Gregory J. Raven

The defendant, Pankaj Bedi, was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and possession charges.

The court conditionally stayed fentanyl trafficking charges based on the Kienapple principle, as the Crown did not provide evidence of the quantity of fentanyl or the accused's knowledge of its presence.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of heroin and the presence of fentanyl as an inherent danger, and mitigating factors such as the accused's remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and compliance with bail conditions.

Credit was given for pre-trial custody and house arrest.

The defendant was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary for trafficking heroin, reduced to an effective sentence of 44 months after credit for pre-trial custody and house arrest.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a Charter s. 8 application to exclude evidence obtained during a strip search, alleging excessive force and improper conduct.

The court found that while the applicant was briefly completely undressed, a minor deviation from *Golden* guidelines, the force used was the minimum necessary given the applicant's non-compliance and safety concerns.

The application was dismissed as no Charter infringement was found.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care for a severe foot fracture, resulting in permanent injury, and unlawfully placed the accused in administrative segregation for 79 days without proper justification or review.

Concluding that the state's conduct was egregious and offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency, the court held that this was one of the clearest of cases where a stay of proceedings was warranted to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The applicant, Adrian Rover, sought to exclude evidence under sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unlawful arrest, an invalid search warrant based on illegally obtained third-party information, and a violation of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for Rover's arrest and for the arrest of third parties, thus upholding the validity of the search warrant.

While acknowledging a breach of Rover's right to counsel due to police delay, the court applied the Grant analysis and determined that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, dismissing the application to exclude evidence.