Asha James

The Police Defendants brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5), (6), and (7) seeking an order to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiffs provided explanations for a four-year delay, primarily citing the incarceration of Krystle Oag, which made mandatory mediation impossible for a significant period.

The court found the incarceration to be an acceptable explanation for three of the four years of delay.

Despite a presumption of prejudice, the plaintiffs successfully rebutted it by demonstrating that all relevant documents were produced, key witness memories were captured in discovery transcripts, and all key witnesses remained available for trial.

The motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to the poor quality of the plaintiffs' evidence explaining the delay.

The court also ordered a timetable for remaining interlocutory steps, including noting a defendant in default, mandatory mediation, and setting the action down for trial.

The applicants, a First Nation and its former Chief, brought an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) and (h) seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the Environmental Assessment Act and the Crown's Duty to Consult and Accommodate.

The application arose in the context of the proposed Marten Falls Community Access Road in the Ring of Fire region.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite legislation or provide a de facto reference on how the Crown should discharge its duty in the future without a live factual dispute.

The court held that the application did not raise a justiciable issue and was not properly brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant, R.W. (Brad) Blair, appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against Premier Doug Ford, which was dismissed under an anti-SLAPP motion (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

Ford cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Blair's appeal, upholding the dismissal of the defamation action, and allowed Ford's cross-appeal in part regarding the timing of costs payment, making the full award immediately payable.

The court also quashed appeals from preliminary interlocutory orders due to lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants, landlords of student housing, appealed the dismissal of their claims for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, Charter violations, and bad faith against fire prevention officers and the City of Windsor.

The claims arose after the appellants were charged with Fire Code violations for operating their properties as lodging houses, which charges were later withdrawn or acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the fire prevention officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges, did not conduct a negligent investigation, and did not act with malice.

The court also dismissed the Papic appellants' additional claims related to property development delays, finding them to be policy decisions or lacking legal basis.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the defendant sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that full indemnity was not appropriate because the action was not a SLAPP suit, and instead awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

Noting that both parties engaged in an unnecessary 'deep dive' into the evidence, the court fixed the costs at $130,000 all-inclusive, payable in two installments.

The plaintiff, former interim Commissioner of the OPP, brought a defamation action against the Premier of Ontario over public statements alleging the plaintiff breached the Police Services Act.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff could not show that the defence of fair comment had no real prospect of success, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the public interest in permitting the action to continue.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

The police defendants in a civil action arising from a criminal sexual assault acquittal moved to seal materials filed in support of their summary judgment motion.

The media sought intervenor status to oppose the sealing order.

The court granted the media intervenor status and dismissed the motion to seal, finding the police defendants failed to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test to overcome the open court principle.

The court confirmed the criminal publication ban protecting the complainant's identity remained in force and ordered the use of initials in pleadings.

Following the discontinuance of a counterclaim against one of several defendants, the moving party sought recovery of litigation costs incurred defending the claim.

The court applied the justified action test governing costs after discontinuance under Rule 23.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondents provided no affidavit or evidentiary record demonstrating a bona fide cause of action or justification for commencing the claim against the moving party.

While the court accepted that some costs were incurred as a result of being named in the action, the bill of costs did not clearly identify work performed solely for that defendant.

Exercising its discretion under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court awarded a modest fixed amount of costs.