Danielle Aimée Carbonneau

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied to be appointed as the permanent guardian of property for Fumio Hara, a 91-year-old suffering from dementia, and to terminate the existing power of attorney naming his brothers, Gerald and Katsushi Hara.

The court found compelling evidence that Gerald had misappropriated and mismanaged Fumio’s property, and that no other family member was willing or able to act as guardian.

The court appointed the PGT as permanent guardian, despite Fumio’s prior wishes, and awarded substantial indemnity costs against Gerald.

The accused, M.A., brought two post-conviction applications: one under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay, and another to reopen the trial or declare a mistrial based on ineffective assistance of counsel and fresh evidence.

The court found a Charter s. 11(b) violation due to excessive delay (totaling 57 months, well over the 18-month ceiling for provincial courts), staying the original four charges.

Regarding the second application, the court admitted fresh evidence from M.A. and three other witnesses, which seriously undermined the Crown's case.

The court found that trial counsel's decision not to call this exculpatory evidence was not a tactical decision but an error, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

Consequently, the findings of guilt on the remaining charges were set aside, and those charges were dismissed, as the new evidentiary matrix left the judge with a reasonable doubt as to M.A.'s guilt.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a recognizance after being caught driving past his curfew.

He admitted the breach but argued he had a lawful excuse, claiming he was rushing to assist his pregnant wife with a medical emergency.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility, noting inconsistencies and his failure to call his wife as a witness to corroborate the emergency.

The accused failed to prove the lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities and was found guilty.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay criminal harassment and distribution of intimate images charges against the respondent due to alleged late and incomplete disclosure.

The trial judge found the Crown breached its disclosure obligations regarding police notes of conversations with the complainant, which the defence claimed were necessary to determine a potential conflict of interest.

On appeal, the Superior Court found the trial judge erred in concluding the Crown breached its disclosure obligations, as the requested information was irrelevant and the defence was engaged in a fishing expedition.

The court also found the trial judge erred in his application of the stay of proceedings test and in finding a conflict of interest had crystallized.

The stay was lifted and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Justice of the Peace to receive private informations without government-issued photo identification, arguing it infringed on his Indigenous identity and sovereignty.

The court found that the act of receiving an information and administering the oath is ministerial and not subject to judicial review.

Even if reviewable, the Justice of the Peace did not err in requiring reliable identification.

The court also noted the proposed prosecution was vexatious due to previous similar actions and the applicant's insistence on "Torah Law." The application for mandamus was dismissed.

The applicant, who was convicted of uttering a threat to cause bodily harm based on his rap music lyrics, applied under section 684 of the Criminal Code for state-funded legal assistance for his appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to prove he was indigent, as he likely had undisclosed income from his music career.

Furthermore, the court held that the appeal was frivolous, devoid of merit, and not in the public interest to fund, given the minor sentence imposed and the applicant's ability to represent himself.

The appellant appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding her refusal was unequivocal, misapprehended evidence, and improperly rejected her reasonable excuse defence based on a respiratory infection.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was intentionally delaying the investigation was reasonable and supported by video evidence.

The court also held there was no material misapprehension of evidence and the trial judge properly applied credibility assessment principles.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and driving over 80.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred by applying the wrong test for reasonable suspicion to demand a roadside screening test, misapprehending the evidence regarding the respondent's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and failing to conduct a proper s. 24(2) analysis.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown brought an application to declare the defendant a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant had launched a prodigious number of meritless proceedings across various tribunals and courts.

The application was granted, and the affected existing proceedings were stayed pending an ex parte application to dismiss them.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to quash his committal to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued there was no evidence that he forcibly confined the deceased distinct from the act of killing during a robbery in a small washroom.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could conclude the applicant unlawfully confined the deceased for a period of time beyond what was integral to the killing.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault simpliciter, arguing the trial judge reached irreconcilable verdicts, provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and drew impermissible inferences.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant of assault with a weapon but found she assaulted the complainant by forcibly removing him from her apartment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no material misapprehension of evidence or unreasonable inferences, concluding the evidence supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault and choking after attacking an intoxicated stranger in a public park.

The Crown sought a sentence of four years, while the defence sought a sentence at the lower end of the three to five-year range.

The court emphasized the brutality of the assault, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for general deterrence, while noting the offender's alcohol issues and potential for rehabilitation.

The offender was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary, along with mandatory ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The appellant was convicted of careless storage and transportation of a firearm after the trial judge permitted the Crown to amend the Information.

The appellant appealed, arguing the amendments created new offences outside the six-month limitation period for summary conviction offences under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the amendments did not prejudice the appellant, they did create new charges that were statute-barred.

The convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.

The applicant, Monique Savin, sought an order from the Superior Court of Justice to compel a trial of allegations including fraud, extortion, and criminal harassment against an employment lawyer, Allyson Fischer.

This application followed two unsuccessful private prosecution attempts before Justices of the Peace, who declined to issue process.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the Justices of the Peace's decisions.

The court reiterated that the only available remedy for such decisions is prerogative relief (mandamus) for jurisdictional error, not a rehearing of the merits.

Mustafa Ururyar appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found him guilty and sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment and three years probation, also ordering $8,000 restitution for the complainant's legal costs.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's reasoning process, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias, improper judicial notice of academic commentary, different standards of scrutiny for evidence, unreasonable verdict due to irrational reasoning, misapprehension of evidence, and error in assessing consent.

The appellate court found the trial judge's reasons for judgment to be conclusory and incomprehensible, failing to adequately explain the resolution of credibility conflicts or why the appellant's evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge's reliance on academic literature and personal opinions about rape, and apparent "backwards reasoning" from rape literature to identify the accused as a rapist, was deemed impermissible.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered, due to the deficiencies frustrating meaningful appellate review and prejudicing the appellant's right to appeal.

