Kristen Emily Dearlove

The court considered whether the plaintiff, Cory McGrath, sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision, as required by the "threshold" in section 267.5(15) of the Insurance Act.

After a jury trial and detailed review of the evidence, including expert and lay testimony, the court found that Ms. McGrath met the threshold, entitling her to recover health care expenses and non-pecuniary loss.

The decision provides a thorough application of the statutory and regulatory framework, and the relevant case law, to the facts of the case.

An employee of a daycare facility operated by the appellant municipality sustained a workplace injury from a slip and fall on a wet floor.

The municipality leased the daycare space from the respondent school board.

The school board was sued and brought a third party claim against the municipality, seeking a declaration that the municipality must defend and indemnify it under the terms of their commercial lease.

The motion judge ordered the municipality to defend and indemnify the school board.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the interpretation of the lease provisions governing insurance obligations and indemnification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the municipality's obligation to maintain comprehensive general liability insurance constituted an assumption of the relevant risk of loss, and that the lease provisions, read together, clearly allocated the risk to the municipality.

The police defendants in a civil action arising from a criminal sexual assault acquittal moved to seal materials filed in support of their summary judgment motion.

The media sought intervenor status to oppose the sealing order.

The court granted the media intervenor status and dismissed the motion to seal, finding the police defendants failed to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test to overcome the open court principle.

The court confirmed the criminal publication ban protecting the complainant's identity remained in force and ordered the use of initials in pleadings.

The defendant, The Corporation of the County of Essex, brought a motion requesting the plaintiff, Josef Stonehouse, attend a further neuropsychological assessment and for raw test data from the plaintiff's neuropsychologist.

The court denied the motion, finding that leave was required under Rule 48.04(1) as the trial record had been filed and parties had previously agreed they were ready for trial.

Even if leave were granted, the defendant failed to establish the necessity of the further examination, having made a strategic decision to delay and not comply with previous timetables, and considering potential prejudice and "practice effects" on the plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Belleville Police respondents for false arrest and false imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for possession of stolen property, and that the police were not required to accept the appellants' innocent explanation before laying charges.

The Court also agreed that the intentional tort claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date of arrest, and that summary judgment was appropriate as the liability of the Belleville respondents was severable from the other defendants.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The police defendants brought two motions: one to exclude the public from the court hearing pursuant to s. 135(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and another to seal the file pursuant to s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Both motions were dismissed.

The court noted that the defendants could seek public exclusion on a hearing-by-hearing basis to address concerns over the release of personal and identifying information of complainants and minor witnesses.

Material for a future summary judgment motion (Rule 20) may be sealed upon filing, subject to the motion judge's discretion.

Costs were reserved.

The plaintiff, a minor who suffered severe abuse by his biological parents, brought a civil action against various parties, including the police and CAS, alleging negligence in failing to protect him.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 30.10 seeking production of the complete Crown Brief from the Ministry of the Attorney General and the police.

The court dismissed the motion against the Crown, noting the police already possessed the brief.

The court found the motion against the police was improperly brought under Rule 30.10 as they were parties, but proceeded to determine relevance under Rule 30.06.

The court held that the contents of the Crown Brief were relevant to what the police knew or ought to have known prior to the final assault, and declared the material producible.