Ken R. Lockhart

The appellant, Michael Lights, appealed convictions for dangerous driving and criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and his sentence.

The convictions stemmed from a high-speed red light violation causing a serious accident, where his passenger had been shot.

The appeal grounds included the unreasonableness of the driver identification, the trial judge's failure to address the necessity defence, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's identification of the driver was reasonable, there was no air of reality to the necessity defence, and the sentence was fit.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to admit expert evidence on false memories and in assessing witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude the expert evidence, noting the judge's explicit consideration of false memories.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments, emphasizing deference and the probative value of similar fact evidence.

The appeals from convictions were dismissed.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 4, 2019, ordering continued detention in the General Forensic Unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge or, alternatively, an independent assessment of his treatment plan and risk with an early hearing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's determination that the appellant continues to meet the threshold for significant threat was amply justified.

However, the court expressed concern that no concrete plan for community reintegration had been established as previously directed.

Three appellants appealed their convictions for a September 2015 bank robbery and related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from a witness with bipolar disorder and a permanent brain injury who had given a police statement while in custody.

The appellants challenged the admissibility and reliability of her evidence, arguing she was merely reading from her police statement rather than testifying from refreshed memory, and that a Vetrovec warning should have been given.

The trial judge found her evidence reliable and corroborated by circumstantial evidence including DNA evidence and surveillance footage.

The appellants also sought to introduce the witness's criminal record as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and grounded in evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and refusing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the appellant was self-represented.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to explain the presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which compromised the fairness of the trial on that charge as the appellant could not make an informed decision about calling evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered for the care or control charge, while the conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample was upheld.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was found asleep in his running car while intoxicated.

The trial judge acquitted based on the respondent's credible testimony that he had no intention to drive and had an alternate plan to walk home after recovering from an asthma attack.

The appeal court upheld the acquittal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessment regarding the realistic risk of the vehicle being set in motion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assault, arguing that the trial was unfair due to numerous judicial interventions, that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons, and that the trial judge subjected his evidence to a greater degree of scrutiny than that of the complainant.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were necessary for clarity and did not indicate bias, that the reasons were sufficiently detailed for appellate review, and that there was no evidence of uneven scrutiny of the appellant's and complainant's evidence.

The appellant, a high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two of his students.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the physical impossibility of the assaults and applied a stricter standard of scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainants' evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were well-reasoned, even-handed, and free from material misapprehension of evidence.

Dellen Millard was convicted of the first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, his third first-degree murder conviction.

The court considered whether the mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility period for this murder should be served concurrently or consecutively to his existing 50-year parole ineligibility for two previous first-degree murders.

Applying the totality principle and considering the paramount sentencing objectives of denunciation and retribution, the court ordered the 25-year parole ineligibility period to be served consecutively, resulting in a global parole ineligibility of 75 years.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of his father, who died from a gunshot wound to the eye while sleeping.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's purchase of the murder weapon, his presence near the scene at the time of death, and his fabrication of a false alibi.

The court rejected the defence theory of suicide, finding that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that the accused planned and deliberated the intentional killing of his father.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit expert opinion evidence on shooting scene reconstruction.

The court ruled on the admissibility of Detective Constable Grant Sutherland's expert testimony.

While evidence concerning the general operation of revolvers and the specific firearm's design and gunshot residue (GSR) dispersal was deemed admissible, the expert's opinions on the gun's position, orientation, and the likelihood of the deceased discharging the shot were excluded.

The exclusion was primarily due to concerns about the expert's methodology and demonstrated confirmation bias, indicating an unwillingness or inability to provide impartial, independent, and unbiased evidence.

Dellen Millard, charged with first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, elected trial by judge alone.

The Crown sought to introduce a photograph from the accused's online gaming profile, depicting him with a bloody eye wound, posted two weeks before his father's death by a gunshot wound to the eye.

The Crown argued its relevance to whether the death was suicide or homicide, suggesting it indicated a contemplation of murder or an improbable reaction if it were suicide.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance or excessive prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding it not relevant and material, as the Crown's reasoning was speculative propensity reasoning rather than logical inference.

Even if relevant, its minimal probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused brought two motions seeking further instructions to the jury at the end of the jury charge.

The first motion sought an instruction to disregard evidence elicited in re-examination regarding the accused's prior interest in firearms.

The second motion sought an instruction that the Crown's failure to call the accused's girlfriend as a witness constituted a gap in the evidence providing a basis for reasonable doubt.

The trial judge dismissed both motions, finding that the re-examination evidence was necessary to correct a false impression left during cross-examination, and that the failure to call the witness did not leave a gap in the Crown's case as she was an unnecessary and unreliable witness.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to override the Attorney General's refusal to consent to a judge alone trial under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that extensive adverse pre-trial publicity from a prior murder conviction rendered a fair jury trial impossible.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the demanding standard for Charter relief was not met and that traditional safeguards, including challenge for cause, should be attempted first.

The court granted the alternative motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and approved a set of six questions for the jury selection process.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit various pieces of circumstantial evidence, including firearms purchases, text messages, and statements made by the accused.

The court applied the test of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that evidence of a handgun purchase shortly before the victim's disappearance was highly probative of intent and planning and thus admissible.

However, evidence of other firearms purchases and certain highly prejudicial text messages referring to other criminal activities were excluded or ordered to be edited.

Evidence of the financial relationship between the co-accused was deemed admissible to show the nature of their relationship.

The Crown and one of the co-accused brought a joint pre-trial motion to admit numerous out-of-court statements made by the alleged murder victim prior to her disappearance.

The statements were tendered either for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and the state of mind exception, or as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence.

The court admitted most of the statements, finding them substantively reliable or relevant to the declarant's state of mind, but excluded certain statements alleging prior assaults as unreliable and irrelevant.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit similar fact evidence and discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior murder conviction involving the disposal of remains in an incinerator, as well as prior criminal acts, text messages, and rap lyrics.

The court dismissed the similar fact motion, finding the moral prejudice of introducing a prior murder outweighed its probative value.

The court also excluded most of the discreditable conduct evidence, but allowed an edited calendar entry and the first verse of a rap song that had a strong circumstantial link to the alleged disposal of the victim's body.

The accused, Dellen Millard, brought a motion seeking a six-month adjournment of his first-degree murder trial to retain counsel and prepare for trial.

The trial was scheduled to commence in mid-October 2017, with pre-trial motions beginning in March 2017.

The court found that the accused had access to substantial private funds and had been given ample time—nearly two years—to retain counsel but had failed to act diligently.

The court also noted that a further adjournment would jeopardize the co-accused's right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the public interest in timely justice.

The motion for an adjournment was dismissed.

Zachary Barton was found guilty by a jury of multiple firearms offences.

He brought an application for a stay of proceedings or a new trial, alleging police failed to preserve or disclose exculpatory video evidence.

The court dismissed this application, finding the defence failed to establish the existence of the alleged video footage.

Subsequently, the court proceeded to sentencing, considering Barton's extensive criminal record, the seriousness of the offences involving a loaded prohibited firearm, and sentencing principles.

A global sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 6 years and 9 months.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA sample.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial motions for severance and for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the severance motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial and that any prejudice from out-of-court statements could be managed with limiting instructions.

The court also dismissed the s. 11(b) motion, calculating the net delay at 29 months after deducting 15 months for the discrete event of a concurrent murder trial involving the same accused.

Alternatively, the court found the delay justified by the case's exceptional complexity and transitional provisions.