Taro Inoue

The defendant, Zhuxi Xi Shen, brought a second application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application was summarily dismissed by Justice Spies.

The court refused to grant leave to hear the application due to the applicant's repeated failure to comply with filing deadlines under the Criminal Proceedings Rules and the Provincial Practice Direction, noting a flagrant disregard for prior rulings and procedural rules.

Furthermore, the court found that even if leave were granted, the application had no reasonable prospect of success, as the total delay, after accounting for periods previously addressed by another judge and exceptional circumstances (hung jury, pandemic backlog, complainant's unavailability), fell well within the presumptive Jordan timeline.

The court also found no basis to exercise residual discretion to grant a stay.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a pre-trial application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The application was filed late, violating the Criminal Proceedings Rules and the provincial Practice Direction.

The court summarily dismissed the application, finding that the late filing would cause systemic delays and that the application had no reasonable prospect of success, as the delay was primarily attributable to the defence's re-election and the Covid-19 pandemic.

The accused, Raphael Fortune, was charged with fraud over $5,000 and possession of proceeds of crime in relation to an alleged diamond investment scheme.

The complainant, Mike Rantissi, invested a significant sum with Fortune based on representations of no risk and high profits, but never received diamonds or his money back.

The court found that Fortune intentionally deceived Rantissi, diverting the funds for personal expenses rather than purchasing diamonds as promised.

The accused was found guilty of both counts.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a forensic biologist to testify by video conference at a second-degree murder trial.

The application was brought in light of the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce the risk of virus transmission.

The defence opposed the application, citing concerns about opening the floodgates for remote testimony.

The court allowed the application, finding that remote testimony was appropriate given the pandemic, the non-contentious nature of the expert's credibility, and the benefits to the administration of justice.

During a homicide proceeding, the Crown sought to admit text messages sent from the deceased's phone to her father shortly before her death.

The Crown argued the messages were admissible to show the deceased's state of mind and to help establish the date of death.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, finding the messages admissible to show the deceased's intention that the accused move out of their shared apartment, and relevant to the date of death.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied to be seated outside the prisoner's dock during jury selection and trial.

He argued that sitting in the dock would reflect negatively on the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the seating of the accused is within the trial judge's discretion and that the customary position in the dock does not violate Charter rights or undermine the presumption of innocence.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought a jury instruction that text messages sent from the victim's phone and handwritten notes left by the accused constituted fabricated evidence.

The court ruled that there was circumstantial evidence allowing the jury to infer the accused sent the text messages after the victim's death to deflect responsibility, which would constitute fabrication.

However, the court found the accused's handwritten denial of involvement did not rise to the level of fabrication and should be assessed under the W.(D.) principles without an adverse inference of fabrication.

The applicant, facing charges including fraud, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon, sought a bail review following his detention on the secondary ground.

He argued that the withdrawal of certain driving charges, the proposal of two new sureties, and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstance.

The court found that while the withdrawal of charges and the pandemic's impact on correctional facilities were material changes, the pandemic did not personally affect the applicant's health.

The court ultimately denied the application, finding the proposed supervision plan inadequate to mitigate the substantial likelihood that the applicant would commit further offences.

The applicant, Aiko Hamasaki, brought a motion to exclude a statement she gave to police, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided upon arrest.

However, the court found a breach of section 10(b) when a police officer suggested Ms. Hamasaki consult a lawyer "more versed in criminal law" than her immigration lawyer, Matthew Wong, after she had expressed a desire to contact Mr. Wong.

This unsolicited advice was deemed an impermissible interference with her right to counsel of choice, especially given her vulnerable state and the power imbalance.

Consequently, the statement was excluded from evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with the complainant.

The complainant testified that the sexual activity was initially consensual but she withdrew her consent when it became rough, and the accused did not stop.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility, addressing inconsistencies, delayed disclosure, and forensic DNA evidence.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence, finding that she communicated her withdrawal of consent and the accused continued the sexual activity.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, charged with ammunition and drug offences, brought a Charter s. 8 application to exclude evidence obtained during a search of a basement apartment.

They argued the police unlawfully entered the apartment prior to obtaining a warrant under the pretense of retrieving baby supplies, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading grounds for a night time search.

The court found that while the warrantless entry to retrieve baby items did not meet the threshold for exigent circumstances, excising the observations made during that entry left sufficient grounds to issue the warrant.

The court also held that the night time search was reasonable and less intrusive given the circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The three accused were charged with firearms and drug offences following a vehicle stop.

They brought Charter applications alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The Crown argued the stop was a valid dual-purpose stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found the officers' testimony lacked credibility and that the HTA rationale was a pretext for an unlawful criminal investigation.

The court concluded the accused were arbitrarily detained and subjected to unreasonable searches.

Given the seriousness of the breaches and the finding that the officers misled the court, the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in acquittals.

Sentencing of four offenders convicted of multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, money laundering, and committing offences for a criminal organization.

The offenders orchestrated a sophisticated, multi-million dollar fraud scheme targeting the Canada Small Business Financing Program and several major banks using sham construction companies.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from 14 months to 8 years, along with significant restitution orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture.

The defendants were charged with multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, laundering proceeds of crime, and committing offences for a criminal organization in relation to a scheme to fraudulently obtain Canada Small Business Financing Program loans from various banks.

The Crown alleged that the defendants used sham corporations, forged financial documents, and inflated or fabricated invoices for leasehold improvements and equipment to deceive the banks into advancing loan funds, which were then laundered among the defendants.

The court found that Marshall Kazman and Gad Levy orchestrated the scheme and were guilty of fraud, money laundering, and the criminal organization offence.

Ali Vaez Tehrani and Madjid Vaez Tehrani were found guilty of fraud on specific counts but acquitted of the criminal organization charge.

Armand Levy, Ekaterina Chapkina, and Kamyar Ghatan were acquitted of all charges.

The appellant, Arafat Bakshi, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and misapplied the principles from R. v. W.D. The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided detailed and careful reasons, correctly instructed herself on the reasonable doubt standard, and properly applied the W.D. principles by assessing the complainant's credibility and finding the appellant's evidence implausible.

The court emphasized the deference owed to trial judges in credibility assessments.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault arising from unprotected sexual intercourse after an HIV positive diagnosis.

He argued the trial judge erred by making an unassisted handwriting comparison of a motel registration card and by failing to properly apply the W.(D.) analysis to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's handwriting conclusion was reasonable and that he had properly instructed himself on the burden of proof and credibility assessment.

Following a jury trial, three accused were convicted of robbery arising from a group robbery of two complainants in a Toronto hotel room during Caribana weekend.

The sentencing judge found that although threats of violence were made by a co‑accused not before the court, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used or that the robbery was pre‑planned.

The court assessed the offenders’ differing personal circumstances, including one offender’s extensive criminal record and the others’ relative youth and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed distinct sentences reflecting each offender’s background and role.

Sentences included time served and probation for one offender, a short custodial sentence consecutive to an existing federal sentence for another, and a conditional sentence with probation for the third.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.