Danielle Aimée Carbonneau

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied to be appointed as the permanent guardian of property for Fumio Hara, a 91-year-old suffering from dementia, and to terminate the existing power of attorney naming his brothers, Gerald and Katsushi Hara.

The court found compelling evidence that Gerald had misappropriated and mismanaged Fumio’s property, and that no other family member was willing or able to act as guardian.

The court appointed the PGT as permanent guardian, despite Fumio’s prior wishes, and awarded substantial indemnity costs against Gerald.

The accused, M.A., brought two post-conviction applications: one under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay, and another to reopen the trial or declare a mistrial based on ineffective assistance of counsel and fresh evidence.

The court found a Charter s. 11(b) violation due to excessive delay (totaling 57 months, well over the 18-month ceiling for provincial courts), staying the original four charges.

Regarding the second application, the court admitted fresh evidence from M.A. and three other witnesses, which seriously undermined the Crown's case.

The court found that trial counsel's decision not to call this exculpatory evidence was not a tactical decision but an error, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

Consequently, the findings of guilt on the remaining charges were set aside, and those charges were dismissed, as the new evidentiary matrix left the judge with a reasonable doubt as to M.A.'s guilt.

The applicant sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Justice of the Peace to receive private informations without government-issued photo identification, arguing it infringed on his Indigenous identity and sovereignty.

The court found that the act of receiving an information and administering the oath is ministerial and not subject to judicial review.

Even if reviewable, the Justice of the Peace did not err in requiring reliable identification.

The court also noted the proposed prosecution was vexatious due to previous similar actions and the applicant's insistence on "Torah Law." The application for mandamus was dismissed.

The applicant, Monique Savin, sought an order from the Superior Court of Justice to compel a trial of allegations including fraud, extortion, and criminal harassment against an employment lawyer, Allyson Fischer.

This application followed two unsuccessful private prosecution attempts before Justices of the Peace, who declined to issue process.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the Justices of the Peace's decisions.

The court reiterated that the only available remedy for such decisions is prerogative relief (mandamus) for jurisdictional error, not a rehearing of the merits.

Mustafa Ururyar appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found him guilty and sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment and three years probation, also ordering $8,000 restitution for the complainant's legal costs.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's reasoning process, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias, improper judicial notice of academic commentary, different standards of scrutiny for evidence, unreasonable verdict due to irrational reasoning, misapprehension of evidence, and error in assessing consent.

The appellate court found the trial judge's reasons for judgment to be conclusory and incomprehensible, failing to adequately explain the resolution of credibility conflicts or why the appellant's evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge's reliance on academic literature and personal opinions about rape, and apparent "backwards reasoning" from rape literature to identify the accused as a rapist, was deemed impermissible.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered, due to the deficiencies frustrating meaningful appellate review and prejudicing the appellant's right to appeal.

The issue of restitution for legal fees was not addressed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against W.R., an intellectually disabled man, for sexual assault, due to unreasonable delay under R. v. Jordan.

The trial judge found a 21-month delay, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and no exceptional circumstances.

The Crown argued errors in assessing complexity, discrete events, and transitional provisions.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the case was not complex, the Crown failed to act diligently in securing expert evidence, and the delay was unreasonable even under pre-Jordan guidelines.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" due to a 22-minute delay waiting to enter a police station sally port.

The trial judge relied on extensive experience to find the delay reasonable and not requiring specific explanation.

The Superior Court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court emphasized that the "as soon as practicable" standard does not require an accounting for every minute of delay, especially when the overall time is reasonable and within the two-hour statutory limit.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the completion of trial was 21½ months, exceeding the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown sought to justify the delay by pointing to exceptional circumstances and defence delay.

The court found that while both parties bore some responsibility for the delay caused by a video copying error, this constituted an exceptional circumstance.

Additionally, the court found that the underestimation of trial time by counsel, made in good faith, also fell within exceptional circumstances.

After deducting approximately six months for these exceptional circumstances, the court concluded the delay was approximately 15 months and therefore did not violate section 11(b) of the Charter.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case on charges of robbery and possession of stolen property.

The Crown’s theory was that the accused assisted the robbery by making a telephone call to the robbers and that she constructively possessed property stolen during the robbery that was later found in the home where she lived.

Applying the directed verdict test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The court held there was no evidence that the accused made any call or participated in the robbery, and no evidence of knowledge or control over the stolen property sufficient to establish constructive possession.

As the Crown’s theory required impermissible speculation, the motion was granted and verdicts of acquittal were directed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude recognition evidence from a witness who had identified him in surveillance footage and a YouTube video related to a robbery investigation.

The defence argued the witness lacked sufficient familiarity with the accused to place her in a better position than the jury to identify him and that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from governing appellate authorities, the court held that the witness had known the accused for several years through extended family connections and had seen him frequently enough to possess an advantage over jurors viewing the footage for the first time.

The absence of a specific distinguishing feature underlying her recognition went to weight rather than admissibility.

The recognition evidence was therefore admitted, subject to jury instruction.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.