplace, and noting the Commission's statutory obligations of confidentiality.

This endorsement addresses a costs ruling following successful summary judgment motions.

The defendants, as moving parties for costs, sought $70,000 in partial indemnity costs in each of two proceedings.

The plaintiffs, as responding parties, argued against the award, citing lack of notice regarding certain claims and the potential impediment to their ongoing litigation against other defendants.

The court granted the defendants the full requested costs, totaling $140,000, finding that the defendants were entirely successful, their offer to settle was generous, the allegations against them were serious, and the amount sought was reasonable.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments against the costs award.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action.

The action alleged mistreatment by professors and York University, and sought damages, an investigation by the Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development, and the establishment of an independent tribunal.

The motion judge found no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the Ministry owed no duty of care to post-secondary students regarding administrative complaints and could not intervene in the internal management of an autonomous university.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application against the Law Society of Ontario and various individuals.

The motion judge had found the appellant's pleadings to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to their rambling, racist, and misogynistic content.

The Court of Appeal, exercising its authority under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the appellant's notice of appeal and factum continued the abusive conduct and raised no arguable grounds.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's action, alleging it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found the action lacked merit and constituted an abuse of process, as the plaintiff, previously declared a party under disability and subject to an order precluding him from bringing actions without leave, had disregarded court guidance and orders regarding his legal capacity and the involvement of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the claim was stayed.

This endorsement from a case conference addressed procedural issues concerning examinations for discovery scheduled for a three-week period.

Key issues included confirming the discovery schedule for defendants, determining the order of examination between co-plaintiffs, and allocating discovery costs.

The court set the discovery schedule, ordered one plaintiff's counsel to examine witnesses first due to preparedness, and denied a request for an advance list of questions.

Costs were apportioned 3/4 to one plaintiff's clients and 1/4 to the self-represented plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their action against various judicial officials and court staff under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the appeal, finding it completely devoid of merit.

The action largely consisted of complaints about alleged obstruction of a separate earlier claim.

The court found no cause of action against the judges due to judicial immunity and no claim against court staff due to the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The statement of claim exhibited hallmarks of vexatious litigation.

The plaintiff, William Rallis, brought an action against various judicial officials and court staff.

The court considered a request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that claims against judicial officials were barred by absolute judicial immunity, and claims against court staff were barred by section 5(6) of the Proceedings against the Crown Act.

Consequently, all claims against the named judicial officials and court staff defendants were dismissed without costs.

The appellant, a former employee of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, appealed an order from the Superior Court that restricted her ability to commence legal proceedings.

The order prohibited her from initiating or continuing any civil or criminal proceedings without prior authorization from a Superior Court judge.

The appellant had engaged in extensive litigation across multiple forums, filing numerous civil actions, private informations, and peace bond applications, all of which were dismissed or withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the restriction on civil proceedings under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act but struck down the restriction on criminal proceedings, finding that the Superior Court lacked the inherent jurisdiction to prevent access to justices of the peace for private informations and peace bond applications.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a notice of default and dismissed her action against the Crown on the grounds of abuse of process and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant's action alleged that Ministry of the Attorney General employees misconducted themselves in relation to proceedings before the Landlord Tenant Board, Divisional Court, and Superior Court of Justice that had been decided adversely against her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the action constituted an abuse of process as it represented an attempt to question the legitimacy of unfavourable proceedings, and that the appellant failed to plead the necessary elements of malice or intent to injure for the tort of misfeasance in public office.

A unionized Crown employee appealed the dismissal of his claim arising from his employment termination in 2014.

The employee pleaded conspiracy to injure, unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, abuse of process, defamatory libel, and slander against the Crown and several Crown managers.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the essential nature of the claim arose out of the collective agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the legal test or characterization of the pleadings.

The respondents (Ontario, the Attorney General of Ontario, and the Attorney General of Canada) sought to dismiss two appeals brought by the appellant under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the appeals were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

In C62801, the court found the record inadequate to assess the request for dismissal.

In C62802, the court granted the Rule 2.1 request, finding that while the appeal lacked merit, it was also abusive in nature, as the appellant had failed to perfect her appeal despite being given guidance and an extension of time to do so.