Asha James

The Police Defendants brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5), (6), and (7) seeking an order to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiffs provided explanations for a four-year delay, primarily citing the incarceration of Krystle Oag, which made mandatory mediation impossible for a significant period.

The court found the incarceration to be an acceptable explanation for three of the four years of delay.

Despite a presumption of prejudice, the plaintiffs successfully rebutted it by demonstrating that all relevant documents were produced, key witness memories were captured in discovery transcripts, and all key witnesses remained available for trial.

The motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to the poor quality of the plaintiffs' evidence explaining the delay.

The court also ordered a timetable for remaining interlocutory steps, including noting a defendant in default, mandatory mediation, and setting the action down for trial.

The public complainants appealed the penalty imposed on a police officer found guilty of neglect of duty and discreditable conduct in relation to the sudden death investigation of an Indigenous man.

The Hearing Officer had ordered an 18-month demotion and cultural competency training.

The complainants argued the officer should be dismissed, citing the public interest, the importance of reconciliation, and region-specific demands regarding anti-Indigenous racism.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer reasonably weighed all relevant factors, including the public interest and reconciliation, and did not err in concluding that dismissal was not warranted.

The Appellant, a Staff Sergeant, appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding him guilty of neglect of duty and discreditable conduct under the Police Services Act, and the resulting penalty of an 18-month demotion.

The charges arose from his role as the lead investigator into the sudden death of an Indigenous man, where he prematurely concluded the death was non-criminal and failed to conduct a basic investigation.

The Commission found the Hearing Officer's conclusions reasonable, including the finding that the Appellant's deficient investigation was rooted in racial bias and stereotypes.

The appeal was dismissed and the findings and penalty were confirmed.

The applicants, a First Nation and its former Chief, brought an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) and (h) seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the Environmental Assessment Act and the Crown's Duty to Consult and Accommodate.

The application arose in the context of the proposed Marten Falls Community Access Road in the Ring of Fire region.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite legislation or provide a de facto reference on how the Crown should discharge its duty in the future without a live factual dispute.

The court held that the application did not raise a justiciable issue and was not properly brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The complainants sought leave to appeal the penalty imposed on a police officer who was found guilty of neglect of duty and discreditable conduct regarding his investigation into the sudden death of an Indigenous man.

The officer had been demoted for 18 months and ordered to complete cultural competency training.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the issues raised regarding the appropriate penalty and the consideration of the Indigenous community's perspective were of significant importance to the policing profession and the community at large.

The appellant, R.W. (Brad) Blair, appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against Premier Doug Ford, which was dismissed under an anti-SLAPP motion (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

Ford cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Blair's appeal, upholding the dismissal of the defamation action, and allowed Ford's cross-appeal in part regarding the timing of costs payment, making the full award immediately payable.

The court also quashed appeals from preliminary interlocutory orders due to lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants, landlords of student housing, appealed the dismissal of their claims for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, Charter violations, and bad faith against fire prevention officers and the City of Windsor.

The claims arose after the appellants were charged with Fire Code violations for operating their properties as lodging houses, which charges were later withdrawn or acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the fire prevention officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges, did not conduct a negligent investigation, and did not act with malice.

The court also dismissed the Papic appellants' additional claims related to property development delays, finding them to be policy decisions or lacking legal basis.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the defendant sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that full indemnity was not appropriate because the action was not a SLAPP suit, and instead awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

Noting that both parties engaged in an unnecessary 'deep dive' into the evidence, the court fixed the costs at $130,000 all-inclusive, payable in two installments.

The plaintiff, former interim Commissioner of the OPP, brought a defamation action against the Premier of Ontario over public statements alleging the plaintiff breached the Police Services Act.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff could not show that the defence of fair comment had no real prospect of success, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the public interest in permitting the action to continue.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

The applicant brought a motion to expedite the hearing of his application, which sought a determination of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to review the hiring process for the next OPP Commissioner.

