Ken R. Lockhart

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from a date with the complainant.

The trial judge found that while the sexual activity began consensually, the complainant withdrew consent when the appellant attempted to record her without permission, and the appellant subsequently forced vaginal intercourse.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework by fragmenting the evidence and provided insufficient reasons regarding credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the evidence, correctly applied the burden of proof, and provided adequate reasons explaining why the complainant's evidence was accepted over the appellant's.

The appellants, David Hui and Musab Saboon, appealed their convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder of Lee Chiodo, as well as Hui's sentence for kidnapping.

Both were convicted after a trial by judge alone and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis of Marshall Hardy-Fox, a Vetrovec witness whose evidence was key to the convictions.

The appellants also argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal test for assessing credibility and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of Hardy-Fox's evidence, proper application of the credibility test, and adequate reasons.

The court also dismissed Hui's sentence appeal based on the parity principle.

The appellant, Seyed Amir Yaghoubi-Araghi, appealed his convictions and sentence for firearm and drug offences following a R.I.D.E. stop, police pursuit, and search that uncovered a handgun and methamphetamine.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the evidence due to breaches of his rights under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge properly recognized the seriousness of the Charter breaches, the evidence was lawfully obtained and the balancing of factors under R. v. Grant did not warrant exclusion.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call rebuttal evidence, failing to apply the W.(D.) framework to defence evidence, and admitting unauthenticated Snapchat screenshots.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to admit the rebuttal evidence as it responded to a new issue raised by the defence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof or the admission of the electronic evidence, which met the low threshold for authentication.

The appellant sought to overturn his conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning the number of intruders and the appellant's vehicle parking location.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence and affirmed that the trial judge's findings were available on the record.

The court further held that even if any misapprehension occurred, it did not play an essential part in the reasoning process leading to conviction, as required by the Morrissey and Lohrer tests.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism and appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's testimony, finding it illogical and inconsistent, consistent with the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

The court also rejected the appellant's submissions regarding an alleged mistaken inference about the complainant's age and its relation to consciousness of guilt, and a ground concerning the materiality of a photograph's date.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The 30-year-old first offender was convicted of being a party to a sexual assault after digitally penetrating the complainant while she was physically restrained by another passenger in his vehicle.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence argued for 18 months to two years less a day.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the gravity of the offence and the vulnerability of the victim, finding that digital penetration is as serious as penile penetration.

The offender was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

The defendant, Tyler Willan, was charged with arson as an aider under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code, for assisting in the burning of a Honda Accord used in a murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including video chronology of the Honda and Willan's Outlander, the purchase of gas in a Jerry Can, and the movements of the alleged perpetrators (Male 1 and Male 2).

The court found that Male 1 and Male 2 committed arson by intentionally burning the Honda, which was not wholly owned by them, to destroy evidence related to a murder.

The court concluded that Willan aided the arson by driving Male 1 and Male 2 from the burn site back to Oshawa, having known about the Jerry Can and the purpose of the trip.

Willan was found guilty.

Abdirashid Adam was found guilty of manslaughter after a jury trial for the shooting death of Jovanh McKnollys.

The court determined the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the planned confrontation, the use of a concealed, loaded firearm with an obliterated serial number, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Mitigating factors included the offender's educational and employment history, good rehabilitative prospects, genuine remorse, harsh pre-sentence detention conditions, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on his life experiences, particularly his decision to carry a firearm for safety.

The court emphasized that while social context evidence could mitigate the offender's responsibility, it did not mitigate the seriousness of the offence.

Deterrence and denunciation were deemed paramount.

The Crown sought 11 years, and the defence sought 5 years.

The accused, Libsom Hibab, was charged with sexual assault as a party to the offence under s. 272(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The complainant alleged that Hibab digitally penetrated her vagina while another individual, Tinsay, restrained her.

Hibab admitted to some sexual touching but claimed it was consensual and stopped when asked, and that Tinsay's actions were separate and unknown to him.

The court rejected Hibab's testimony, finding it contrived and unbelievable, particularly his explanation for the complainant's injuries.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, supported by physical injuries and her distressed demeanour during the 911 call.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, convicting Hibab as charged.