The issue of restitution for legal fees was not addressed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and choking following an encounter with the complainant in a park.

The complainant, who was highly intoxicated and lost, testified that she was sexually assaulted and choked by the accused, a stranger.

The accused claimed the encounter was consensual and that the complainant suddenly began yelling 'rape'.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible and found that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to alcohol impairment.

The court further found that the complainant did not consent and that the accused did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" due to a 22-minute delay waiting to enter a police station sally port.

The trial judge relied on extensive experience to find the delay reasonable and not requiring specific explanation.

The Superior Court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court emphasized that the "as soon as practicable" standard does not require an accounting for every minute of delay, especially when the overall time is reasonable and within the two-hour statutory limit.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against W.R., an intellectually disabled man, for sexual assault, due to unreasonable delay under R. v. Jordan.

The trial judge found a 21-month delay, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and no exceptional circumstances.

The Crown argued errors in assessing complexity, discrete events, and transitional provisions.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the case was not complex, the Crown failed to act diligently in securing expert evidence, and the delay was unreasonable even under pre-Jordan guidelines.

The appellant, Steve Katsikaris, appealed the imposition of a common law peace bond by a trial judge following his acquittal on a charge of threatening death.

The trial judge had dismissed the threatening charge, finding the Crown had not proven intent, but issued a peace bond due to concerns for the safety of a doctor and a police chief, based on a reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace.

On appeal, Katsikaris raised various unrelated issues.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial judge's jurisdiction to impose the common law peace bond, citing R. v. Parks, and found no error in the exercise of discretion, dismissing the appeal. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision affirms the common law jurisdiction of a trial judge to impose a peace bond, even after an acquittal, where there is a reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace.

It relies on the principle established in R. v. Parks, which confirms the inherent authority of the court to prevent breaches of the peace.

The case highlights that an appellant must address the legal issues relevant to the appeal, rather than extraneous matters, for their submissions to be considered pertinent. final_judgement: The appeal is dismissed, and the common law peace bond is upheld. winning_degree_applicant: 5 winning_degree_respondent: 1 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2017 decision_number: 3640 file_number: "CR-17-10000006-00AP" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3640/2017onsc3640.html" cited_cases: legislation: [] case_law: - title: "R. v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1992/1992canlii78/1992canlii78.html" keywords: - Criminal law - Appeal - Peace bond - Common law jurisdiction - Threatening death - Mental Health Act - R. v. Parks areas_of_law: - Criminal Law - Civil Procedure --- # Court File and Parties **Court File No.:** CR-17-10000006-00AP **Date:** 2017-06-13 **Ontario Superior Court of Justice** **Between:** Her Majesty the Queen – and – Steve Katsikaris **Counsel:** Danielle Carbonneau, for the Crown Steve Katsikaris on his own behalf **Heard:** June 12, 2017 **Before:** R.F. Goldstein J. --- ## Reasons for Judgment [1] On November 18, 2015 Mr. Katsikaris attended at the Ryerson Medical Centre for a mental health assessment.

Dr. Hogarth saw him.

She became concerned about his stability.

He became agitated and angry.

Mr. Katsikiaris told her that police officers were trying to kill him.

He specifically mentioned killing Paul Martin, the Chief of Durham Regional Police.

In the course of her assessment Dr. Hogarth became concerned that there was a risk he would cause harm to others.

She issued a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act.

He was taken to St. Michael’s Hospital for a psychiatric assessment. [2] Mr. Katsikaris was arrested and charged with threatening death.

He was tried by Justice Bigelow of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Justice Bigleow dismissed the charge.

His Honour found that the Crown had not proven that the Mr. Katsikaris intended to threaten Chief Martin or that he meant that the threat be taken seriously. [3] After the acquittal the Crown requested a common law peace bond.

Justice Bigelow was concerned about the safety of Dr. Hogarth and Chief Martin.

He explained that Mr. Katsikaris was simply required to stay away from them. [4] Mr. Katsikaris appeals.

He raised multiple issues before me.

Most of the issues had nothing to do with the case.

He asked for disclosure, although it was not clear to me what he was asking for disclosure of.

He made a number of allegations relating to conspiracies by various police forces.

He seemed to suggest that the government of the United States was also involved.

It appears that there might be some kind of history between Mr. Katsikaris and the police force and the local government in the Town of Kawartha Lakes.

It was unclear to me if there was any connection between that and the appeal.

In any event, none of his submissions directly addressed the real issue, which was whether or not the trial judge had the jurisdiction to impose a common law peace bond and whether it was justified. [5] It is clear that Justice Bigelow had the jurisdiction under his authority at common law: [R. v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 at para. 63](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1992/1992canlii78/1992canlii78.html).

It is also clear that there was evidence before him that there was a reasonable apprehension that Mr. Katsikaris may breach the peace.

His mental health is an issue.

He lives next door to Chief Martin.

He also indicated that he might want to reach out to Dr. Hogarth. [6] There was a clearly basis for the trial judge to issue the peace bond.

I see no error and no reason to interfere with what was essentially the exercise of his discretion.

The appeal is dismissed. --- R.F. Goldstein J. Released: June 13, 2017

The Crown appealed a summary conviction trial judge's decision to stay charges of impaired driving and over 80 due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 17 months, falling just below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters under the new Jordan framework.

The Crown argued the trial judge reversed the onus and failed to consider the defence's lack of initiative.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the transitional framework from Jordan, noting that defence initiative was not required for the period preceding the Jordan decision, and the trial judge properly considered the Crown's delay in disclosure and the overall context.