The applicant argued urgency based on public concern and the potential compromise of the OPP's integrity if the new Commissioner assumed his role before the review.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no urgency that justified displacing other scheduled matters, noting that the Ombudsman's authority is limited to reporting and cannot prevent the appointment.

The police defendants in a civil action arising from a criminal sexual assault acquittal moved to seal materials filed in support of their summary judgment motion.

The media sought intervenor status to oppose the sealing order.

The court granted the media intervenor status and dismissed the motion to seal, finding the police defendants failed to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test to overcome the open court principle.

The court confirmed the criminal publication ban protecting the complainant's identity remained in force and ordered the use of initials in pleadings.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind turbine project, the successful respondent sought costs of $20,000.

The appellant argued no costs should be awarded as he was a public interest litigant and the appeal raised a novel issue.

The Divisional Court rejected these arguments, noting that private landowners challenging REAs are not public interest litigants and the appeal did not raise a novel issue.

The court fixed costs payable by the appellant to the respondent at $10,000.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal confirming the director's issuance of renewable energy approvals for two wind turbine projects.

They argued that section 145.2.1 of the Environmental Protection Act requires a two-step process shifting the onus to the approval-holder, that the tribunal erred in rejecting the material contribution test for causation, and that they were denied procedural fairness when an adjournment was refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statute imposes a single onus on the appellants to prove harm, the material contribution test was properly rejected, and the tribunal reasonably exercised its discretion in denying the adjournment.

The appellants sought to appeal an October 1 order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order in question was interlocutory.

Under the Courts of Justice Act, the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of interlocutory orders.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction with no order as to costs.

The plaintiff commenced a professional negligence action in Small Claims Court.

The deputy judge dismissed the claim under r. 12.02 for failure to produce formal expert reports.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, finding the dismissal was a denial of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that under Westerhof v. Gee Estate, treating physicians can provide expert opinion evidence without formal reports, and this principle applies equally to Small Claims Court proceedings to ensure accessible justice.

The appellant appealed a Renewable Energy Approval granted to the approval holder for a wind facility.

At a preliminary hearing, the Environmental Review Tribunal considered unopposed requests for participant and presenter status from various individuals and organizations.

The Tribunal granted participant status to a conservation authority and a local resident, and presenter status to a naturalist group and a citizens' coalition.

The Tribunal also issued procedural directions and a schedule for the proceeding.

The Appellant appealed a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) issued for a 5-turbine wind facility, arguing it would cause serious harm to human health and serious and irreversible harm to the natural environment, and that the REA process violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Tribunal reviewed extensive expert evidence on wind turbine noise, infrasound, and health impacts, concluding the Appellant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the project would cause serious harm to human health.

The Tribunal also found no Charter violation due to the lack of an evidentiary foundation for serious physical or psychological harm.

Finally, the Tribunal rejected the environmental claims, finding the project would not cause serious and irreversible harm to bird species at risk or their habitat.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant in a renewable energy approval appeal brought a motion seeking disclosure of the complete Species At Risk Report submitted by the approval holder to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry.

The approval holder had only disclosed redacted portions it deemed relevant to the appellant's proposed expert evidence.

The Environmental Review Tribunal ordered the disclosure of the report in its entirety, finding it potentially relevant to the appeal.

However, to protect species at risk, the Tribunal ordered that the report be marked confidential and its disclosure limited to the parties' counsel and expert witnesses.

Following the discontinuance of a counterclaim against one of several defendants, the moving party sought recovery of litigation costs incurred defending the claim.

The court applied the justified action test governing costs after discontinuance under Rule 23.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondents provided no affidavit or evidentiary record demonstrating a bona fide cause of action or justification for commencing the claim against the moving party.

While the court accepted that some costs were incurred as a result of being named in the action, the bill of costs did not clearly identify work performed solely for that defendant.

Exercising its discretion under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court awarded a modest fixed amount of costs.