The offender was found guilty of kidnapping, extortion, using an imitation firearm, administering a noxious substance, aggravated assault, fraud, and failing to comply with probation.

The victim was held for 12-14 hours, extorted, and tortured with boiling liquid, resulting in severe burns.

The Crown sought 12 years, while the defence sought 7-8 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, reduced from 11 years due to mitigating factors including harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (lockdowns and COVID-19) and restrictive bail conditions.

After applying Summers credit, the remaining sentence was 7 years and 3 months.

The accused was charged with kidnapping, extortion, aggravated assault, and other offences following the targeted abduction and torture of the complainant.

The Crown's case on identity was entirely circumstantial, relying on video surveillance, financial transactions using the accused's account, and fingerprint evidence found in the complainant's stolen vehicle.

The court found that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence established the accused's identity as a central participant in the kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on all counts, either as a principal, aider, or party to a common intention.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, applied to sever their trial from a co-accused who had recently been extradited to Canada and was unready for the scheduled trial.

The applicants had been awaiting trial for nearly 30 months and had caused no delay.

The Crown opposed severance, citing the societal interest in a joint trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicants' right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter outweighed the public interest in a joint trial, especially given the Crown's duty to mitigate delay caused by discrete events like extradition.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred when the complainant was a child and later a teenager.

The court found the complainant honest and the accused generally unimpressive, but held that sincerity did not resolve serious reliability concerns arising from the complainant's evidence about memory formation, suppression, flashbacks, and therapeutic recall.

Applying the criminal burden of proof and the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that the decisive details necessary for conviction were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all three counts of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The appellant, Xiu Jin Teng, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder and her sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was the trial judge's dismissal of her Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel, which the trial judge found was not bona fide but an attempt to delay the trial.

Other grounds included Charter breaches (s. 11(b) right to trial within reasonable time, s. 10(a) and (b) detention rights), jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Rowbotham application was an abuse of process and that the trial was fair.

It also found no Charter breaches, no error in jury instructions, and that the conviction was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was allowed on a narrow point, varying a communication prohibition order to allow for family law-related communications.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including kidnapping and extortion, arguing there was no evidence identifying him as the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically the use of the applicant's details and file photograph during a foreign currency transaction with the victim's bank card.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the teller's standard practice of verifying identity against the file photograph provided sufficient evidence of identity to meet the threshold for committal.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a child complainant, brought an application under section 278.93 of the Criminal Code to admit a cell phone video recorded by the complainant's mother.

The video appeared to show the complainant recanting the allegations.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the recantation was coerced.

The court applied the test under section 278.92(2) and found that the video had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The court held that a fair determination of the issues required the evidence to be put to the complainant in cross-examination, and granted the application.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, mischief, criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation, arising from incidents involving his former girlfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions reasonable and supported by strong circumstantial evidence, including text messages.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to correct a Kienapple error, setting aside a duplicative conviction for uttering threats based on the same evidence.

The Court also set aside the victim surcharges as unconstitutional.

Duane Anderson appealed a decision by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that continued his detention order and imposed a condition prohibiting non-medical use of alcohol or drugs, specifically recreational cannabis.

The appellant argued the condition was not the least restrictive and lacked sufficient evidentiary basis.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB was entitled to rely on expert psychiatric evidence that cannabis generally exacerbates psychotic symptoms, coupled with evidence of a prior aggressive incident linked to the appellant's excessive cannabis use.

Given the conceded significant risk to public safety, the Board was not required to wait for an actual adverse event.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the ORB's condition.

The appellant, R.M., appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and robbery, and his adult sentence of eight years, for offences committed when he was 17.

The Crown cross-appealed the conditional stay of the gang sexual assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed R.M.'s conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the complainant's credibility assessment proper.

It also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the adult sentence as not demonstrably unfit, finding the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness rebutted and the "Coke principle" not violated.

The Crown's cross-appeal was allowed, setting aside the conditional stay for gang sexual assault, as it was deemed a distinct offence from sexual assault with a weapon under the Kienapple principle.