Kathryn Wells

The appellant was charged with possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

Police arrested him before obtaining a search warrant for his residence, and then denied him access to counsel for almost six hours while they obtained and executed the warrant.

The appellant immediately requested to speak to a lawyer upon arrest but was refused.

The trial judge found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the police followed an unconstitutional routine practice of denying access to counsel whenever they intended to obtain a search warrant, without considering the specific circumstances of the case.

The court held that the evidence should have been excluded as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that had set aside convictions for firearms offences on the grounds that amendments to the information were statute-barred by the six-month limitation period in section 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was charged with two hybrid firearms offences under section 86 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown elected to proceed summarily and sought to amend the information to substitute different offences that better conformed to the evidence at trial.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the amendments were barred by the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that amendments to an information do not constitute the institution of new proceedings and therefore are not restricted by the limitation period in section 786(2).

The court emphasized that proceedings are instituted by the laying of an information, not by amendments thereto.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and his four-year sentence.

The sole issue on appeal concerned the trial judge's treatment of identification evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly account for frailties in the identification evidence provided by Officer Snyder and erred in relying on corroborating evidence from a witness.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence, finding that the identification circumstances were excellent and the corroborating evidence was properly used.

The appellant's extensive history of similar driving offences supported the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of careless storage and transportation of a firearm after the trial judge permitted the Crown to amend the Information.

The appellant appealed, arguing the amendments created new offences outside the six-month limitation period for summary conviction offences under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the amendments did not prejudice the appellant, they did create new charges that were statute-barred.

The convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.

In the context of a dangerous offender application, the applicant (Robertson) sought to exclude expert reports (de Munnik, Marshall, and Woodside) on grounds that they constituted personal health records unlawfully obtained by the Crown.

The court found that the consents signed by Robertson as a young offender were limited in scope and duration, and did not authorize disclosure to the Ministry of the Attorney General.

Given the conflicting information provided to Robertson regarding confidentiality and the lack of legal advice at the time, the court ruled that the reports of de Munnik and Marshall were not lawfully obtained.

Consequently, Dr. Woodside's report, which relied on these inadmissible reports, was also excluded.

The Crown was directed to propose a new expert assessor.

The applicant, Adrian Rover, sought to exclude evidence under sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unlawful arrest, an invalid search warrant based on illegally obtained third-party information, and a violation of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for Rover's arrest and for the arrest of third parties, thus upholding the validity of the search warrant.

While acknowledging a breach of Rover's right to counsel due to police delay, the court applied the Grant analysis and determined that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, dismissing the application to exclude evidence.

The appellant, Matthew Connors, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The trial judge found him guilty after rejecting the evidence of a defence witness, Kayla Cochrane, and accepting the consistent evidence of four Crown witnesses.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge erred in assessing Ms. Cochrane's evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of Ms. Cochrane's credibility and reliability, noting her failure to provide a timely police statement and her obvious bias.

The court also found the verdict reasonable given the accepted evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.