Daniel Maurice Joseph Mayer

The plaintiff, a former student at York University, brought an action against the Attorney General of Ontario alleging that the government failed to protect him from mistreatment by the university and its professors.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action as the Crown owes no duty of care to university students and universities are autonomous entities.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process, as similar claims by the plaintiff against the university had already been dismissed by the Divisional Court.

The appellants, the Chief of the Durham Regional Police Service and the Durham Regional Police Services Board, sought judicial review of an interim order made by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Commission had appointed an Administrator to oversee disciplinary proceedings, promotions, and secondary employment within the Service, citing an emergency and a crisis of confidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission had the jurisdiction to make the interim order without notice or a hearing under section 24(1) of the Police Services Act.

The Court held that the decision was reasonable, did not breach procedural fairness, and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

This endorsement from a case conference addressed procedural issues concerning examinations for discovery scheduled for a three-week period.

Key issues included confirming the discovery schedule for defendants, determining the order of examination between co-plaintiffs, and allocating discovery costs.

The court set the discovery schedule, ordered one plaintiff's counsel to examine witnesses first due to preparedness, and denied a request for an advance list of questions.

Costs were apportioned 3/4 to one plaintiff's clients and 1/4 to the self-represented plaintiff.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to extend the time for setting the action down for trial and the subsequent dismissal of the action for delay, the court determined the costs payable to the defendants.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that no costs should be awarded, emphasizing the principle of indemnity and the significant defence costs incurred.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity scale, with the primary private sector defendant receiving the largest share due to its robust defence of its licensed operations.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their action against various judicial officials and court staff under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the appeal, finding it completely devoid of merit.

The action largely consisted of complaints about alleged obstruction of a separate earlier claim.

The court found no cause of action against the judges due to judicial immunity and no claim against court staff due to the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The statement of claim exhibited hallmarks of vexatious litigation.

The plaintiff, William Rallis, brought an action against various judicial officials and court staff.

The court considered a request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that claims against judicial officials were barred by absolute judicial immunity, and claims against court staff were barred by section 5(6) of the Proceedings against the Crown Act.

Consequently, all claims against the named judicial officials and court staff defendants were dismissed without costs.

The applicants sought declarations regarding the governance and operations of the Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries (MPGC), a statutory trust established in 1826.

The court granted the applicants public interest standing and found that MPGC's directors had not been validly appointed since 1987, as they failed to comply with the mandatory election procedures in the 1849 Act.

The court declared that MPGC holds its assets as a charitable trust and that its operation of visitation centres and funeral homes exceeded its statutory objects.

The court declined to order a formal investigation under the Charities Accounting Act but appointed the seven most senior directors as trustees, subject to confirmation at a public meeting.

The appellant, a former employee of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, appealed an order from the Superior Court that restricted her ability to commence legal proceedings.

The order prohibited her from initiating or continuing any civil or criminal proceedings without prior authorization from a Superior Court judge.

The appellant had engaged in extensive litigation across multiple forums, filing numerous civil actions, private informations, and peace bond applications, all of which were dismissed or withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the restriction on civil proceedings under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act but struck down the restriction on criminal proceedings, finding that the Superior Court lacked the inherent jurisdiction to prevent access to justices of the peace for private informations and peace bond applications.

The Crown brought an application to declare the defendant a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant had launched a prodigious number of meritless proceedings across various tribunals and courts.

The application was granted, and the affected existing proceedings were stayed pending an ex parte application to dismiss them.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a notice of default and dismissed her action against the Crown on the grounds of abuse of process and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant's action alleged that Ministry of the Attorney General employees misconducted themselves in relation to proceedings before the Landlord Tenant Board, Divisional Court, and Superior Court of Justice that had been decided adversely against her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the action constituted an abuse of process as it represented an attempt to question the legitimacy of unfavourable proceedings, and that the appellant failed to plead the necessary elements of malice or intent to injure for the tort of misfeasance in public office.

A unionized Crown employee appealed the dismissal of his claim arising from his employment termination in 2014.

The employee pleaded conspiracy to injure, unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, abuse of process, defamatory libel, and slander against the Crown and several Crown managers.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the essential nature of the claim arose out of the collective agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the legal test or characterization of the pleadings.

The respondents (Ontario, the Attorney General of Ontario, and the Attorney General of Canada) sought to dismiss two appeals brought by the appellant under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the appeals were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

In C62801, the court found the record inadequate to assess the request for dismissal.

In C62802, the court granted the Rule 2.1 request, finding that while the appeal lacked merit, it was also abusive in nature, as the appellant had failed to perfect her appeal despite being given guidance and an extension of time to do so.

The plaintiff, a former Crown employee, brought an action for conspiracy, misfeasance, abuse of process, and defamation against the Crown and several individuals arising from a workplace investigation and his subsequent termination.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(3), arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute fell under a collective agreement.

Applying the test from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the court found that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and fell squarely within the ambit of the collective agreement's arbitration provisions.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The appellants commenced a medical negligence action in 2015 against the respondents, which was dismissed on summary judgment as res judicata because it duplicated a 2011 action that had been struck as statute-barred.

The appellants appealed the summary judgment dismissal.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering dismissal of the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Receiving no submissions from the appellants, the court dismissed the appeal, finding it was a clear attempt to relitigate claims, including fraudulent concealment, that were finally disposed of in the prior proceeding.

The moving party brought motions to set aside the decisions of two chamber judges.

The first chamber judge held that the Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to issue an originating process such as a Notice of Application, and could only hear appeals from lower courts.

The second chamber judge agreed and granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the chamber judges' decisions and dismissed the motions, noting the appellant had taken no steps to perfect her appeal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in the provision of services based on ancestry, place of origin, and disability after the respondent refused to process his ODSP application.

The respondent had information indicating the applicant was a resident of Quebec and receiving benefits there.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal held that the refusal was based on place of residence, which is not equivalent to ancestry or place of origin, and there was no evidence of a failure to accommodate a disability.

The respondents requested the dismissal of a human rights application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that an employment standards officer (ESO) had already dealt with the substance of the applicant's allegations regarding pregnancy and family status discrimination.

The applicant conceded that issues relating to her termination and return to work were addressed by the ESO, but argued that allegations concerning a change in duties before her leave, accommodation for expressing breast milk, and family status accommodation were not.

The Tribunal found that the ESO decision did not explicitly address or determine these specific allegations, and therefore declined to dismiss those parts of the application.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings to reactivate her human rights application following a decision by an Employment Standards Officer.

The respondents consented to the reactivation but filed their own request to dismiss the application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code and to remove the personal respondents.

The Tribunal reactivated the application and directed that a half-day preliminary hearing be convened to address the respondents' dismissal request.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging workplace discrimination, harassment, and reprisal by the respondent employer.

The applicant had also filed several union grievances relating to the same matters.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending the outcome of the grievances.

Finding an almost complete overlap between the allegations in the application and the grievances, the Tribunal deferred the application to avoid concurrent proceedings and the possibility of inconsistent decisions.

The applicant sought to reactivate her human rights application after it was deferred pending the outcome of an Employment Standards Act claim.

The ESA claim concluded on October 24, 2013, but the applicant did not file her request to reactivate until February 5, 2014, well past the 60-day deadline under the Tribunal's Rules.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's ignorance of the time limit and a subsequent family death did not constitute good reasons to relieve against the time limit.

The application was dismissed for delay.