Dr. Moore

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to admit expert evidence on false memories and in assessing witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude the expert evidence, noting the judge's explicit consideration of false memories.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments, emphasizing deference and the probative value of similar fact evidence.

The appeals from convictions were dismissed.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal confirming the director's issuance of renewable energy approvals for two wind turbine projects.

They argued that section 145.2.1 of the Environmental Protection Act requires a two-step process shifting the onus to the approval-holder, that the tribunal erred in rejecting the material contribution test for causation, and that they were denied procedural fairness when an adjournment was refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statute imposes a single onus on the appellants to prove harm, the material contribution test was properly rejected, and the tribunal reasonably exercised its discretion in denying the adjournment.

The appellants, residents living near three proposed wind turbine farms, appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) that confirmed the Director's issuance of Renewable Energy Approvals (REAs) for the projects.

The appellants argued that the statutory test requiring them to prove the projects would cause 'serious harm to human health' violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statutory test aligned with the jurisprudential threshold for section 7 claims and did not depart from the consensus scientific view on wind turbines.

The Court also upheld the ERT's treatment of lay witness evidence, its finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Director's REA issuance process for Charter compliance, and its discretionary decisions denying adjournments.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, sexual touching, and uttering death threats against his seven-year-old nephew.

The complainant provided delayed and incremental disclosure of the abuse, culminating in a traumatic seizure-like episode where he spontaneously uttered fears about his uncle.

The court admitted expert evidence on child sexual abuse disclosure patterns and trauma symptoms.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's blanket denial and defence theories of fabrication.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in ruling the proposed opinion evidence of a psychologist inadmissible and in admitting a child's out-of-court statement.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge correctly concluded the expert evidence was unnecessary as it did not fall outside the experience of a trial judge.

The Court also found no error in admitting the out-of-court statement, as the hearsay dangers were overcome by the opportunity for cross-examination, videotape evidence of demeanour, and the child's understanding of truth and falsehood.

The appeal was dismissed.

The complainants, minors with autism spectrum disorder, brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the definition of 'age' in subsection 10(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The definition restricted age discrimination protections to individuals aged 18 or older.

The complainants argued this exclusion violated their equality rights under subsection 15(1) of the Charter.

The Tribunal found that the definition of age in the Code discriminated against children by denying them access to the human rights system, thereby marginalizing them and treating them as less worthy.

The Tribunal further held that this infringement was not demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The Tribunal declared the definition of age in subsection 10(1) of the Code to be of no force or effect for the purpose of the complaints, allowing the complainants to amend their pleadings to include discrimination based on age.